In what appears to be an unprecedented action (at least if it stands), a federal judge has expunged the concededly valid conviction of a woman he sentenced 13 years before, whose difficulties in finding and keeping employment evidently moved him to take extraordinary measures.  In Doe v. United States, Judge John Gleeson (EDNY) commented on the “excessive and counterproductive” employment consequences of old convictions:

Doe’s criminal record has prevented her from working, paying taxes, and caring for her family, and it poses a constant threat to her ability to remain a law-abiding member of society. It has forced her to rely on public assistance when she has the desire and the ability to work. Nearly two decades have passed since her minor, nonviolent offense. There is no justification for continuing to impose this disability on her. I sentenced her to five years of probation supervision, not to a lifetime of unemployment.

The opinion begins like this:

Jane Doe filed an application on October 30, 2014, asking me to expunge her thirteen-year old fraud conviction because of the undue hardship it has created for her in getting – and especially keeping – jobs. Doe gets hired to fill home health aide and similar positions only to be fired when her employers learn through subsequent background checks about her conviction. Since the conviction was for health care fraud, it’s hard to blame those employers for using the conviction as a proxy for Doe’s unsuitability.

However, even if one believes, as I do, that employers are generally entitled to know about the past convictions of job applicants, and that their decisions based on those convictions are entitled to deference, there will nevertheless be cases in which all reasonable employers would conclude that the conviction is no longer a meaningful consideration in determining suitability for employment if only they had the time and the resources to conduct a thorough investigation of the applicant or employee.

I have conducted such an investigation, and this is one of those cases. In addition to presiding over the trial in Doe’s case and her subsequent sentencing, I have reviewed every page of the extensive file that was created during her five years under probation supervision. I conclude that the public’s interest in Doe being an employed, contributing member of society so far outweighs its interest in her conviction being a matter of public record that the motion is granted and her conviction is expunged.

It ends like this:

In my research into relief from collateral consequences for those with federal convictions, I have not come across another case in which a federal court expunged the record of a valid conviction and was upheld on appeal.  Indeed, few federal courts are willing to expunge even an arrest record under circumstances similar to those described by Judge Gleeson.

While applauding the result in this case on policy grounds, and commending Judge Gleeson for his courage and compassion, I think it almost certain that the government will appeal and, if past is prologue, will probably prevail.

But at the very least the decision calls attention to the President’s miserable record of pardoning and the absence of any other relief for those with federal convictions.  And, it makes all the more pressing the case for Congress to grant courts explicit authority to grant expungement or other relief in cases like Ms. Doe’s.  More and more states are realizing that they must address the social and economic problems created by the collateral consequences of arrest and conviction.  It is high time for the federal government to do so as well.