Restoration of Rights Project – New Hampshire Profile
Guide to restoration of rights, pardon, sealing & expungement following a New Hampshire criminal conviction
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- Illinois set to become fifth state to cover criminal record discrimination in its fair employment law (2/13/2021) - NOTE: Governor Pritzker signed S1480 into law on March 23. In our recent report on criminal record reforms enacted in 2020, we noted that there were only four states that had fully incorporated criminal record into their fair employment law as a prohibited basis of discrimination. These states (New York, Wisconsin, Hawaii, and California) provide that employers can only disqualify a person based on their record if it meets a specific standard, such as being related to the work in question or posing an unreasonable risk to public safety. Illinois will become the fifth state to take this important step as soon as Governor Pritzker signs S1480. Illinois has been working up to this, having amended its Human Rights Act in 2019 to prohibit employment discrimination based on “an arrest not leading to a conviction, a juvenile record, or criminal history record information ordered expunged, sealed, or impounded.” With S1480, Illinois has now taken the final step of incorporating criminal record fully into the law's structure, which includes authorization to file a lawsuit in the event administrative enforcement is unsatisfactory. A preliminary analysis of the new Illinois law indicates that it now offers more protection for more people with a criminal record in the employment context than any state in the Nation other than California. The provisions of the Illinois bill, enrolled and sent to the governor for signature on February 12, are described below. We then compare them with the laws in the four other states that incorporate criminal record into their fair employment law. This post notes the handful of additional states that have fortified their record-related employment protections in recent years, then summarizes relevant reforms that were enacted in 2020. The new Illinois law makes it unlawful for any employer, employment agency, or labor union to use a conviction record “as a basis to refuse to hire” or to take other employment related adverse action, unless “there is a substantial relationship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the employment sought or held” or “the granting or continuation of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.” 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-103.1(A). “Substantial relationship” is defined to mean “a consideration of whether the employment position offers the opportunity for the same or a similar offense to occur.” In making a determination under subsection (A), the employer must consider a variety of factors including the length of time since conviction, the extent of the record, the nature and severity of the conviction itself and its relationship to the safety and security of others, the age of the employee at the time of the offense, and evidence of “rehabilitation efforts.” 5/2-103.1(B). If the employer reaches a preliminary determination of disqualification or other adverse action, the employer must give written notice and an opportunity for respond, and in the event of a final determination an explanation of the reasons.” 5/2-103.1(C). The new Illinois law compares well with the laws in the four other states that incorporate criminal record into their fair employment law. Although the Illinois “substantial relationship” standard is not as protective as New York’s “direct relationship” standard, Illinois law elaborates the standard with the same public safety emphasis and offers more procedural protections in the form of reasons and an opportunity for reconsideration. Also, unlike New York, it prohibits any consideration of non-conviction records and sealed or expunged convictions. Hawaii has a weaker “rational relationship” standard and also excludes a large number of employments, although it bars inquiry into criminal record until after a conditional offer has been made and thereafter prohibits any consideration of non-conviction records, as well as any conviction more than seven years in the past for felonies and five years for misdemeanors (as reduced in 2020). California also bars inquiry until after a conditional offer has been made, prohibits consideration of non-conviction records and records that have been the subject of judicial relief, provides considerable procedural protections, and has the strongest standard for testing the relevance of a conviction (“direct and adverse relationship”). Wisconsin’s law is the weakest of the five: it applies a “substantial relationship” standard but does not elaborate it, and it offers no procedural protections to applicants or existing employees other than administrative enforcement of this substantive standard. The District of Columbia has also enacted robust fair chance employment protections that apply to both public and many private employers, but its law stops short of authorizing individuals dissatisfied with action by the Office of Human Rights to go to court. Colorado, Connecticut, and Nevada have recently prohibited some employers from considering certain criminal records, but those prohibitions are not fully integrated into a broader nondiscrimination law. Other states are still catching up, with many stalled at the "ban the box" stage. Our report on new legislation in 2020 documented comparatively modest but still noteworthy advances toward fair chance employment in 6 states last year. We reprint the discussion of 2020 reforms from our report below: In 2020, 6 states expanded access to employment for people with a record through 7 bills and one executive order. Two states (New Hampshire and Virginia) enacted a ban-the-box law applicable to public