Tag: firearms

Updated North Carolina relief guide now available

At long last I have released the 2015 edition of my online guide to relief from a criminal conviction in North Carolina. This free guide, available here from the UNC School of Government, covers the various forms of relief available under North Carolina law, including expunctions, certificates of relief, petitions to restore firearm rights and terminate sex offender registration obligations, and other procedures. It includes changes made by the North Carolina General Assembly through the end of its 2015 legislative session. This edition of the guide is longer, reflecting the greater attention given by the North Carolina General Assembly to this area of law in recent years. North Carolina law now authorizes certificates of relief, patterned after the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act. North Carolina also has expanded the opportunities to obtain an expunction. Expunctions are now available for older nonviolent felony convictions. Recent statutory changes prohibit public and private employers and educational institutions from inquiring about expunged charges and convictions and, further, require government agencies to advise applicants that they have the right not to disclose expunged information. People still must meet precise statutory criteria to be eligible for relief, however. Although North Carolina courts granted approximately 13,000 expunctions of dismissals in fiscal year 2013–14, they granted about 700 expunctions of convictions and other matters. See 2014 Expunctions Report [NCAOC and DOJ Joint Report Pursuant to G.S. § 15A-160] (Sept. 1, 2014) (providing data on expunctions from 2008 to 2014). The guide is intended to help lawyers, judges, and others navigate this surprisingly complex area of law. The guide includes a brief explanation of each type of relief along with a table identifying the requirements for each. Another feature of the guide, thanks to the School’s new website, is that it automatically adjusts to the screen of any electronic device, including mobile phones. Live links to statutes, forms, and other resources appear throughout the guide. Also included is a link to our online Collateral Consequences Assessment Tool (C-CAT), a free electronic database on the collateral consequences of a conviction in North Carolina, updated through 2015. The guide addresses questions I have received since release of the previous edition, reflected in the body of the guide and in a longer section of frequently addressed questions. Because few expunction matters are appealed, many of these questions have not been addressed by the North Carolina appellate courts. For example, North Carolina law allows a court to continue a case permanently, without entering judgment, after a person has pled guilty or has been found guilty. This disposition, called a prayer for judgment continued or PJC, is intended to keep a person’s record free of a conviction; but, for many purposes, such as sentencing in a later case or employment licensing, the law treats a PJC as the equivalent of a conviction. Can a PJC be expunged under North Carolina law? Because of the absence of a final judgment, trial courts have been uncertain how to proceed. The guide contains a longer analysis here, but my short answer is yes, a PJC may be expunged under the same circumstance as a conviction. The language of the expunction statutes as well as the policy reasons behind them support this result. One benefit of an online publication is that it can be easily updated. Please feel free to contact me if you have questions not addressed in the guide or other information you wish to share. For people with prior criminal convictions who are trying to regain their footing, this is an area of law worth further consideration. Read more

