UK Supreme Court issues major ruling on employer access to criminal records

On January 30, 2019, the UK Supreme Court issued a significant decision largely upholding the UK’s categorical rules for when criminal records are disclosed to employers, but declaring two key rules incompatible with privacy rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.  The first rule in question, the so-called multiple conviction rule, automatically requires people who have more than one conviction to disclose all prior convictions on “standard” and “enhanced” records checks.  (As explained below, the UK disclosure scheme provides for three levels of checks, depending on the nature of the employment involved, the two specified being the more in-depth.)  The second rule requires that certain youth reprimands and warnings—administered without an admission or determination of criminal charges—be disclosed on both types of checks.  CCRC contributor Alessandro Corda posted about this case this past July when it was being considered by the court and Christopher Stacey, co-director of a charity organization that intervened in the case, who attended the three days of hearings, provided guest commentary.

The decision has significant implications for the employability of people with criminal records in the UK and could offer policy lessons for the US.  It is therefore worth discussing in some detail.

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Sex offender registration litigation: punishment and free speech

In the past week, there were two notable developments regarding the constitutionality of state sex offender registration schemes.

First, as noted by Douglas A. Berman at Sentencing Law and Policy, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed highly significant amicus briefs in two Michigan Supreme Court cases, “arguing that Michigan’s sex offender registration and notification requirements are punishment because they are so burdensome and fail to distinguish between dangerous offenders and those who are not a threat to the community.”  Both of the Michigan cases involve constitutional challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause to the retroactive application of the state registration requirement.  Michigan v Snyder, No. 153696; People v. Betts, No. 148981.

In the second development, U.S. District Judge W. Keith Watkins of the Middle District of Alabama on Monday held that Alabama’s sex offender registration law (“ASORCNA”) violates the First Amendment by branding state-issued ID cards with “CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER” and imposing extensive internet-use reporting requirements.  Doe v. Marshall, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW (M.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2019).  This case presents an interesting twist on the now-vulnerable theory espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court and many states that sex offender registration is not “punishment.”

These two caselaw developments are discussed further below.

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“Executive Clemency in the United States”

This is the title of CCRC Executive Director Margaret Love’s new article for the Oxford Research Encyclopedia.  The article describes the historic role played by the executive pardon power in reducing punishments (including collateral ones) and explains clemency’s diminished vitality and reliability in modern times in most states and in the federal system.  Love concludes that “[i]t appears unlikely that an unregulated and unrestrained executive power will ever be restored to its former justice-enhancing role, so that those concerned about fairness and proportionality in criminal punishments must engage in the more demanding work of democratic reform.”

Here’s the abstract:

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Federal farm bill legalizes hemp, but bars participation based on criminal record

In the past six years, almost every state has taken at least some steps to chip away at the negative effects of a criminal record on a person’s ability to achieve employment, housing, education and public benefits, and participation in civil society.  In stark contrast, Congress has not dealt with the problem of reintegration for more than a decade—either by reducing federal collateral consequences or by restoring rights to people with federal convictions.  The new farm bill continues this trend.

Enacted on December 20, 2018, the bill puts in place a new regulatory regime for the legalized cultivation and sale of hemp, a variety of the cannabis plant grown for industrial uses.  At the same time, the bill adds a new collateral consequence to federal law (which already has more than a thousand): anyone convicted of a drug-related felony may not participate in legalized hemp production for 10 years after their date of conviction, unless they are part of a hemp pilot program authorized by the 2014 farm bill.  An earlier version of the farm bill would have banned people with drug-related felony convictions from participating in hemp production for life, so the final bill is somewhat more progressive.

This new restriction reflects and contributes to an ongoing practice in which many jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana have excluded people with marijuana convictions from participating in this booming new industry.  Moving in the other direction, some jurisdictions such as California and Massachusetts—recognizing racial disparities and other injustices of the war on drugs—have enacted policies to clear marijuana convictions, allocate marijuana tax revenue to communities disproportionately affected by past drug policies, and encourage full participation in legalized marijuana industries by members of disproportionately affected communities.

“Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement”

This is the title of an important new article by Professor Beth Colgan, forthcoming in the Vanderbilt Law Review, in which she documents how inability to pay economic sanctions associated with a criminal conviction (such as fines, fees and restitution) results in continuing disenfranchisement nationwide.  While the law in almost every state now restores the vote to those convicted of felonies no later than completion of sentence, and while fewer than a dozen states explicitly condition re-enfranchisement upon payment of court-imposed debt, Colgan shows how the link between re-infranchisement and conditions of supervision “significantly expands the authorization of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement across the country.”  Through a detailed analysis of interrelated laws, rules, policies and practices, including those related to conditions of probation and parole, she establishes that “wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is authorized in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.”

After describing the mechanisms of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement, Colgan offers a legal theory for “dismantling” them.  She argues that courts have looked at these mechanisms “through the wrong frame—the right to vote—when the proper frame is through the lens of punishment.”  Applying the doctrine developed in cases restricting governmental action that would result in disparate treatment between rich and poor in criminal justice practices, she concludes that wealth-based penal disenfranchisement violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

The article’s abstract follows:

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