employment, while North Carolina’s governor issued a broad executive order that not only prohibited public employers from making application-stage inquiries, but also established standards for considering criminal record thereafter. Maryland’s legislature overrode a governor’s veto to apply application-stage limits on inquiry to private employers with more than 15 employees. Hawaii amended its venerable fair employment law to reduce the periods after which a conviction may not be considered by any employers. Overall, however, these 2020 laws had limited effect on the fair employment landscape. At the end of 2020, there were still only four states (California, Hawaii, New York, and Wisconsin) that included discrimination based on criminal record as part of their general fair employment scheme, and all but California’s law were enacted many years ago. Colorado, Connecticut, and Nevada have, like Illinois, more recently prohibited some employers from considering certain criminal records, but those prohibitions are not fully integrated into a broader nondiscrimination law. Most of the fair employment laws recently enacted involve fairly modest limits on application stage inquiry. The National Employment Law Project keeps a running tab of new “ban-the-box” laws, and reported in September 2020 that 36 states and more than 150 municipal and county ordinances now require public employers to consider applicants’ qualifications before their criminal histories, with 14 extending these limits to private employers. However, as noted in our Many Roads report, few of these laws include the kind of robust post-inquiry standards that make the 2020 North Carolina Executive Order described below stand out. The new employment laws and orders in 2020 are described briefly below: Hawaii shortened the lookback period in which a person may be disqualified based on conviction under its fair employment law, to seven years for felonies and five years for misdemeanors, excluding periods of incarceration (SB 2193). Hawaii includes discrimination based on conviction record in its more general fair employment practices law, and under preexisting law it is an unlawful employment practice to inquire into arrest and conviction records before the employee receives a conditional offer of employment, and an employer could withdraw an offer only if a conviction within the previous 10 years (exclusive of any period of incarceration) “bears a rational relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the position.” Under this new law, 10-year period is reduced to 7 years for felonies and 5 years for misdemeanors. Maryland enacted a ban-the-box law applicable to private employers with more than 15 employees, overriding Governor Hogan’s veto. The law prohibits inquiry into an applicant’s criminal record until the first interview; and authorizes civil penalties. Certain employment is excepted. The law specifically does not preclude local jurisdictions from imposed stricter standards (HB 994). Md. Code Lab. & Empl. § 3-1403. North Carolina’s governor issued an executive order (EO 158), which directs all state agencies to remove questions about criminal record from employment application forms, and to defer inquiries until “the completion of the initial job interview.” The order further prohibits agencies from considering the following: (i) expunged or pardoned convictions, (ii) charges or convictions that do not relate to the underlying employment matter, (iii) arrests not resulting in a conviction, or (iv) charges resulting in dismissal or not guilty. State employment decisions “shall not be based on the criminal history of an individual unless that criminal history is demonstrably job-related and consistent with business necessity associated with the position, or if state or federal law prohibits hiring an individual convicted of certain crimes for a particular position.” New Hampshire prohibited an application-stage inquiry into criminal record in public employment prior to the initial interview, “unless the public employer is required to screen applications for specific criminal convictions because it is prohibited from hiring those with such convictions under state or federal law” (HB 253). N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275:37-c(II). Utah removed an absolute barrier based on certain convictions for employment with vulnerable populations, if the applicant will be serving only adults whose only impairment is a mental health diagnosis. In addition, certain convictions cannot be disqualifying after 10 conviction-free years for felonies, and three years for misdemeanors (HB 436). Virginia prohibited inquiry into criminal record by public employers prior to interview. Excepts law enforcement employment and certain other sensitive employments (HB 757). Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.2-2812.1, 15.2-1505.3. Virginia added crimes to the list for which an exception is available for employment with a substance abuse or mental health program at community services boards and private providers of behavioral health services licensed by the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services. This law also allows the Department to hire individuals convicted of various crimes at a state facility if the Department determines the individual has been rehabilitated successfully and is not a risk to those receiving services (HB 1540). Virginia also decriminalizes marijuana possession, restricted public access to records relating to past arrests, charges, or convictions for this offense, prohibited employers and educational institutions from inquiring about them, and prohibited state and local officials from requiring an applicant for a license, permit, registration, or governmental service to disclose information about them (SB 2 / HB 972). Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-250.1; 19.2-389.3.
