Category: Due process

WA lifetime ban on childcare work held unconstitutional

On February 21, 2019, the Washington State Supreme Court declared that a state regulation imposing a lifetime ban from ever obtaining a childcare license, or having unsupervised access to children in childcare, is unconstitutional as applied to Chrystal Fields.  The lifetime ban was triggered by Ms. Fields’ 1988 attempted second degree robbery conviction for trying to grab a woman’s purse in front of a drugstore.  (The licensing agency has a list of 50 permanently disqualifying convictions, one of which is robbery; an attempted offense is treated the same as a completed offense.)  The court held that the licensing agency’s failure to conduct an individualized determination of Ms. Fields’ qualifications violated her federal right to due process.  Fields v. Dep’t of Early Learning, No. 95024-5 (Wash. Feb. 21, 2019).  The full decision is available here.  A brief discussion of the case follows.

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Sex offender registration litigation: punishment and free speech

In the past week, there were two notable developments regarding the constitutionality of state sex offender registration schemes. First, as noted by Douglas A. Berman at Sentencing Law and Policy, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed highly significant amicus briefs in two Michigan Supreme Court cases, “arguing that Michigan’s sex offender registration and notification requirements are punishment because they are so burdensome and fail to distinguish between dangerous offenders and those who are not a threat to the community.”  Both of the Michigan cases involve constitutional challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause to the retroactive application of the state registration requirement.  Michigan v Snyder, No. 153696; People v. Betts, No. 148981. In the second development, U.S. District Judge W. Keith Watkins of the Middle District of Alabama on Monday held that Alabama’s sex offender registration law (“ASORCNA”) violates the First Amendment by branding state-issued ID cards with “CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER” and imposing extensive internet-use reporting requirements.  Doe v. Marshall, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW (M.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2019).  This case presents an interesting twist on the now-vulnerable theory espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court and many states that sex offender registration is not “punishment.” These two caselaw developments are discussed further below.

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“Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement”

This is the title of an important new article by Professor Beth Colgan, forthcoming in the Vanderbilt Law Review, in which she documents how inability to pay economic sanctions associated with a criminal conviction (such as fines, fees and restitution) results in continuing disenfranchisement nationwide.  While the law in almost every state now restores the vote to those convicted of felonies no later than completion of sentence, and while fewer than a dozen states explicitly condition re-enfranchisement upon payment of court-imposed debt, Colgan shows how the link between re-infranchisement and conditions of supervision “significantly expands the authorization of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement across the country.”  Through a detailed analysis of interrelated laws, rules, policies and practices, including those related to conditions of probation and parole, she establishes that “wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is authorized in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.” After describing the mechanisms of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement, Colgan offers a legal theory for “dismantling” them.  She argues that courts have looked at these mechanisms “through the wrong frame—the right to vote—when the proper frame is through the lens of punishment.”  Applying the doctrine developed in cases restricting governmental action that would result in disparate treatment between rich and poor […]

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Lawsuit challenges PA good-character requirement for cosmetologists

The Institute for Justice has filed a lawsuit on behalf of two women who were denied a license by the Pennsylvania Board of Cosmetology based on their criminal record, because they could not establish the necessary “good moral character.”  The IJ lawsuit illustrates the continuing difficulties faced by people with a past conviction in the workplace even when they are qualified and fully rehabilitated.  At the same time, in recent years Pennsylvania courts have not looked kindly on conviction-based employment bars, and last summer a board appointed by Governor Tom Wolf to review occupational licensing in the state issued a report critical of the good-character requirement in many licensing laws.  So perhaps the tide is turning.    A piece in Forbes by IJ’s Andrew Wimer describes the case of Amanda Spillane, one of the two plaintiffs in the lawsuit:  As a teenager, Amanda started using drugs to self-medicate for mental health issues. Eventually, she turned to burglary to support her habit. She was caught, convicted and spent two years in a state correctional facility.  In prison, she overcame her addiction to drugs and found a new faith. After release, with help from family, she remained clean and worked a fast food […]

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Justice Gorsuch on collateral consequences and due process

In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), Justice Gorsuch provided the essential fifth vote to affirm a finding that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act was too vague to be applied in a deportation case. The residual clause defined a “crime of violence” as including “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” A crime constituting a crime of violence was deemed an “aggravated felony” requiring deportation and rendering a non-citizen ineligible for almost all forms of relief. Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion contains at least two points important for the law of collateral consequences.  First, he is much more concerned with the seriousness of the deprivation rather than its categorization as civil or criminal when evaluating how much process is required under the Constitution.  Unimpressed with the line of cases that treated deportation as quasi-criminal, he notes: grave as that penalty may be, I cannot see why we would single it out for special treatment when (again) so many civil laws today impose so many similarly severe […]

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