Tag: jury

New 2019 laws restore voting rights in 11 states

This is the first in a series of comments describing some of the 153 laws passed in 2019 restoring rights or delivering record relief in various ways.  The full report on 2019 laws is available here. Restoration of Civil Rights Voting  In 2019, eleven states took steps to restore the right to vote and to expand awareness of voting eligibility.  Our experience is that many people convicted of a felony believe they are disqualified from voting when they are not:  almost every state restores voting rights automatically to most convicted individuals at some point, if they are even disenfranchised to begin with. The most significant new re-enfranchisement laws were enacted in Colorado, Nevada and New Jersey, where convicted individuals are now eligible to vote except when actually incarcerated.  Colorado restored the vote to persons on parole supervision, while Nevada revised its complex system for restoring civil rights so that all people with felony convictions may now vote except while in prison.  In one of the final legislative acts of 2019, New Jersey’s governor signed a law limiting disenfranchisement to a period of actual incarceration, even in cases where a court has ordered loss of the vote for election law violations, immediately restoring the vote to 80,000 people.  These three states joined the two states (New York and Louisiana) that in 2018 took steps to limit disenfranchisement to a period of incarceration:  New York’s governor issued the first of a series of executive orders under his pardon power restoring the vote to individuals on parole, and Louisiana passed a law allowing people to register if they have been out of prison for at least five years. Now, only three of the 19 states that disenfranchise only those sentenced to prison still extend ineligibility through completion of parole:  California, Connecticut, and Idaho.  Bills under consideration in 2019 in both California and Connecticut would allow people to vote once they leave prison, though in California this will require a constitutional amendment. Kentucky saw perhaps the most dramatic extension of the franchise in 2019, when its incoming governor Andy Beshear issued an executive order restoring the vote and eligibility for office to an estimated 140,000 individuals convicted of non-violent felonies who had completed their sentences.  Before the order, individuals were required to petition the governor individually to obtain restoration of their voting rights.  (Governor Beshear’s father had issued a similar order in 2015 at the end of his own term as governor, but it was revoked by his successor.)  Iowa is now the only state that does not restore the vote automatically to most convicted individuals at some point. Other states took less dramatic but nonetheless significant steps in 2019 to expand the franchise.  Arizona repealed its law making automatic restoration of the vote to those with no more than one felony conviction depend on payment of fines and fees (those who owe restitution must still apply to the court, like recidivists, to regain their voting rights).  (See below for Arizona’s revision of its firearms restoration laws.)  Arkansas corrected an unintended gap in its election law that made it hard for juveniles prosecuted as adults to regain the right to vote.  Oklahoma revised its laws to clarify that voting rights are lost upon conviction of a felony and are restored upon completion of sentence. Four states (Colorado, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Washington) enacted laws directing corrections officials to inform people leaving custody of their eligibility to register, addressing the pervasive public misunderstanding that the right to vote is permanently lost by conviction.  Illinois’ two new laws on this subject also facilitate voting by mail for eligible persons detained in county jails, and provide for peer-led programs to teach civics to prisoners who are soon to be released.   Florida is the only state that took steps during the year to restrict rather than enlarge the franchise, in the wake of that state’s restoration of the franchise in 2018, by ballot initiative, to more than a million state residents who had completed their court-imposed sentences.  That ballot initiative automatically restored the right to vote for people convicted of felonies, other than murder or sexual offenses, upon “completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.”  In 2019, the Florida legislature passed a law interpreting “completion of sentence” to include payment of fines, fees, and court costs.  The 2019 legislation defines “completion of all terms of sentence” to include all legal financial obligations (LFOs).  The Florida Supreme Court recently agreed in an advisory opinion that Amendment 4’s reference to “completion of all terms of sentence” does include all legal financial obligation imposed in conjunction with a sentence. Nonetheless, individuals and supporters of Amendment 4 have brought several federal court challenges to the legislation as violating the U.S. constitution, arguing that by disqualifying persons with outstanding LFOs, even if a person has no ability to pay and even if the court has converted an LFO to a civil lien, the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  They also argue that the law burdens the fundamental right to vote, is an unconstitutional poll tax, infringes on free speech and association, and was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose.  In October, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Florida cannot deny the plaintiffs their “right to vote so long as the state’s only reason for denying the vote is failure to pay an amount the plaintiff is genuinely unable to pay.”  