Tag: Washington Post

Study reveals potential for racial bias in presidential pardon process

Last week the RAND Corporation published its long-awaited Statistical Analysis of Presidential Pardons, commissioned in 2012 by the Bureau of Justice Statistics to determine whether the Justice Department process for deciding who to recommend for a presidential pardon is tainted with “systematic” racial bias. The RAND study appears to have been a direct response to an investigative report published jointly in December 2011 by ProPublica and the Washington Post, which concluded based on an examination of pardon cases granted and denied during the administration of George W. Bush, that race was “one of the strongest predictors of a pardon.” Specifically, the ProPublica study concluded that “White criminals seeking presidential pardons over the past decade have been nearly four times as likely to succeed as minorities” while “Blacks have had the poorest chance” of receiving a pardon. In a 224-page statistical analysis of how pardon petitions were evaluated by the Office of the Pardon Attorney (OPA) between 2001 and 2012, the RAND researchers “[did] not find statistically significant evidence that there are racial differences in the rates at which black and white petitioners receive [favorable] pardon recommendations.” (Note that sentence commutations were not a part of the RAND study.)  At the same time, there was also “no question that non-Hispanic white petitioners as a group were more likely to receive a pardon than did black petitioners.” The apparent contradiction between these two statements can be explained by the fact that white applicants were statistically more likely to satisfy the formal standards that apply to OPA decisions about which cases to recommend for pardon, suggesting that either the formal standards need revision or the pool of applicants needs to be expanded, or both. To this point, the RAND researchers appeared troubled by the extent to which subjective lifestyle criteria influence the evaluation of pardon petitions under governing policies: “There may well be specific instances, both within our study time frame and without, where conscious or unconscious bias on the part of a member of OPA’s staff influenced the ultimate outcome of a petition, either for or against a grant of pardon.” This would appear to be an understatement. The composite profile of a successful pardon applicant that RAND describes, based on its examination of hundreds of OPA casefiles, is a U.S.-born white man in his mid-50s, who committed a white-collar crime in his late 20s and had no criminal activity before or after the conviction, who pled guilty and was sentenced to probation, and who applied for a pardon more than 20 years after he was sentenced. Steady employment, stable family life, charitable activity, military service, recommendations from public officials, and assistance by legal counsel were also found to be statistically valid predictors of success. The least successful composite petitioner was “a non-Hispanic black female who was not a U.S. citizen by birth and was in her late thirties when the underlying offense (a firearms-related crime) was committed,” who (inter alia) had “indications in her case file of criminal activity both before and after the conviction,” who had experienced financial and employment instability, who “was likely seeking clemency for the purpose of obtaining or restoring a professional license,” and whose character references came predominantly from family members. The RAND researchers conclude the following about what sort of person was most likely to get a favorable recommendation from OPA during the period 2001-2012: [T]he takeaway here is that a petition has the best chance for success when the petitioner has led a fairly ordinary life other than in regard to a single brush with the law, received only modest sanctions when sentenced and served it without incident, never experienced financial or behavioral troubles, had a stable family and employment history, waited decades before seeking executive clemency, and had a criminal justice experience benign enough so that those who prosecuted his case or were responsible for his pretrial evaluation had little concern over a grant of pardon. To be fair, the subjective criteria applied by OPA are all but dictated by the standards for consideration of pardon applications set forth in the Justice Manual, which have not changed for many years. They require an assessment of “post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation,” as well as “seriousness and relative recentness of the offense,” and “acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and atonement.”  “Need for relief” is described in the standards in terms of mandatory restrictions like those in statutes applicable to bonding and licensing. The degree to which “conscious or unconscious bias” might influence application of these standards in particular cases would be particularly hard for an outsider to gauge given the highly opaque and even secretive OPA process, which the report says “mirrors to some degree the inquisitorial system utilized in civil law countries.” But in this case the statistics don’t lie. Other interesting (though not surprising) statistics gleaned from the RAND report are: Fully a third of petitioners were seeking pardon to regain their firearms rights Only 5.6% of petitioners deemed eligible after OPA’s initial winnowing process were ultimately recommended favorably for pardon The U.S. Attorney supported pardon in only 9.5% of the cases in which that official’s views were sought, an investigative step that occurred late in the review process