Category: Caselaw

PA high court will again review sex offender registration

Two years ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court shook up long-settled orthodoxy by ruling that the state’s sex offender registration law, otherwise known as SORNA (Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act) was punishment. The case, Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2018), presented the Court with two questions: whether people who committed their crimes before the adoption of the law could continue to be registered without running afoul of the state Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, a fairness doctrine that prevents governments from retroactively applying greater punishments to conduct than could have been applied at the time of the crime; and, second, whether the law more broadly violates due process by unfairly labeling a person as sexually dangerous without first proving that fact and without giving the person an opportunity to challenge that message. While the Court answered the first question with a resounding yes, it punted on the second.

The effect of that decision meant that although Pennsylvania was forced to reduce the length of registration for many people who had committed their crimes many years before, or in many cases remove them from the registry altogether, it did little to change how the law would be applied moving forward.  SORNA was largely left undisturbed for the roughly 1500 new people added to the registry every year.  The due process issue left undecided by the Pennsylvania high court in Muniz is now again before that court, and this time it will be harder to avoid deciding it.

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WA lifetime ban on childcare work held unconstitutional

On February 21, 2019, the Washington State Supreme Court declared that a state regulation imposing a lifetime ban from ever obtaining a childcare license, or having unsupervised access to children in childcare, is unconstitutional as applied to Chrystal Fields.  The lifetime ban was triggered by Ms. Fields’ 1988 attempted second degree robbery conviction for trying to grab a woman’s purse in front of a drugstore.  (The licensing agency has a list of 50 permanently disqualifying convictions, one of which is robbery; an attempted offense is treated the same as a completed offense.)  The court held that the licensing agency’s failure to conduct an individualized determination of Ms. Fields’ qualifications violated her federal right to due process.  Fields v. Dep’t of Early Learning, No. 95024-5 (Wash. Feb. 21, 2019).  The full decision is available here.  A brief discussion of the case follows.

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UK Supreme Court issues major ruling on employer access to criminal records

On January 30, 2019, the UK Supreme Court issued a significant decision largely upholding the UK’s categorical rules for when criminal records are disclosed to employers, but declaring two key rules incompatible with privacy rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.  The first rule in question, the so-called multiple conviction rule, automatically requires people who have more than one conviction to disclose all prior convictions on “standard” and “enhanced” records checks.  (As explained below, the UK disclosure scheme provides for three levels of checks, depending on the nature of the employment involved, the two specified being the more in-depth.)  The second rule requires that certain youth reprimands and warnings—administered without an admission or determination of criminal charges—be disclosed on both types of checks.  CCRC contributor Alessandro Corda posted about this case this past July when it was being considered by the court and Christopher Stacey, co-director of a charity organization that intervened in the case, who attended the three days of hearings, provided guest commentary.

The decision has significant implications for the employability of people with criminal records in the UK and could offer policy lessons for the US.  It is therefore worth discussing in some detail.

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Sex offender registration litigation: punishment and free speech

In the past week, there were two notable developments regarding the constitutionality of state sex offender registration schemes.

First, as noted by Douglas A. Berman at Sentencing Law and Policy, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed highly significant amicus briefs in two Michigan Supreme Court cases, “arguing that Michigan’s sex offender registration and notification requirements are punishment because they are so burdensome and fail to distinguish between dangerous offenders and those who are not a threat to the community.”  Both of the Michigan cases involve constitutional challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause to the retroactive application of the state registration requirement.  Michigan v Snyder, No. 153696; People v. Betts, No. 148981.

In the second development, U.S. District Judge W. Keith Watkins of the Middle District of Alabama on Monday held that Alabama’s sex offender registration law (“ASORCNA”) violates the First Amendment by branding state-issued ID cards with “CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER” and imposing extensive internet-use reporting requirements.  Doe v. Marshall, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW (M.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2019).  This case presents an interesting twist on the now-vulnerable theory espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court and many states that sex offender registration is not “punishment.”

These two caselaw developments are discussed further below.

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Lawsuit challenges PA good-character requirement for cosmetologists

The Institute for Justice has filed a lawsuit on behalf of two women who were denied a license by the Pennsylvania Board of Cosmetology based on their criminal record, because they could not establish the necessary “good moral character.”  The IJ lawsuit illustrates the continuing difficulties faced by people with a past conviction in the workplace even when they are qualified and fully rehabilitated.  At the same time, in recent years Pennsylvania courts have not looked kindly on conviction-based employment bars, and last summer a board appointed by Governor Tom Wolf to review occupational licensing in the state issued a report critical of the good-character requirement in many licensing laws.  So perhaps the tide is turning.   