However, that ruling only applies to 17 plaintiffs in the case, and the judge deferred addressing a number of other issues until after trial later this year, giving the legislature an opportunity to address inability to pay.  The coalition behind Amendment 4 is also raising money to help people pay off their debts.  One of the knotty problems associated with efforts to re-enfranchise Florida residents is the uneven state of court records in the state, such that inconsistent and missing records can make it difficult for individuals to show that they have in fact fully satisfied financial penalties associated with criminal cases. In the broader national picture, at the conclusion of 2019 almost half the states allow people with a felony conviction to vote if they are living in the free community.  A total of 18 states and the District of Columbia now allow people to vote unless in prison, Louisiana allows voting five years after release, and Maine and Vermont do not disenfranchise anyone based on conviction.  Of the remaining states, a majority restore the vote automatically upon completion of sentence, which may or may not also require payment of court debt.  However, a significant minority of states require at least some individuals (recidivists, persons convicted of specific offenses, or those who owe court debt) to file individual petitions with the governor or a court to regain the right to vote. The coming year should see additional developments in Florida regarding restoration for those with unpaid fines, fees, or restitution.  This is turn could have ramifications for the half dozen additional states that impose similar financial barriers to the franchise.           2.  Jury eligibility and public office Three other measures to restore civil rights for jury service and public office are worth mentioning.  California passed a statute restoring eligibility for trial jury service upon completion of sentence (previously a pardon was necessary).  Maryland also lowered its conviction-related bar to jury eligibility.  Previously, people were ineligible to serve on a jury if they had received a sentence of more than six months of imprisonment, and were not pardoned, or had a pending charge for an offense punishable by more than six months imprisonment; under the new law, these six-month periods are extended to one year. Finally, New Hampshire revised its law disqualifying people with a conviction from holding public office, making the restriction applicable only during actual incarceration, so that it is now coincident with the period of felony disenfranchisement (this limit on disenfranchisement to only during actual incarceration has been in place in the Granite State since 1965).         3.  Firearms restoration Arizona revised its law on firearms restoration to authorize the sentencing court to restore rights to most people with felony offenses two years after completion of sentence.  (Note that the automatic restoration of civil rights for offenses does not include restoration of firearms rights.)  People convicted of “serious” offenses must wait 10 years, and those convicted of “dangerous” offenses are ineligible for restoration. SB 2080. Read more

California becomes third state to adopt “clean slate” record relief

On October 8, Governor Newsom signed into law AB 1076, the so-called “Clean Slate Act,” authorizing automatic record relief in the form of set-aside or sealing for individuals with certain convictions and arrests under California law.  The new law supplements but does not supplant the existing system of petition-based relief, and applies to convictions and arrests occurring after the bill’s effective date of January 1, 2021.  Eligibility for automatic relief under the new law is similar to but not precisely coincident with eligibility under existing law.  The new law also for the first time prohibits courts and the state repository from disclosing information about conviction records that have been granted relief, except where specifically authorized, whether under the new automatic process or the older petition-based system. California is now the third state to adopt general “clean slate” record relief, after Pennsylvania (2018) and Utah (2019).  While the automatic feature of the new law has prospective effect only, its limits on disclosure will, when effective, apply to all conviction records that have at any time been dismissed or set aside, whether automatically or by petition, as well as to all arrests and other non-conviction records that have been sealed.  The specific features of AB 1076 are described in detail in the following comment posted on October 3. Governor Newsom also on October 8 signed two other bills that affect collateral consequences:  SB 310 amends Section 203 of California’s Code of Civil Procedure to make people convicted of a felony eligible to serve of a trial jury unless incarcerated or under supervision, or required to register as a sex offender based upon a felony conviction; and AB 1394 repeals a law requiring that juveniles pay a fee to have their records sealed. California poised to become third state to adopt “clean slate” record relief October 3, 2019 On September 23, the California legislature sent AB 1076 to California Governor Gavin Newsom, who has until October 13 to sign or veto this potentially transformative legislation.  If enacted, AB 1076 would make California the third state (after Pennsylvania (2018) and Utah (2019)) to authorize “clean slate” record relief, a direction to authorities to seal certain arrest and conviction records automatically. (Illinois, New York, and California have enacted automatic relief for certain marijuana convictions, and several states have automatic relief for non-convictions.)  