after the applicant had survived all earlier stages, and this official’s recommendation was given “great weight” in OPA’s final recommendation (confirming concerns about the negative influence of federal prosecutors on pardon recommendations) It took an average of more than four years to produce a favorable Justice Department recommendation, and more than half of this time was consumed by requests to OPA from officials in the Deputy Attorney General’s office for more information or a different recommendation (confirming concerns about heavy-handed oversight by political appointees) A favorable pardon decision was more likely during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration than during the first four years of the Obama administration. The RAND researchers attribute “the difference in the findings between our study and ProPublica’s . . . to the fact that both studies utilized relatively small samples of pardons granted.”  They acknowledge that their small sample size may have skewed the results in other ways, noting that the review they had initially planned of 1500 case files had to be reduced to fewer than 300 cases as a result of the announcement of the Obama Clemency Initiative in 2014, which forced an end to its review of pardon casefiles and halted all processing of pardon applications for 18 months. The RAND report acknowledges the overrepresentation of white petitioners in absolute numbers compared to Black and Hispanic pardon seekers, and cites the possible deterrent effect of so much detailed instructional information on the OPA website. While the report opines that the application form itself should be relatively easy to fill out, its authors may have had in mind the profile of the successful pardon applicant, rather than someone with a lot of potentially damaging and dated information to disclose, such as prior and subsequent criminal record, employment history, drug use and treatment, mental health consultations, financial issues, etc. In any event, it recommends encouraging criminal defense attorneys to inform their clients about the possibility of petitioning for a pardon, and assisting petitioners through providing free clemency clinics and expanding programs like Obama’s 2014 clemency initiative to address this racial imbalance. Finally, in what may be the most disturbing finding for the Biden Administration, the RAND report observes that OPA appears to be struggling to manage a growing case backlog despite having had its attorney staff augmented during the Obama years. OPA appears to be having increased difficulty in keeping up with the incoming pardon caseload. As of the beginning of June 2018, over 2,000 pardon petitions were classified as pending, but for most years prior to 2016, the pending caseload was no more than half that amount. Since June 2018, in part because of President Trump’s deliberate neglect of the regular pardon process, the backlog of pending pardon petitions has grown to more than 3,000 cases, some of which have been pending for more than a decade, while the commutation caseload now exceeds 12,000 cases. The RAND report expresses concern that this overwhelming caseload may increase the time it takes to process a pardon application, which it characterizes as already “long and drawn-out.” Indeed, it suggests that an intractable backlog could continue to grow given the hundreds of thousands of individuals who are eligible to apply for pardon, particularly if they are “motivated to apply under the belief that a more receptive ear currently resides in the White House.”  The report does not suggest alternative ways of dealing with the caseload, such as shortcutting the investigative process or increasing administrative case closures, as much as conceding that such efficiency measures would have racially skewed results. But in accepting a backlog of pardon cases as inevitable and likely to grow larger, particularly if the president stirs up interest by granting pardons, the RAND report fails to recognize that the primary problem with the pardon process today is not structural racism or a slow-moving bureaucracy or even antagonistic federal prosecutors (though all three contribute to the dysfunction of that process). The primary problem is that the federal criminal legal system relies too heavily on an extraordinary power of the presidency to perform tasks that are essentially routine. While the states have been busy expanding their courts’ authority to restore rights and opportunities to people with state convictions, Congress has done nothing to provide alternative statutory relief mechanisms to people with federal convictions. This has left the president solely responsible for implementing the important public policy of facilitating reintegration, armed only with a personal constitutional power that is notoriously unfair and that cannot be delegated. It also leaves a great deal of power in the hands of unaccountable staffers. Addressing this untenable situation must be the work of the Biden Administration and Congress in the next few years. Happily, if past is prologue, it is likely to have an unusual degree of bipartisan support. A forthcoming issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, which I had the privilege of guest editing, contains essays discussing the impact on the regular pardon process of Donald Trump’s irregular use of the pardon power, proposing ways in which the president’s power can be used more fairly and efficiently, and suggesting how it may be supplemented by statutory remedies. The issue will be described in this space when it is published at the end of this month. The RAND report can be accessed here.       Read more