- New 2019 laws restore voting rights in 11 states (1/22/2020) - This is the first in a series of comments describing some of the 153 laws passed in 2019 restoring rights or delivering record relief in various ways. The full report on 2019 laws is available here. Restoration of Civil Rights Voting In 2019, eleven states took steps to restore the right to vote and to expand awareness of voting eligibility. Our experience is that many people convicted of a felony believe they are disqualified from voting when they are not: almost every state restores voting rights automatically to most convicted individuals at some point, if they are even disenfranchised to begin with. The most significant new re-enfranchisement laws were enacted in Colorado, Nevada and New Jersey, where convicted individuals are now eligible to vote except when actually incarcerated. Colorado restored the vote to persons on parole supervision, while Nevada revised its complex system for restoring civil rights so that all people with felony convictions may now vote except while in prison. In one of the final legislative acts of 2019, New Jersey’s governor signed a law limiting disenfranchisement to a period of actual incarceration, even in cases where a court has ordered loss of the vote for election law violations, immediately restoring the vote to 80,000 people. These three states joined the two states (New York and Louisiana) that in 2018 took steps to limit disenfranchisement to a period of incarceration: New York’s governor issued the first of a series of executive orders under his pardon power restoring the vote to individuals on parole, and Louisiana passed a law allowing people to register if they have been out of prison for at least five years. Now, only three of the 19 states that disenfranchise only those sentenced to prison still extend ineligibility through completion of parole: California, Connecticut, and Idaho. Bills under consideration in 2019 in both California and Connecticut would allow people to vote once they leave prison, though in California this will require a constitutional amendment. Kentucky saw perhaps the most dramatic extension of the franchise in 2019, when its incoming governor Andy Beshear issued an executive order restoring the vote and eligibility for office to an estimated 140,000 individuals convicted of non-violent felonies who had completed their sentences. Before the order, individuals were required to petition the governor individually to obtain restoration of their voting rights. (Governor Beshear’s father had issued a similar order in 2015 at the end of his own term as governor, but it was revoked by his successor.) Iowa is now the only state that does not restore the vote automatically to most convicted individuals at some point. Other states took less dramatic but nonetheless significant steps in 2019 to expand the franchise. Arizona repealed its law making automatic restoration of the vote to those with no more than one felony conviction depend on payment of fines and fees (those who owe restitution must still apply to the court, like recidivists, to regain their voting rights). (See below for Arizona's revision of its firearms restoration laws.) Arkansas corrected an unintended gap in its election law that made it hard for juveniles prosecuted as adults to regain the right to vote. Oklahoma revised its laws to clarify that voting rights are lost upon conviction of a felony and are restored upon completion of sentence. Four states (Colorado, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Washington) enacted laws directing corrections officials to inform people leaving custody of their eligibility to register, addressing the pervasive public misunderstanding that the right to vote is permanently lost by conviction. Illinois' two new laws on this subject also facilitate voting by mail for eligible persons detained in county jails, and provide for peer-led programs to teach civics to prisoners who are soon to be released. Florida is the only state that took steps during the year to restrict rather than enlarge the franchise, in the wake of that state’s restoration of the franchise in 2018, by ballot initiative, to more than a million state residents who had completed their court-imposed sentences. That ballot initiative automatically restored the right to vote for people convicted of felonies, other than murder or sexual offenses, upon “completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.” In 2019, the Florida legislature passed a law interpreting “completion of sentence” to include payment of fines, fees, and court costs. The 2019 legislation defines “completion of all terms of sentence” to include all legal financial obligations (LFOs). The Florida Supreme Court recently agreed in an advisory opinion that Amendment 4's reference to “completion of all terms of sentence” does include all legal financial obligation imposed in conjunction with a sentence. Nonetheless, individuals and supporters of Amendment 4 have brought several federal court challenges to the legislation as violating the U.S. constitution, arguing that by disqualifying persons with outstanding LFOs, even if a person has no ability to pay and even if the court has converted an LFO to a civil lien, the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also argue that the law burdens the fundamental right to vote, is an unconstitutional poll tax, infringes on free speech and association, and was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. In October, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Florida cannot deny the plaintiffs their "right to vote so long as the state’s only reason for denying the vote is failure to pay an amount the plaintiff is genuinely unable to pay." However, that ruling only applies to 17 plaintiffs in the case, and the judge deferred addressing a number of other issues until after trial later this