President promises a more “open” pardon process, more pardon grants

During a Town Hall in South Carolina on March 6, President Obama spoke for the second time in recent weeks about his intention to use his pardon power more generously in the final two years of his term. Responding to a criminal defense attorney who asked what she could do to “increase the number of federal pardons,” the President explained that he was taking a “new approach” to pardons after receiving surprisingly few favorable recommendations from the Justice Department during his first term.  He said he had asked the Attorney General to “open up” the pardon process, and to work with advocacy groups and public defenders to make people more aware of the availability of this relief: [W]hen I came into office, for the first couple of years I noticed that I wasn’t really getting a lot of recommendations for pardons that — at least not as many as I would expect. And many of them were from older folks. A lot of them were people just looking for a pardon so they could restore their gun rights. But sort of the more typical cases that I would have expected weren’t coming up.   So I asked Attorney General Holder to work with me to set up a new office, or at least a new approach, inside the Justice Department. Because historically, what happened was the President would get a big stack of recommendations and then he could sign off on them — because obviously, I don’t have time to go through each request. And so what we’ve done now is open it up so that people are more aware of the process.  And what you can do is contact the Justice Department. But essentially, we’re now working with the NAACP, we’re working with various public defenders offices and community organizations just to make people aware that this is a process that you can go through. The President advised that “typically we have a pretty strict set of criteria for whether we would even consider you for a pardon or commutation,” and directed the inquirer to the Justice Department website where he said those criteria can be found. So my first suggestion would be to go to the Justice Department website.  If the person doesn’t qualify because they may have served time but there were problems when they served time, or if it was a particularly violent crime, or they may just not fit the criteria where we would consider it — a lot of what we’re focused on is non-violent drug offenses where somebody might have gotten 25 years, and she was the girlfriend of somebody and somehow got caught up, and since then has led an exemplary life, but now really wants to be able to start a new career or something like that.  That’s the kind of person, typically, that would get through the process. So, a couple of things about the President’s comments.  As in his BuzzFeed interview ten days ago, and as reported by Greg Korte in USA TODAY, the President seems genuinely willing to consider requests for full pardon from people who have completed their sentences and “led an exemplary life, but now really want[] to be able to start a new career.” This is good news. President Obama has taken a commendable interest in prisoner requests for sentence commutation, but his record of granting full pardons to date has been disappointing: Available statistics indicate that he has granted fewer full pardons than any full-term president since John Adams. On the other hand, the President’s “new approach” to handling clemency requests, and his promise of a more “open” pardon process seems so far not to have materialized.  In fact, the Justice Department’s pardon process appears to be more opaque and overburdened than ever before. This is largely because of the “clemency initiative” announced by the Attorney General in April of last year, which invited federal prisoners serving long prison terms to apply for commutation of sentence. Not surprisingly, many have accepted this invitation. The Washington Post reported on February 29 that “more than 35,000 inmates — about 16 percent of the federal prison population — have applied to have their sentences shortened under the Justice Department-led initiative,” either directly with the Office of the Pardon Attorney (OPA), or with the consortium of private organizations known as Clemency Project 2014.  Most of the applications are being processed through this private screening process.  The Post reports that “a complicated review process” has “slowed” the processing of this “massive influx of applications.”  After a full year, no grants have yet been made to applicants vetted by Clemency Project 2014, and according to the Post article it has to date submitted only 14 petitions to be considered for clemency. In addition to the thousands of prisoner petitions, more than 800 applications for full pardon have been filed with OPA, some of which have been fully investigated and awaiting disposition for some time.  While it is true (as the President said) that many pardon petitioners are interested in restoration of their firearms rights (there is no other way), or are simply seeking official recognition that they have paid their debt to society, many others are badly in need of relief from the harsh consequences of conviction in the workplace and in the community.   With DOJ resources and attention focused on commutation requests, pardon cases appear to have been put on the back burner, and the newly appointed Pardon Attorney has so far declined requests to meet or speak about this neglected aspect of her office’s workload. Never before in our history has the pardon power played a more important role in the justice system, and never before has the official pardon process seemed so dysfunctional.  It is understandable that the President would be reluctant to use an extraordinary constitutional power to address systemic problems with the legal system, but then one might expect to see him encourage legislative substitutes for pardon, such as the judicial certificates whose enactment in Illinois he himself secured a decade ago, or even the federal expungement proposal sponsored by Senators Cory Booker and Rand Paul.  The Justice Department has available to it statutory authority for seeking sentence reduction from the courts, but it has been unwilling to use it except for prisoners who are dying or completely disabled. President Obama’s comments expressing impatience with the output of the Justice Department’s pardon process are eerily reminiscent of President Bill Clinton’s comments expressing frustration with the pardon process shortly before the end of his term: I have done–I haven’t seen the final numbers, but before the last batch at least, I had done fewer than any President in almost 30 years. And part of that, frankly, is the way the system works, something I’m not entirely satisfied with.   The consequences of President Clinton’s dissatisfaction with the official pardon process at the end of his term are well known.  President Bush experienced a similar disappointment in the official process, and attempted to warn his successor.  George W. Bush, Decision Points 105 (2010)(““On the ride up Pennsylvania Avenue on Inauguration Day, I told Barack Obama about my frustrations with the pardon system. I gave him a suggestion: announce a pardon policy early on, and stick to it.”) Let us hope that there is still time before the end of his term for President Obama to get what he wants from the Justice Department’s pardon process, something Presidents Clinton and Bush were not able to do, or to put in place a substitute for it.  If past is prologue, this will not happen if the Justice Department is left to its own devices. Getting the Justice Department’s pardon process to deliver a substantial number of favorable recommendations, whether in commutation or pardon cases, will take direct hands-on intervention from the White House, by people who have an understanding of how the process can and should work to serve the presidency as well as the American public.  Otherwise, one can predict only a token number of commutation grants and a scrum of pardon favor-seekers outside the White House Counsel’s door in the final days of President Obama’s term.  He can’t say he wasn’t warned.     Read more