CCRC in the Post: Protesting should not result in a lifelong record

CCRC’s Margaret Love and David Schlussel published an op-ed in the Washington Post on Monday: “Protesting should not result in a lifelong criminal record.”  The piece begins: Sparked by the killing of George Floyd on May 25, protesters across the country have been demonstrating against police violence and racism. As of June 4, the Associated Press tallied more than 10,000 arrests during and after protests, and the number has surely increased. Most of those arrested will almost certainly be released without charges or have their charges dropped. Others will face charges and may be convicted. Regardless of the outcome, the mere fact of an arrest will leave a person with a criminal record in most states, creating long-term barriers to employment and housing, and in other areas of daily life. Protesters should not wind up with a lifelong criminal record. States should provide for automatic expungement of records that do not result in a conviction, particularly where the government does not even bring charges. States should also expand the availability of relief for convictions. . . . . Our research indicates that automatic or expedited expungement of many non-conviction records is available in 15 states, thanks to recent reforms. Thirty-three additional states expunge or seal certain non-conviction records, but only after a person completes a court or administrative process, often with restrictive eligibility requirements and burdensome procedures, including waiting periods and even contested hearings. Ironically, in most of these states it is harder to seal the record of an uncharged arrest, which does not find its way into a court document, than to seal charges that are dismissed or acquitted. The District of Columbia, a center of the protest movement, has one of the most restrictive record-sealing laws in the country, and certainly the most complicated. Two states, Arizona and Wisconsin, do not expunge non-conviction records at all, and there is no statutory authority to expunge federal arrest records. Most states allow some convictions to be sealed, but eligibility criteria and procedural requirements tend to be restrictive. Fortunately, legislative trends favor automatic expungement of non-conviction and minor conviction records in a growing number of states. In the wake of the current protests, lawmakers should accelerate this process. . . . . Read the full op-ed here or in today’s print edition. Read more

Administration withdraws proposal to require federal job-seekers to disclose diversions

The Washington Post reports that the White House has directed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to drop its proposal to expand the types of criminal records that must be disclosed by applicants seeking federal jobs and contracting work.  OPM’s proposal, which we described in March, would have required applicants for federal jobs and contracting work to disclose participation in pretrial diversion programs in the last 7 years. In March, we launched our non-conviction records project, a major study of the public availability and use of non-conviction records – including arrests that are never charged, charges that are dismissed, deferred and diversionary dispositions, and acquittals.  The appearance of these records in background checks can lead to significant discrimination against people who have never been convicted of a crime, and result unfairly in barriers to employment, housing, education, and many other opportunities.  Our letter opposing the OPM proposal cited our research on diversions and pointed out that while “state lawmakers, judges, and prosecutors favor diversionary dispositions in appropriate cases to help people avoid the restrictions and stigma of a conviction, OPM’s proposal disfavors them by treating them like convictions.” We are pleased to see the administration quash this ill-advised proposal, in the face of opposition from advocates on the left and right, lawmakers from both parties, and prosecutors and public defenders.  At a time of growing consensus in Congress and the states about the need to prioritize rehabilitation and reintegration for individuals with a criminal record, the federal government should be moving to reduce the collateral consequences of diversion (as Indiana and Wisconsin did in 2018 when they prohibited licensing boards from considering arrests not resulting in conviction, or California and Nevada did in 2017 when they prohibited employers from considering an applicant’s successful completion of diversion). While every state legislature has in some way addressed the problem of reintegration since 2012, Congress has not enacted any laws dealing with the problems presented by collateral consequences for more than a decade.  Now is the time for federal action in support of reintegration, as the withdrawal of the OPM proposal evidently recognizes. Read more

“Justice Alito’s misleading claim about sex offender rearrests”