year, giving the legislature an opportunity to address inability to pay. The coalition behind Amendment 4 is also raising money to help people pay off their debts. One of the knotty problems associated with efforts to re-enfranchise Florida residents is the uneven state of court records in the state, such that inconsistent and missing records can make it difficult for individuals to show that they have in fact fully satisfied financial penalties associated with criminal cases. In the broader national picture, at the conclusion of 2019 almost half the states allow people with a felony conviction to vote if they are living in the free community. A total of 18 states and the District of Columbia now allow people to vote unless in prison, Louisiana allows voting five years after release, and Maine and Vermont do not disenfranchise anyone based on conviction. Of the remaining states, a majority restore the vote automatically upon completion of sentence, which may or may not also require payment of court debt. However, a significant minority of states require at least some individuals (recidivists, persons convicted of specific offenses, or those who owe court debt) to file individual petitions with the governor or a court to regain the right to vote. The coming year should see additional developments in Florida regarding restoration for those with unpaid fines, fees, or restitution. This is turn could have ramifications for the half dozen additional states that impose similar financial barriers to the franchise. 2. Jury eligibility and public office Three other measures to restore civil rights for jury service and public office are worth mentioning. California passed a statute restoring eligibility for trial jury service upon completion of sentence (previously a pardon was necessary). Maryland also lowered its conviction-related bar to jury eligibility. Previously, people were ineligible to serve on a jury if they had received a sentence of more than six months of imprisonment, and were not pardoned, or had a pending charge for an offense punishable by more than six months imprisonment; under the new law, these six-month periods are extended to one year. Finally, New Hampshire revised its law disqualifying people with a conviction from holding public office, making the restriction applicable only during actual incarceration, so that it is now coincident with the period of felony disenfranchisement (this limit on disenfranchisement to only during actual incarceration has been in place in the Granite State since 1965). 3. Firearms restoration Arizona revised its law on firearms restoration to authorize the sentencing court to restore rights to most people with felony offenses two years after completion of sentence. (Note that the automatic restoration of civil rights for offenses does not include restoration of firearms rights.) People convicted of “serious” offenses must wait 10 years, and those convicted of “dangerous” offenses are ineligible for restoration. SB 2080.
- Legislative update: third quarter 2019 sees more new licensing and expungement laws (10/11/2019) - In July we reported on the extraordinary number of new laws enacted in the first half of 2019 aimed at restoring rights and status after arrest and conviction. A total of 97 separate pieces of legislation, some covering multiple topics, were enacted by 38 states and many broke new ground in their jurisdictions. Moreover, clear trends begun in 2018 accelerated in the first half of 2019, as state lawmakers continued to focus most of their attention on facilitating access to record-clearing. In addition, a significant number of new laws limited the authority of occupational licensing boards to disqualify a person based on criminal record. Another area of progress was restoring voting rights. Those trends continued over the summer, with 17 new laws, including significant laws enacted to regulate occupational licensing and expand record relief, including but not limited to marijuana convictions. Several states showed a keen interest in exploring the possibility of automating record relief, although only one state actually enacted an automatic relief system by the end of the quarter (New York, for marijuana convictions). (California enacted a "clean slate" law shortly after the beginning of the fourth quarter.) At the end of the third quarter, Arkansas, Colorado and Florida were studying the feasibility of automating relief, North Carolina was considering automatic expunction of non-conviction records, and the Governor of New Jersey was attempting to persuade his legislature to adopt an automated system for convictions as well as non-convictions.) By the end of the third quarter of 2019, 42 states had enacted an unprecedented total of 114 laws restoring rights and status, and more new laws on the horizon. All of the laws described briefly below are more fully analyzed in the context of the state's overall restoration scheme, in the detailed profiles of the Restoration of Rights Project. Occupational licensing Florida and North Carolina enacted impressive occupational licensing schemes. Florida's new licensing provisions added by H7125 appear targeted to trades learned in the state prison system, and also provide that: “A conviction, or any other adjudication, for a crime more than 5 years before the date the application is received by the applicable board may not be grounds for denial of a [specified] license.” Boards are permitted to consider violent and sexual offenses but only if they “relate to the practice of the profession.” Starting on October 1, 2019, and updated quarterly thereafter, the boards must compile a list identifying each crime used as a basis for a license denial. North Carolina’s new law prohibits disqualification from licensure unless a crime is “directly related” to the license involved, requires written reasons in the event of denial, and provides for a