The specific provisions are described generally below, and more fully after the break. AB 1076 would not modify eligibility for relief under California’s existing petition-based scheme of judicial remedies for people with criminal records, primarily via dismissal and set-aside for convictions and sealing for non-conviction records.  Rather, effective January 1, 2021, it would create a new automatic process obviating the requirement of an individually-filed petition or motion in most cases.  Eligibility for relief under this new automatic process would be similar but not identical to eligibility under the existing petition-based process, both for convictions and for non-convictions.  If this bill is signed into law, California would break new ground in becoming the first state to extend automatic “clean slate” relief to felony convictions (other than for marijuana possession). A less-noted but significant feature of AB 1076 is its expansion of the effect of relief for conviction records:  it provides for non-disclosure of records of convictions that have been dismissed or set aside, whether automatically or by petition, and makes this provision applicable both to court records (effective February 1, 2021) and to records in the state repository (effective January 1, 2021), except in certain specified circumstances where disclosure is mandated by law.  As it is, and notwithstanding the widespread use of the term “expungement” to describe its general relief scheme for convictions, California has no law authorizing limits on public access to most conviction records, whether held by the court or by the state repository.  This would change in 2021, if this law is enacted.  (Most non-conviction records are now eligible for sealing by petition under California law.)  Note that, like most state repositories, California’s repository permits disclosure only to government agencies and specified private entities, so that the new limits apply within the class of otherwise authorized repository users. The sponsors of AB 1076 emphasize that making relief automatic without the need for individual action will significantly reduce “barriers to employment and housing opportunities for millions of Californians.”  They point to the key findings of J.J. Prescott and Sonja Starr’s 2019 study of record-sealing in Michigan: 1) people who had their conviction records sealed tended to have improved employment outcomes and lower recidivism rates than the general population; but 2) only a small percentage (6.5%) of those individuals eligible for set-aside and sealing actually applied, likely because of the complexity and burdens of filing a petition for relief with the court.  While no comparable study has been done for California, experience with that state’s marijuana-sealing law suggests that the low “take-up” rate is similar to the one Prescott and Starr found in Michigan. If California’s new law is enacted, beginning in 2021 the state will automatically grant relief for many arrests not resulting in conviction, for infraction and misdemeanor convictions, and for some less serious felony convictions.  For eligible non-convictions—misdemeanor and some felony arrests—sealing will become automatic.  (However, a significant set of felony arrests not leading to conviction are excluded, as discussed below, although most of these dispositions remain eligible for petition-based relief.)  For eligible convictions, dismissal and set-aside will be automatic provided that a number of additional eligibility requirements are satisfied, including that a person must not be required to register as a sex offender, or be currently subject to prosecution, supervision, or incarceration for any offense.  Prosecutors and probation officers may object to automatic conviction relief in individual cases on “based on a showing that granting such relief would pose a substantial threat to the public safety,” and such an objection may be tested in a court hearing. A major shortcoming of AB 1076 — in contrast to the “clean slate” laws enacted in Pennsylvania and Utah—is that its automatic relief is prospective only.  That is, relief is automatic only for arrests and convictions occurring after the law’s effective date.  Those with arrests and convictions occurring before 2021 would still have to apply to the court for relief.  Though the original bill had applied retroactively, the Assembly amended the bill to exclude arrests and convictions occurring before January 1, 1973, and then the Senate further amended it to exclude those occurring before January 1, 2021.  Presumably these changes were based on financial and logistical considerations.  The annual cost for the California Department of Justice (DOJ) and courts to carry out the final bill is estimated to total between about $2 and $5 million each year.  Moreover, the bill’s effective date, January 1, 2021, is specifically subject to an appropriation in the annual budget, and the State’s Department of Justice has indicated it “would need the implementation date to be delayed to July 1, 2023 for proper implementation.”  Despite challenges in implementation, we hope that, as the new automated system is developed, it will be feasible to extend relief to records predating 2021. Of course, as noted, the provisions providing for non-disclosure of conviction records would apply to all cases dismissed or set-aside, without regard to when or by what process this relief was granted. We will now describe in detail California’s clean slate legislation, which would add two new sections to the Penal Code, 851.93 and 1203.425, dealing with arrests and convictions, respectively, and amend the section of the Penal Code that deals with state records systems, 11105. Arrests A person arrested on or after January 1, 2021, is eligible for automatic relief if any of the following is true: The arrest was for a misdemeanor and either the charge was dismissed, the person was acquitted of any charges, or at least 1 year has elapsed since the arrest and there is no indication that criminal proceedings have been initiated; The arrest was for a felony punishable by imprisonment in county jail, and either the person was acquitted of any charges, or at least 3 years have elapsed since the arrest and there is no indication that criminal proceedings have been initiated; or The person successfully completed one of various specified diversion programs. Cal. Penal Code section 851.93.  (Note: this excludes an arrest for a felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison and dismissed cases where the arrest was for for a felony punishable by imprisonment, unless the person successfully completed a specified diversion program.) The DOJ will be required to review the records in the statewide criminal justice databases on a monthly basis to identify persons with arrest records that are eligible for relief, and “shall grant relief” if such information is present in the records.  On a monthly basis, the DOJ must submit to the superior court a notice of all cases in that jurisdiction for which relief was granted.  The DOJ must annually publish statistics for each county regarding the total number of arrests granted relief and the percentage of arrests for which the state summary criminal history information does not include a disposition. Effect of relief Following relief, all state summary criminal history information in all statewide criminal databases “shall include” next to or below the entry “arrest relief granted,” and the date.  The arrest “is deemed not to have occurred, and a person who has been granted arrest relief is released from any penalties and disabilities resulting from the arrest, and may answer any question relating to that arrest accordingly,” except that relief does not affect: a person’s obligation to disclose an arrest in response to a direct question contained in a questionnaire or application for employment as a peace officer; the ability of a criminal justice agency to access and use records, or a district attorney to prosecute an offense within the applicable statute of limitations; a person’s authorization to own or possess a firearm; any prohibition from holding public office; or the authority to receive, or take adverse action based on, criminal history information or certified court records under various sections of the Health and Safety Code, or other provisions that incorporate those criteria. Starting on February 1, 2021, courts “shall not” disclose information concerning the arrest or case to any person or entity, in any format, except to the subject of the arrest, a criminal justice agency, or under one of the exceptions above. Convictions A person convicted on or after January 1, 2021, is eligible for automatic relief if otherwise eligible under existing law, and if each of the following conditions are also true: the person is not required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act; the person does not have an active record for local, state, or federal supervision; based on information in the DOJ record, it does not appear that the person is currently serving a sentence for any offense and there is no indication of pending criminal charges; and there is no indication that the conviction resulted in a sentence of incarceration in state prison, and either: (1) the defendant was sentenced to probation, and, based on DOJ’s records, appears to have completed probation without revocation; or (2) the defendant was convicted of an infraction or misdemeanor, was not granted probation, and, based on DOJ’s records, appears to have completed their sentence, and at least 1 year has elapsed since the judgment. Cal. Penal Code section 1203.425.  Nonetheless, even if a person is eligible, the prosecutor or probation department may file a petition to prohibit automatic relief “based on a showing that granting such relief would pose a substantial threat to the public safety.”  The petition must be filed by 90 days before eligibility, and the court must give notice to the defendant and conduct a hearing within 45 days.  (A person denied automatic relief can still petition for relief under existing law.) The DOJ will be required to review the records in the statewide criminal justice databases on a monthly basis to identify persons with conviction records that are eligible for relief, and “shall grant relief, including dismissal of a conviction,” if such information is present in the records, unless a petition to prohibit relief has been granted.  On a monthly basis, the DOJ must submit to the superior court a notice of all cases in that jurisdiction for which relief was granted.  The DOJ must annually publish statistics for each county regarding the total number of convictions granted and prohibited from automatic relief. Effect of relief Following relief, all state summary criminal history information in all statewide criminal databases “shall include” next to or below the entry “relief granted” and the date.  