The title of this post is the Washington Post’s “Fact Checker’s” assessment of a statement in Justice Alito’s concurrence in Packingham v. North Carolina about the recidivism rates of sex offenders.  We reprint excerpts because of the importance of the issue to the Supreme Court’s collateral consequences jurisprudence: “Repeat sex offenders pose an especially grave risk to children. ‘When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.’” –Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., concurring opinion in Packingham v. North Carolina, June 19, 2017 . . . . . The Fact Checker normally doesn’t fact-check Supreme Court justices, and we certainly do not fact-check opinions. But the topic of sex offender recidivism is worth clarifying because it is often misconstrued, so we found Alito’s claim newsworthy. And this specific claim is an assertion of fact, rather than the justices’ actual opinion. What do the data show? The Facts There are many limitations in recidivism data for sex offenders, so it’s difficult to use rearrest rates to accurately measure their threat to public safety. Many sex offenses are not reported to police, so there are problems of underreporting. Rearrests are not the same as reconvictions or reincarceration, and researchers are inconsistent in their method of calculating recidivism. (This Department of Justice report offers a detailed look at limitations in sex offender recidivism data.) Sex offenders have a relatively low rate of committing the same sex crime after being released from prison. Yet policymakers often base policies on rearrest rates or the fear that sex offenders are more likely than other convicted criminals to commit the same crime after release. Alito’s claim in this opinion reflects a common misrepresentation of sex offender recidivism. Alito quotes a sentence from an opinion by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in the 2002 case McKune v. Lile: “When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” There are two citations. The first is a reference in McKune to a 1997 Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) report on recidivism among prisoners released in 11 states in 1983. The report found: “Released rapists were 10.5 times more likely than nonrapists to have a subsequent arrest for rape. Prisoners who had served time for other sexual assaults were 7.5 times more likely than those who had not served time for sexual assault to be arrested for a new sexual assault.” The second citation is a 2013 Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Kebodeaux, which cites an updated version of the 1997 report. This report, published in 2003 using data from 1994, is considered one of the most comprehensive studies on sex offender recidivism. The 2013 opinion cites the report’s finding that released sex offenders were four times more likely to be rearrested for a sex crime than non-sex offenders, and 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested for a sex crime within three years after release. When you dig into the data, it’s clear Alito has fallen for an apples-and-oranges comparison — one that unfairly compares sex offenders to non-sex offenders. The 5.3 percent figure represents 517 of the 9,691 released sex offenders in 1994. But that’s measured against a much larger pool of 262,420 non-sex offenders, of whom 1.3 percent were arrested for a sex crime. On the surface, comparing 1.3 percent to 5.3 percent makes it seem like sex offenders are four times more likely to commit a sex crime after release. But the 1.3 percent represents 3,328 of 262,420 released non-sex offenders. So out of the total of 3,845 people arrested post-release on sex crimes, 13 percent were prior sex offenders. Moreover, this comparison doesn’t tell you much about the dangers posed by sex offenders after release. “The broad majority of all rearrests for all offenders are not for new sex offenses, so we would be better off looking at recidivism rates generally, and not just for new sex offenses,” said Marc Mauer, executive director of the Sentencing Project. “For example, if 90 percent of the rearrests of sex offenders were for homicide, that’s clearly very important and would outweigh the relatively modest proportion of new arrests for a sex offense.” The rate of getting rearrested for the same crime is lowest among sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders, with the exception of people convicted of homicide. The most recent prisoner recidivism data are in a 2014 BJS study of 404,648 prisoners released in 30 states in 2005. It shows the percentage of all prisoners who were arrested for the same type of crime within five years of release. Here’s a breakdown (the corresponding percentages match the order of the bolded figures in the first bullet point): Homicide: Among released prisoners whose most serious crime was homicide, 2.1 percent were rearrested for the same crime (homicide); 51.2 percent were arrested for any violent or property offense. Rape or sexual assault: 5.6 percent; 60.1 percent. Robbery: 13.1 percent; 77 percent. Assault: 34.4 percent; 77.1 percent. Burglary: 23.2 percent; 81.8 percent. Larceny/motor vehicle theft: 41.4 percent; 84.1 percent. Fraud/forgery: 29.7 percent; 77 percent. Drug: 51.2 percent; 76.9 percent. Most post-release arrest charges for prisoners released on rape or sexual assault involved property offenses or assault — not sex offenses. This is not the first time that questionable interpretation of sex offender recidivism statistics found its way to a Supreme Court opinion. Kennedy wrote in his McKune opinion: “The rate of recidivism of untreated offenders has been estimated to be as high as 80 percent.” This traces back to one 1986 article in Psychology Today that had no research to back it up. Yet the 80 percent statistic even made its way to the Packingham case, and was included in an argument by a lawyer defending the North Carolina law. [Adam Liptak’s article commenting on the questionable validity of the argument made by counsel for North Carolina at oral argument is here.] Ira Ellman, law professor at the University of California-Berkeley’s Center for the Study of Law and Society, wrote a detailed examination of the 80 percent figure. He wrote: “The label ‘sex offender’ triggers fear, and disgust as well. Both responses breed beliefs that do not yield easily to facts. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has fed the fear. It’s become the ‘go to’ source that courts and politicians rely upon for ‘facts’ about sex offender recidivism rates that aren’t true.” Ellman also was critical of Alito’s use of recidivism statistics in the Packingham opinion: “Where’s he getting his social science? From an old judicial opinion.” A spokeswoman for the Supreme Court said: “As a matter of policy the Court does not comment on its opinions, which speak for themselves.” The Pinocchio Test The reference to sex offender rearrest trends in Alito’s opinion is quite misleading. It measures the likelihood of sex offenders to be arrested for sex crimes after release from prison, and compares it to the likelihood of non-sex offenders to be arrested for sex crimes after release. This makes it seem like recidivism among sex offenders to be a uniquely bad problem, but it is an apples-to-oranges comparison. This opinion cites previous opinions that use outdated data going back to the 1980s — more than 30 years ago. Moreover, it obscures the fact according to 2005 data, the percentage of sex offenders getting rearrested for the same crime is low compared to non-sex offenders, with the exception of people convicted of homicide. It does the public no service when the Supreme Court justices make a misleading characterization like this. We award Three Pinocchios. Three Pinocchios       Read more