A piece in Forbes by IJ’s Andrew Wimer describes the case of Amanda Spillane, one of the two plaintiffs in the lawsuit:  As a teenager, Amanda started using drugs to self-medicate for mental health issues. Eventually, she turned to burglary to support her habit. She was caught, convicted and spent two years in a state correctional facility.  In prison, she overcame her addiction to drugs and found a new faith. After release, with help from family, she remained clean and worked a fast food job, before deciding to improve her prospects by taking a course to become an esthetician (a cosmetologist who focuses on the face), which required 300 hours of instruction and cost about $6,000.  In applying for a license, Amanda did not expect her past to be an issue; she knew cosmetology was a skill taught to women in prison.  But the Board of Cosmetology informed her that she lacked the requisite “good moral character” for licensure because of her criminal record. When she appealed, a board official “questioned whether her faith was real, demanded proof that Amanda gave regularly to charity, and asked why the people who had provided letters of recommendation had not traveled the two hours to the hearing to testify in person.”  Her appeal was denied.

On December 12, 2018, IJ filed suit on behalf of Amanda and Courtney Haveman—another Pennsylvania woman similarly rejected for a license—challenging the Pennsylvania law that requires applicants for esthetician, nail technician, and natural-hair barber licenses to “be of good moral character.”  Click here to read the complaint.  

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Landmark criminal record disclosure case in the UK Supreme Court

Court litigation and policy debate revolving around the issue of criminal record disclosure are not unique to the United States. Especially in the United Kingdom, the past few years have witnessed important court decisions on the legal framework in place regulating access to criminal history information and the amount of information that can be obtained by third parties. For people with criminal records in the United Kingdom, last month was pretty significant.  This is why I am very happy to post on the CCRC blog a commentary on recent litigation before the UK Supreme Court authored by Christopher Stacey, co-director of Unlock, an independent charity organization that provides a voice and support for people with convictions who are facing stigma and obstacles because of their criminal record. Christopher last month led Unlock’s intervention before the UK Supreme Court. They put forward strong arguments on behalf of those who are unfairly affected by the criminal records disclosure regime.

Before discussing the case, let me briefly summarize the framework of the disclosure regime currently in place in the UK.  This regime and the ongoing court litigation should be particularly interesting to advocates and lawmakers in the U.S. who are working to reform their own regimes.

Following the adoption of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act in 1974, adult and juvenile convictions automatically become “spent” after the passage of a certain amount of “rehabilitation” time following completion of the sentence if the punishment imposed in court did not exceed a certain threshold provided for by the law (currently, a custodial sentence of over four years). Convictions triggering a custodial sentence of more than four years can never become spent.  Required periods of post-sentence rehabilitation before a conviction is considered spent currently range from one to seven years for adult convictions, and from six months to three and a half years for juvenile offenses.  There is no rehabilitation period before criminal records not resulting in conviction are considered spent.

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Justice Gorsuch on collateral consequences and due process

In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), Justice Gorsuch provided the essential fifth vote to affirm a finding that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act was too vague to be applied in a deportation case. The residual clause defined a “crime of violence” as including “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” A crime constituting a crime of violence was deemed an “aggravated felony” requiring deportation and rendering a non-citizen ineligible for almost all forms of relief.

Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion contains at least two points important for the law of collateral consequences.  First, he is much more concerned with the seriousness of the deprivation rather than its categorization as civil or criminal when evaluating how much process is required under the Constitution.  Unimpressed with the line of cases that treated deportation as quasi-criminal, he notes:

grave as that penalty may be, I cannot see why we would single it out for special treatment when (again) so many civil laws today impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Why, for example, would due process require Congress to speak more clearly when it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien than when it wishes to subject a citizen to indefinite civil commitment, strip him of a business license essential to his family’s living, or confiscate his home? I can think of no good answer.

Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch J., concurring).1

His solution is to level up the process due (in this case, the necessary degree of specificity required of statutory provisions) in civil cases, rather than level down criminal protections: “any suggestion that criminal cases warrant a heightened standard of review does more to persuade me that the criminal standard should be set above our precedent’s current threshold than to suggest the civil standard should be buried below it.” Id. at 1229.

A second interesting point is his guidance for legislatures about how penalty clauses like the one at issue could be drafted.  He notes that “the statute here fails to specify which crimes qualify for [the label of crime of violence],” id. at 1231, and that “Congress remains free at any time to add more crimes to its list.” Id. at 1233.  Many collateral consequence provisions, among other statutes, have the character of the provision voided here: they disqualify based on a quite general description of the crimes that give rise to the consequence (e.g., crimes involving dishonesty), and ask courts or agencies to evaluate specific offenses one at a time to determine whether they fit the categorical criteria.  Only after that process of evaluation do we know whether the consequence applies.

Instead of courts or agencies guessing what legislatures had in mind, it would be perfectly practical instead for Congress and state legislatures, when drafting the law in the first instance, to go item by item through the criminal codes, actually determine whether specific provisions should result in disqualification, and provide a list of those triggering crimes in the statute creating the consequence.  This is the approach of a recent Kansas statute.  If Justice Gorsuch is right that the Constitution is structured to “ensure fair notice before any deprivation of life, liberty, or property could take place,” id. at 1228, this cataloging effort does not seem like too much to ask.