Putting teeth in Heller’s promise for people with a conviction: Second Amendment litigation round-up

Author, Alan Gura, describes in this post recent efforts to persuade federal courts that people who have lost their firearms rights by virtue of a criminal conviction may be entitled to claim the protections of the Second Amendment.  Alan himself has spearheaded this litigation for the Second Amendment Foundation, following up his Supreme Court victories in D.C. v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago.   While successes have to date involved civil rights actions in behalf of people with dated non-violent convictions, these precedents may eventually find their way into felon-in-possession and related prosecutions. They also may portend, like the cases invalidating retroactive registration requirements, a greater willingness by courts to limit the scope of categorical collateral consequences that are considered unreasonable and unfair. Ed. *** When Congress enacted the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, with its broad provisions for the disarmament of potentially dangerous people, the Second Amendment laid dormant. Courts paid the Second Amendment cursory attention, considering the provision only when rubber-stamping it with an erroneous, unexamined “collective right” interpretation that rendered the right to arms a nullity. Some of the Gun Control Act’s Congressional sponsors were happy to parrot that view. S. Rep. 89-1866 at 68 (1966) (individual views). But Congress understood that the Act ensnared many people whose disarmament could not be justified as beneficial to society or basically just. As the title of a leading article on the subject asks, “Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?” The task of ferreting out the hard luck and irrational cases fell to the Executive Branch, which would evaluate individual applications for relief based on personal circumstances, with unsuccessful applicants having recourse to judicial relief. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). This process more or less worked, for many years, until anti-gun rights forces in Congress defunded the program in the mid-1990s. With the Government unable to print or process applications for relief, a growing number of people convicted of non-violent, sometimes not terribly egregious crimes found themselves forever prohibited from touching firearms. While some states provided an alternative relief process, many did not, and federal offenders could only pray for a presidential pardon to restore their rights. This injustice is nearing its end. In 2008, the Supreme Court clarified that people have an individual right to keep and bear arms. The rational basis test for gun restrictions went out the window. In came a burden on the Government to actually prove, and not merely assert, that each law restricting access to firearms is consistent with a fundamental constitutional right retained by the people. Categorical prohibitions leveled at people convicted of crimes, including the so-called “felon in possession” ban (though it also reaches many misdemeanants), could be upheld in a general sense. But most courts have now realized, just as Congress did in enacting the federal gun control scheme, that the traditional grounds for denying individuals the means of self-defense—dangerousness, untrustworthiness, a serious risk of unlawful violence—are not going to be satisfied when someone lies about having sold Imclone at 60 on insider information, or is convicted of “felony fishing without a license,” or has pled guilty to any misdemeanor that might be punished by over two years in jail (the alleged standard often employed by courts enforcing the “felon in possession” ban). Most of the early cases arose, as Second Amendment cases often do, in the criminal context. Courts had no trouble telling plainly dangerous criminals charged with being felons in possession that the Framers did not have them in mind when ratifying the Second Amendment, but were usually careful to leave the door open, as Congress did in enacting Section 925(c), for people who once erred but are not a threat today, if they ever were. For these individuals, one leading federal appellate case set the task as follows: To raise a successful as-applied challenge, [an individual] must present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections. For instance, a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen. Similarly, a court might find that a felon whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011). The nation’s leading sponsor of landmark gun rights litigation, the Second Amendment Foundation, has tasked me with making full use of this avenue for relief. We are carefully selecting deserving cases to put some teeth behind Heller’s promise, and demonstrate the absurdity of the Government’s shotgun-approach to firearms disabilities. In light of the Supreme Court’s renewed interest in the constitutional avoidance doctrine, some of our cases also challenge the overly-aggressive statutory interpretation of the federal prohibition with which courts have become unfortunately comfortable. There is, after all, no question that the constitutional questions raised by disarming plainly non-threatening individuals are significant. The early results are promising. We’re two for two in Pennsylvania. Suarez v. Holder, No. 14-968-WWC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19378 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2015); Binderup v. Holder, No. 13-6750-JKG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135110 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 25, 2014). Julio Suarez, a decorated Army veteran, holder of a security clearance, and elder in his church, faced a lifetime prohibition of Second Amendment rights owing to a quarter-century old Maryland misdemeanor conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. Suarez can’t recidivate—his state doesn’t require a license to carry a handgun, and he’s eligible for a license to carry a handgun concealed. But the government claimed that the bad facts of his 1990 arrest—Suarez had a .12 BAC at the time he was stopped (though not convicted of DUI or any other traffic offense)—meant that he should continue to lose his fundamental rights today. Daniel Binderup’s only offense was a misdemeanor charge for “corruption of minors,” stemming from a long ago consensual affair with an employee just shy of her 18th birthday. Obviously, nobody approves of that conduct—including the state of Pennsylvania, which does not consider him a sex offender and has long ago restored his gun rights (Binderup received a sentence of probation), and Binderup’s wife, who forgave him. The couple has now been married for over 40 years, and has raised two wonderful kids. Like Suarez, Binderup is a stable and productive member of society. The judges in both cases saw nothing that would indicate either gentleman poses any sort of firearms threat beyond that posed by any other law-abiding, responsible citizen. The Government has appealed its loss in Binderup, and we expect it to do the same in Suarez. In both cases, the Government fails to comprehend what an “as applied” challenge means, citing piles of statistics for the proposition that anyone convicted of a crime, without exception, might recidivate. Its briefing extends the argument even to non-violent property offenses. But so what? Binderup and Suarez’s offenses didn’t involve the threat of force. And even if they had, neither of these individuals are likely to recidivate. If generalized recidivism studies can defeat Binderup and Suarez’s cases, then they can defeat all as-applied challenges, effectively overruling Barton and the growing list of appellate precedents confirming real limits on the scope of categorical prohibitions. The weakness of the Government’s claims is underscored by its resort, at least in Binderup’s case, to argument by ad hominem. I won’t repeat here some of the names the Government called my client in the briefing, but the district court was decidedly unimpressed by that approach, and I don’t believe that the court of appeals will like it any better. Moral disapproval is to be expected when one transgresses the law, but it does not suffice to permanently deprive people of their fundamental rights. Of course, the ultimate solution is for Congress to re-fund Section 925(c)’s administrative relief program. Doing so would not entirely eliminate the Second Amendment cause of action, but it would prevent an onslaught of constitutional challenges that the Government cannot possibly defend. The judiciary, and the civil rights bar, will be sure to drive home this point as frequently as necessary in the immediate future. *** About the Author: Alan Gura practices in the areas of civil and appellate litigation, and civil rights law at Gura & Possessky in Alexandria, Virginia. He successfully argued two landmark constitutional cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, D.C. v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, and is currently spearheading efforts to persuade federal courts that people with a criminal conviction may be entitled to claim the protections of the Second Amendment. Read more