A person granted relief “shall be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which the person has been convicted,” except that the relief does not affect: the provisions of Section 13555 of the Vehicle Code; the obligation to disclose a criminal conviction in response to a direct question contained in a questionnaire or application for employment as a peace officer, public office, or for contracting with the California State Lottery Commission; the ability of a criminal justice agency to access and use records; the jurisdiction of the court over a subsequently filed motion to amend the record, petition or motion for postconviction relief, or collaterally attack a conviction; a person’s authorization to own or possess any firearm; a prohibition from holding public office; the authority to receive, or take adverse action based on, criminal history information or certified court records under various sections of the Health and Safety Code, or other provisions that incorporate those criteria; eligibility to provide, or receive payment for providing, in-home supportive services; or pleading and proof of the prior conviction in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant. Starting on February 1, 2021, courts “shall not” disclose information concerning the conviction to any person or entity, except to the person granted relief, to a criminal justice agency, or under one of the exceptions above.  In addition, a sentencing court “shall advise” a defendant of the provisions of this section, as well as the defendant’s right, if any, to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. Finally, by amendments to Cal. Penal Code section 11105(p)(2)(A) that are effective January 1, 2021, the state records repository system is prohibited from disclosing conviction records that have been dismissed or set aside, whether automatically or by petition, in response to certain requests for background information to be used for employment, licensing or certification.  Exceptions in existing law where background checks are authorized by law apply (including law enforcement employment, health care licensure, and a variety of other authorized situations). When effective, these non-disclosure provisions apply without regard to when or by what process relief was granted. Both sections of the clean slate law make clear that they do not limit any petitions, motions, or orders for relief authorized or required under existing law. Read more

Should potentially severe collateral consequences trigger enhanced procedural protections?

In two recent law review articles, Professor Paul T. Crane of the University of Richmond School of Law proposes that courts and legislators—when deciding whether a criminal defendant is entitled to a particular procedural right—should take into account potential exposure to severe collateral consequences.  The two articles together mark a major contribution to the literature.  Much attention has focused on alleviating or eliminating collateral consequences after the criminal case is closed, via restoration of rights, clemency, expungement, and other forms of relief.  Also, lawmakers, courts, and prosecutors have increasingly turned to diversions and deferred adjudications to avoid a conviction record in the first instance.  However, far less attention has been paid to the procedural rights provided to criminal defendants facing potentially severe collateral consequences.  As Crane points out, collateral consequences are “generally deemed irrelevant for determining what procedural safeguards must be afforded.” In Crane’s first article, he argues that courts and legislatures ought to take into account a defendant’s exposure to potentially severe collateral consequences in determining whether procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and to a jury trial, apply.  In his second article, he proposes a framework for determining when defendants may be entitled to enhanced procedural protections. It bears noting that scholars have closely examined whether and when a defendant represented by counsel must receive advice about collateral consequences, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky (holding that “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation”).  However, counsel obligations only apply if a defendant has counsel to begin with, and collateral consequences have been considered irrelevant to whether the constitutional right to counsel applies. Crane’s 2016 article, “Charging on the Margins,” examines how, since the 1990s, prosecutors’ charging decisions have been influenced by the extension of severe collateral consequences (such as sex offender registration, mandatory deportation, and firearm dispossession) to misdemeanors.  Crane explores how prosecutors seeking to induce a particular collateral or indirect consequence might opt to charge a misdemeanor rather than a felony, thereby avoiding important procedural protections available only in felony prosecutions.  In a word, since a misdemeanor conviction is cheaper, faster, and easier to secure, it makes sense to take this route if the specific collateral consequence is the prosecutor’s primary objective. Currently, felony defendants receive heightened procedural safeguards such as rights to a grand jury, preliminary hearing, increased discovery, counsel, and jury trial—rights that misdemeanor defendants are often denied.  Some rights are simply unavailable to misdemeanor defendants (i.e. grand juries and preliminary hearings) whereas others depend on the degree of direct punishment (i.e. only misdemeanor defendants who are actually imprisoned have a federal constitutional right to counsel).  Crane proposes in his first article that the indirect, but sometimes more severe, statutory consequences of conviction should be factored into the suite of procedural rights provided to a criminal defendant in a given case. Professor Crane’s newest article, titled “Incorporating Collateral Consequences into Criminal Procedure,” follows up on the tantalizing proposition advanced in his earlier article by setting forth a holistic and practical three-step framework for determining what procedural rights are due to a defendant based on the collateral consequences that may follow from conviction.  The first step of the proposed approach involves determining the rationale for a particular procedural protection and how it is allocated.  