preliminary determination as to whether an individual will be favorably considered that is binding on the board when the applicant later applies. The new law also requires licensing boards to report annually to the legislature on their consideration of applications from people with a criminal record. In New Hampshire, HB 637 created two categories of criminal history information to be maintained by the state police records repository, one “confidential” and the other “public.” “Confidential criminal history information” (defined to include non-conviction records and records of convictions that have been annulled) will no longer be disseminated for employment and licensing purposes. Sealing and expungement Florida substantially reorganized its laws relating to sealing and expungement of non-conviction records in H7125, and the Department of Law Enforcement was directed to create an automatic process for sealing eligible non-conviction records. See Fla. Stat. § 943.0595. Four states (DE, HI, NH and NY) passed laws authorizing expungement or sealing of marijuana possession convictions. Of these new laws, New York's law setting up an automated relief system is by far the most significant, because it seals the record without requiring eligible individuals to apply to the court for relief. Individuals whose records are sealed may, further, apply later to have the record destroyed. As an important recent study by JJ Prescott and Sonja Starr established, where laws make relief depend upon a burdensome petition process, few eligible individuals will take advantage of them. (As the third quarter ended, a far broader "clean slate" bill was poised for enactment in California, and was signed on October 7.) Relatedly, in August, New Jersey's governor Phil Murphy refused to sign a bill substantially expanding expungement in that state, which included but was not limited to marijuana convictions, on grounds that its cumbersome petition process did not go far enough in addressing the problem of dated convictions. The governor cited with approval the "clean slate" law enacted by New Jersey's neighboring state Pennsylvania, and proposed a series of measures aimed at developing a similar automated system in his state. As of this writing, the governor has been unable to persuade the legislature to adopt it, but we may expect to see another pass at the problem before year's end. Two more states (HI and NC) expanded their provisions offering record relief to victims of human trafficking convicted of any non-violent offense linked to their victim status. Civil rights Finally, New Hampshire revised its law disqualifying people with a conviction from holding public office, making the restriction applicable only during actual incarceration, so that it is now coincident with the period of felony disenfranchisement (this limit on disenfranchisement to only during actual incarceration has been in place in the Granite State since 1965). Perhaps more significant, HB 486 requires the commissioner of the department of corrections to ensure that probation/parole officers receive instruction on the current state of the law regarding the civil rights of individuals convicted of a felony, and to direct that individuals serving a suspended sentence or on parole receive "written notice that he or she may vote during the period of the suspension or parole." Similar provisions were enacted earlier in the year in Colorado and Washington. In our experience, many people who have been convicted of a felony believe that they cannot vote long after their rights have been restored - and some (like those in New Hampshire not sentenced to prison) never lost the right to vote in the first place.
- Prisoners fighting California fires denied licenses after release (8/20/2018) - Nick Sibilla, a legislative analyst at the Institute for Justice, has published this fine op ed piece in today's USA Today, describing how the 2,000 state prisoners currently engaged in fighting the largest fire in California history, are barred from obtaining the necessary EMT license that would enable them to continue this work after their release. It contains, inter alia, a description of the two bills currently pending in the California legislature that would end what Nick describes as a "bitterly ironic" situation, where prisoners gain valuable training in certain vocations that they cannot use after their release. The piece seems particularly relevant, in light of the amazing work being done on occupational licensing reform across the country, much of it inspired by the Institute for Justice's Model Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act. See, e.g. New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Kansas, Indiana, Arizona, and Tennessee. We hope California will soon join this group of enlightened jurisdictions, and that other states will follow in the coming year. Despite fighting California's largest fires, inmates are denied licenses they need to become firefighters after they get out. by Nick Sibilla, USA Today, August 20, 2018 As California struggles to contain the largest fire in state history, more than 2,000 inmates have volunteered to fight the flames. Offering just $1 an hour, the state has long encouraged low-level prisoners to risk their lives and serve alongside professional firefighters, who earn nearly $74,000 a year on average. Firefighting, along with less life-threatening trades like plumbing, welding, and cosmetology, is one of several vocational training programs offered to prisoners by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. But in a bitterly ironic twist, once inmates leave prison, they often can’t work as firefighters, despite their frontline experience. In California, nearly all counties require firefighters to become licensed emergency medical technician (EMTs) — a credential that can be denied to almost anyone with a criminal record. Many are denied