Another court invalidates federal felon-in-possession statute on Second Amendment grounds

A second federal court in Pennsylvania has held that the federal felon-in possession statute cannot constitutionally be applied to an individual convicted many years ago of a minor non-violent offense. In Suarez v. Holder, the district court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that a man convicted in 1990 of misdemeanor possession of an unregistered handgun and sentenced to probation was “no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen,” and therefore entitled to claim the protection of the Second Amendment.  The Suarez court followed the reasoning of the court in Binderup v. Holder, decided in Pennsylvania’s Eastern District in September.  The government has appealed the Binderup decision, and the government’s brief is due this month. As in Binderup, the court evaluated the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under a strict scrutiny standard, and found that it could not constitutionally be applied to someone whose “conviction is decades-old” and who “poses no continuing threat to society.”  In reaching its conclusion that Julio Suarez could not be barred from possessing firearms, the court described his background and circumstances as follows: (1) he has been married for twenty years and is successfully raising three children; (2) he is an elder in his church; (3) he has had no history of violence; (4) a firearm disability imposed under Pennsylvania law was removed by a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas; and (5) he maintains “Secret” security clearance in connection with his employment for a government contractor. The court made no attempt to set forth standards for evaluating whether someone is “no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen” beyond the “know it when I see it” picture of a solid citizen it found in Mr. Suarez.   The government may be expected to point this out in its brief to the Third Circuit. The Suarez court suggested that it may be harder for a criminal defendant to claim Second Amendment protection than it is for a law-abiding individual suing civilly.  Addressing the government’s argument that Suarez’s situation was similar to that of the losing challenger in the leading Third Circuit case, U.S. v. Barton, the court pointed out that Barton presented no facts showing that his circumstances placed him outside the scope of the felon-in-possession statute, “[n]or was he capable of doing so, since he had just been indicted for selling firearms with obliterated serial numbers.” On the way to its constitutional holding, the court denied Mr. Suarez’s argument that because he was convicted of a misdemeanor rather than a felony he was not barred from gun possession by § 922(g)(1).  But the definition of a triggering offense in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) includes any misdemeanor that is “punishable by” a prison sentence exceeding two years, a standard plainly satisfied by the Maryland law under which Mr. Suarez was convicted. As soon as the government files its appeals brief in Binderup we will post it here with comments.  Perhaps by then we will have persuaded Alan Gura, who represents both Mr. Binderup and Mr. Suarez, to take time out from his busy litigation schedule to bring us up to date on the national picture of constitutional challenges to a collateral consequence that is more important than any other to many Americans. Read more