The second step examines which collateral consequences should be considered as potentially triggering the procedural right at issue (considering how a consequence is imposed; to whom it applies; and whether it is mandatory or discretionary).  The third step involves deciding whether a particular consequence is sufficiently severe to trigger the procedural protection. Crane applies his framework to two hallmark procedural protections: the right to counsel and to a jury trial.  Carrying out the three-part analysis, he concludes that defendants who would not be entitled to counsel based on direct consequences, should nonetheless be entitled to counsel based on potential collateral consequences if they face either: a mandatory collateral consequence that he posits is the functional equivalent of at least one day imprisonment (e.g., automatic firearm dispossession, disqualification from certain public benefits); or a potential collateral consequence that is the functional equivalent of more than one year in prison (e.g., immigration consequences or sex offender registration).  Applying the three-step framework to jury trials, he argues that the right to a jury should be triggered by certain severe collateral consequences that are imposed by the sovereign prosecuting the offense (e.g., sex offender registration, firearm dispossession, and certain disqualifications from public benefits). This model would appear to achieve what Professor Crane hopes is a “theoretically coherent path forward that requires only modest adjustments to existing doctrines.”  But in many ways it would be a revolutionary departure from our present system of tying procedural rights to direct punishments, and open an entirely new way of thinking about what have historically been regarded as “civil” consequences of conviction.  If they are considered the type of penalties that trigger procedural entitlement, we are halfway to treating them as constitutional punishment. The abstract of the 2019 article, published in the Wake Forest Law Review (Vol. 54, No. 1, 2019) follows: A curious relationship currently exists between collateral consequences and criminal procedures. It is now widely accepted that collateral consequences are an integral component of the American criminal justice system. Such consequences shape the contours of many criminal cases, influencing what charges are brought by the government, the content of plea negotiations, the sentences imposed by trial judges, and the impact of criminal convictions on defendants. Yet, when it comes to the allocation of criminal procedures, collateral consequences continue to be treated as if they are external to the criminal justice process. Specifically, a conviction’s collateral consequences, no matter how severe, are typically treated as irrelevant when determining whether a defendant is entitled to a particular procedural protection. This Article examines that paradoxical relationship and, after identifying a previously overlooked reason for its existence, provides a framework for incorporating collateral consequences into criminal procedure. Heavily influenced by concerns of practicality and feasibility, the proposed methodology establishes a theoretically coherent path forward that requires only modest adjustments to existing doctrines. After setting forth the three-step framework, the Article applies its insights to the two most hallowed rights in our criminal justice system: the constitutional right to counsel and the constitutional right to a jury trial. The abstract of the 2016 article, published in the William & Mary Law Review (Vol. 57, p. 775), follows: The American criminal justice system has experienced a significant expansion in the number and severity of penalties triggered by misdemeanor convictions. In particular, legislatures have increasingly attached severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses penalties such as requirements to register as a sex offender, prohibitions on owning or possessing a firearm, and deportation. Although there is a wealth of scholarship studying the effect this development has on defendants and their attorneys, little attention has been paid to the impact collateral consequences have on prosecutorial incentives. This Article starts to remedy that gap by exploring the influence that collateral consequences exert on initial charging decisions in low-level prosecutions. Critically, the ability to impose certain collateral consequences through a misdemeanor conviction unlocks an array of additional charging options for prosecutors. As a result, prosecutors are now more likely to engage in a practice I term strategic undercharging. A prosecutor engages in strategic undercharging when she charges a lesser offense than she otherwise could, but does so for reasons that advance her own prosecutorial aims and not as an act of grace or leniency. In other words, prosecutors can sometimes gain more by charging less. By explaining why (and when) prosecutors are likely to engage in strategic undercharging, this Article complicates the conventional wisdom that prosecutors reflexively file the most severe charges available. This Article also proposes that collateral consequences be factored into the determination of what procedural safeguards are afforded a criminal defendant. Under existing law, collateral consequences are generally deemed irrelevant to that inquiry; the degree of procedural protection provided in a given case turns exclusively on the threatened term of incarceration. Changing this approach could have several salutary effects on the administration of collateral consequences. At a minimum, it would honor a basic principle underlying our criminal justice system: the threat of serious penalties warrants serious procedures. Read more