 

Civil death lives!

The first and foremost collateral consequence in Colonial America was civil death; based on the grim fact that felonies were punished by execution, upon conviction, the law began to wrap up the convict’s affairs.  As the law developed, capital punishment ceased to be the default punishment, and civil death was seen as too harsh for a felon who might serve a probationary sentence instead of being executed or even going to prison at all.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court recently issued an opinion demonstrating that this ancient doctrine is not entirely obsolete.

In Gallup v. Adult Correctional Institutions, the court upheld dismissal of a complaint alleging that the state negligently allowed the plaintiff, a prisoner serving life, to be assaulted by another inmate.  The court pointed to the state’s civil death statute, which applies to prisoners serving life in an adult correctional institution. Such persons “shall, with respect to all rights of property, to the bond of matrimony and to all civil rights and relations of any nature whatsoever, be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death had taken place at the time of conviction.”  Of U.S. jurisdictions, only Rhode Island, New York, and the Virgin Islands maintain civil death, and New York’s statute has many exceptions.  There is, accordingly, not much modern law on the scope of civil death statutes.

One wonders whether the Rhode Island statute could really extend to the full scope of its language; could a lifer be denied, for example, freedom of religion and speech under the U.S. and/or Rhode Island constitutions?  Suggesting that the answer is “no” is the fact that the court granted the plaintiff leave to plead a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on the same underlying facts; the court recognized that a state statute cannot eliminate federal rights.

That acknowledgement raises the hard question of the extent to which the federal Constitution protects the property, right to marry, and “civil rights and relations” of even a person serving a life sentence.

NJ high court bars retroactive application of Megan’s Law

The New Jersey Supreme Court on Wednesday held 2014 amendments to Megan’s Law enhancing certain penalties for sex offenders who violate parole requirements unenforceable against four defendants based on the ex post facto clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. The court, in a unanimous ruling, vacated the convictions and sentences of four paroled sex offenders who committed minor violations of their parole conditions and mounted a challenge to the laws. The ruling vacates the individuals’ third-degree convictions for the parole violations.
“A law that retroactively increases or makes more burdensome the punishment of a crime is an ex post facto law,” wrote Justice Barry Albin for the court. “The Amendment, therefore, is an ex post facto law that violates our Federal and State Constitutions as applied to defendants.”  The four sex offenders—Melvin Hester, Mark Warner, Linwood Roundtree and Anthony McKinney—after completing their sentences for the original crimes, were placed on community supervision for life, according to the decision. That means that they must register their addresses with local law enforcement, and inform law enforcement if they change their addresses.  Those registration requirements were enacted by the state Legislature in 1994 after a 7-year-old Hamilton Township girl, Megan Kanka, was sexually assaulted and murdered by a convicted sex offender, Jesse Timmendequas, who was living in her neighborhood. The requirements that paroled sex offenders register their whereabouts later became federal law.

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Florida’s vote restoration process held unconstitutional

In a strongly-worded opinion, a federal judge has ruled that Florida’s method of restoring voting rights to individuals convicted of felonies violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  In Hand v. Scott, a suit brought by seven individuals either denied restoration of rights by the State Clemency Board or ineligible to apply, U.S. District Judge Mark E. Walker held that Florida’s “arbitrary” and “crushingly restrictive” restoration scheme, in which “elected, partisan officials have extraordinary authority to grant or withhold the right to vote from hundreds of thousands of people without any constraints, guidelines, or standards,” violates rights of free speech and association, and risks viewpoint and other discrimination.

As reported in this local press article, Governor Scott’s office issued a statement late Thursday, hinting at an appeal.  Scott was the principal architect of the current system that requires all applicants for clemency to wait at least five years after they complete their sentences, serve probation and pay all restitution, before they may be considered for restoration of the vote and other civil rights.  Throughout his 43-page ruling, Judge Walker cited the arbitrariness of Florida’s system, noting that people have been denied their voting rights because they received speeding tickets or failed to pay child support.

Scott and the Cabinet, meeting as a clemency board, consider cases four times a year, and usually fewer than 100 cases each time. It can take a decade or longer for a case to be heard, and at present the state has a backlog of more than 10,000 cases. Scott imposed the restrictions in 2011, soon after he was elected, with the support of three fellow Republicans who serve on the Cabinet, including Agriculture Commissioner Adam Putnam, now a leading candidate for governor. Scott’s actions in 2011 reversed a policy under which many felons, not including murderers and sex offenders, had their rights restored without application process and hearings. That streamlined process was instituted in 2007 by former Gov. Charlie Crist, then a Republican and now a Democratic member of Congress.

The context in which the case was decided is described in this NPR article.  Last month, Florida elections officials approved a November ballot measure that would automatically restore voting rights to people convicted of felonies who have completed their sentences, with exceptions for murder and serious sex offenses.

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