jobs for their criminal record Nor are firefighters the only position off-limits. Under California law, the state’s licensing boards can deny a credential on the basis of an applicant’s criminal record or alleged misconduct. Thanks to the rise in occupational licensing, nearly 1,800 occupations now require a license, certification, or clearance in the Golden State, affecting one-fourth of California’s workforce. As a result, hundreds of different occupations are effectively barred to roughly 8 million Californians. California’s firefighting felons are a particularly stark illustration of a growing, national problem. According to the American Bar Association, the nation’s occupational and business licensing laws contain over 27,000 restrictions on ex-offenders, including bans on working as barbers or hosting bingo games. Those barriers impose significant costs. Research by the Center for Economic and Policy estimates that in 2014, employment barriers for the incarcerated and those with felony convictions cost the nation’s economy up to $87 billion in annual GDP, equal to “the loss of 1.7 to 1.9 million workers.” Not only do these policies slam the door on economic opportunity, they may also increase re-offending. A recent study from Arizona State University found that states with more burdensome licensing laws saw their average recidivism rates jump by nine percent. By comparison, states with fewer licensing restrictions and no moralizing provisions had recidivism rates decline by 2.5 percent, on average. In fact, licensing burdens were second only to the overall labor market climate when it came to influencing recidivism rates. California is trying to fix the problem Fortunately, new legislation would curb some of California’s licensing barriers against ex-offenders. As part of a public safety omnibus signed earlier this year, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL-FIRE) can certify former prison firefighters as “emergency medical responders,” a certification CAL-FIRE accepts in lieu of an EMT license for some state firefighter jobs. A separate bill would require agencies to report the number of applicants with a criminal conviction who have been denied or granted an EMT license, which would provide valuable data for further reforms. More broadly, another bill, AB 2138, would tighten the standard used to disqualify ex-offenders by the Department of Consumer Affairs, which governs 38 different boards, bureaus and commissions. Under the bill, boards could not use a conviction older than five years to reject a license (though that would not apply to violent felonies). Each board would also have to publish the criteria it uses to evaluate applicants, which must include any evidence of rehabilitation, the time elapsed since the offense as well as the nature and gravity of the offense. Critically, boards could only use convictions, not arrests or records from dismissed cases. AB 2138 has already passed the Assembly earlier this year and is currently under consideration in the Senate. California could soon join 16 states that have already eased or eliminated licensing barriers for Americans with criminal records since 2015. Many of these state reforms protect the ability of ex-offenders to get the permits they need, while also ensuring that boards only deny applicants who would truly threaten public safety. California needs fewer requirements to work These efforts are all welcome reforms to a system in desperate need of an overhaul. Yet even if former inmates aren’t automatically barred because of their past mistakes, burdensome licensing requirements can still keep them from working. According to a recent, nationwide study by the Institute for Justice (where I work), the average license for a lower-income occupation takes almost a year of education or experience. California ranked as the “worst licensing environment for workers in lower-income occupations,” with the average license requiring a staggering 827 days of training. Absurdly, becoming a professional tree trimmer, barber, or painting contractor in California takes vastly more experience than becoming an EMT, who literally holds the lives of others in their hands. A steady job is one of the best ways to prevent re-offending. But strict occupational licensing requirements make it harder for ex-offenders to find work. The denial of so many fundamental civil rights and liberties has essentially turned many ex-offenders into second-class citizens. Restoring the right to earn an honest living is crucial for ex-offenders to regain a sense of hope and a new chance at redemption. Nick Sibilla is a legislative analyst at the Institute for Justice. You can follow him on Twitter: @nick_sibilla More: Louisiana is the only state that requires occupational licenses for florists. It's absurd. Ridiculous licensing rules are holding back people who want to work Prisoners who risk their lives during Calif. wildfires shouldn't be shut out of profession
- Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act (6/29/2018) - We've noted in recent posts the numerous states that, just in the past three or four months, have enacted broad occupational licensing reforms affecting people with a criminal record. Many of these new laws have been influenced by a model developed by the Institute for Justice (IJ), a libertarian public interest law firm that has been litigating and lobbying to reduce barriers to work for more than two decades. In turn, states like Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee and Wisconsin have built upon IJ's model to enact even more progressive schemes intended to ensure that people with the requisite professional qualifications will not be unfairly excluded based on a record of arrest or conviction. Now IJ has incorporated many of these progressive refinements into its original model licensing law, the Occupational Licensing Review Act (OLRA), and