Appeals court finds federal firearms law constitutionally flawed

In a major victory for Second Amendment advocates, the Sixth Circuit court of appeals has sustained an as-applied constitutional challenge to the federal firearms dispossession law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  While the particular provision of that law at issue in Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriffs Department is § 922(g)(4), the subsection prohibiting firearms possession by anyone “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution,” the court’s broad holding and analytical approach will be of considerable interest to those watching developments under the felon-in-possession subsection of the law, § 922(g)(1). Clifford Charles Tyler, a 73-year-old resident Hillsdale County, Michigan, had been involuntarily committed for less than one month in 1986, shortly after an emotionally devastating divorce, based on a risk of suicide that concerned his children.  Since that time he had worked steadily and had had no problems with law enforcement or mental health issues.  Tyler sought a declaratory judgment against enforcement of the federal firearms law based on this brief dated commitment.  He pointed out that in Congress had authorized states to provide relief from this provision as an inducement to cooperate with federal authorities, but that Michigan was one of about half the states that had chosen not to do so.  Because Congress has defunded the federal relief provision, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), Tyler had no forum in which to request a waiver of the “committed to a mental institution” provision of the law as applied to him, and this he claimed resulted in a violation of his Second Amendment rights.  The court of appeals agreed. In a lengthy opinion surveying the history of the prohibition on gun possession by the mentally ill, as well as Second Amendment caselaw under § 922(g) since D.C. v. Heller, the court determined that 1) Tyler’s possession was not categorically unprotected under § 922(g); and 2) the law as applied to him could not be justified under the applicable strict scrutiny test.  The court relied upon Congress’ evident intent that relief should be available from §(g)(4)’s prohibition as confirming that the “committed to a mental institution” provision of §(g)(4) was not “narrowly tailored” to achieve the government’s valid purpose in prohibiting gun possession by the mentally ill: Under this scheme, whether Tyler may exercise his right to bear arms depends on whether his state of residence has chosen to accept the carrot of federal grant money and has implemented a relief program. His right thus would turn on whether his state has taken Congress’s inducement to cooperate with federal authorities in order to avoid losing anti-crime funding. An individual’s ability to exercise a “fundamental righ[t] necessary to our system of ordered liberty,” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778, cannot turn on such a distinction. Thus, § 922(g)(4) lacks narrow tailoring as the law is applied to Tyler. The following review of the circuits’ post-Heller jurisprudence confirms this. We hold that the complaint, as alleged, states a violation of the Second Amendment. The Tyler court’s analytical approach would seem relevant in cases challenging the application of the conviction-based prohibition of § (g)(1), which like (g)(4) gives effect to state relief provisions.  See 18 USC § 921(a)(20).  Individuals convicted of non-violent crimes who can demonstrate that they are “no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen,” and who have no reasonable possibility of relief under state law, may be able to demonstrate the same Second Amendment over-breadth that won the day for Mr. Tyler. Indeed, one federal court has already upheld such a claim, as described in this earlier post.  More such challenges are wending their way through the courts, and Alan Gura who is spearheading this litigation has promised us a report early in the New Year. Read more