broken out the provisions relating to criminal records into a free-standing model act specifically directed at managing collateral consequences in the occupational licensing context, the new Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act (CCOLA). The CCOLA has the same key features as the original OLRA: It provides individuals with an opportunity to seek a preliminary determination from the licensing agency as to whether their criminal record will be disqualifying; It allows the individual to seek this determination at any time, including before investing in the required training necessary to otherwise qualify for the license, requires a written decision within 90 days, and limits what the agency may charge for this determination to $100; It limits the types of records that an agency may consider in a licensing decision to convictions of serious or violent crimes; It shifts the burden of proof to the agency to establish that a petitioner’s conviction is substantially related to the state’s interest in protecting public safety; It requires agencies to provide written reasons justifying denial of a license based on conviction in terms of public safety; and It requires each agency to publish a report annually on the number of applicants with a criminal record seeking a license, the number of approvals and denials, and the type of offenses for each type of action. In addition to these features, IJ has recently further clarified the types of criminal conduct that may be considered in licensing decisions, and specifically prohibited the use of vague criteria like "good moral character" as a basis for exclusion. As revised, IJ's model laws now provide that licensing agencies may not consider non-conviction records, juvenile adjudications, non-violent misdemeanors, and most felonies and violent misdemeanors that occurred more than three years prior to seeking licensure. See CCOLA, 100.02, Subd. 7. Agencies may consider violent felonies and sexual offenses at any time, although even these records must still be tested against the "public safety" standard: The board may deny the petition only if it establishes by clear and convincing evidence that: 1. The individual was convicted of a felony or violent misdemeanor, not excluded by subdivision 7, which is directly, substantially and adversely related to the state's interest in protecting public safety; and 2. The granting of state recognition will put the individual in a position where the individual is more likely than not to reoffend and cause harm. See CCOLA, 100.02, Subd 10(c). IJ's website points out that "[m]ore than 25 percent of workers need a government-issued license to work," so lowering barriers to licensure for people with a criminal record has important implications for efficiency and public safety. In introducing its stand-alone CCOLA model, IJ’s website states the following: An honest living is one of the best ways to prevent those with a criminal record from re-offending. But many occupational licensing laws block or burden ex-offenders from entering regulated fields. Numerous licensing laws have morality clauses that (1) bar automatically and permanently ex-offenders from working without any individualized review or (2) require the ex-offender to prove a negative—that the ex-offender’s past crimes will not cause him to harm customers in the future. Such provisions ironically may decrease public safety. States with prohibitions and high burdens on entry have higher criminal recidivism. Conversely, states that have no such bars and low burdens have seen declines in recidivism, according to Professor Stephen Slivinski’s landmark study Turning Shackles into Bootstraps. IJ’s website surveys some of the key provisions of many of the recently enacted state licensing reforms. It also very happily links to the relevant 50-state chart from the Restoration of Rights Project, which we very much appreciate! With an enrolled bill sitting on its governor's desk for action, New Hampshire is poised to become the 10th state to enact comprehensive licensing reform in 2018. In addition to Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee and Wisconsin, Arizona, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Wyoming have all just this year enacted new laws incorporating many of the features of IJ's model law. Illinois anticipated these states by six months when it significantly amended its licensing scheme to reflect IJ's approach in August 2017. We were pleased to be able to work with Lee McGrath of IJ’s office in Minneapolis in developing many of the amended features of the CCOLA, which have also been folded into IJ's broader model occupational licensing act. We look forward to continuing to work with Lee and his colleagues in months to come.
- More states enact major “second chance” reforms (6/11/2018) - In recent weeks, three more states -- Colorado, Louisiana and Vermont -- have enacted laws intended to make it easier for people with a criminal record to find and keep employment, or otherwise to regain rights and status. We are just now noting Wyoming's enactment in March 2018 of general standards for professional and occupational licensure, which impose new restrictions on how criminal record may be taken into account by licensing agencies, and its amendment of more than a dozen specific licensing laws. In the first five months of 2018 alone, a total of 21 states have enacted legislation to improve opportunities for people with a criminal record, with more similar laws evidently on the way. States have enacted several different types of "second chance" laws this year, from expansion of voting rights to expansion of judicial authority to relieve collateral consequences at sentencing. On May 25, Vermont Governor Phil Scott signed into law an expansion of the state's expungement authority for both adult and juvenile offenders, reducing waiting periods and other eligibility criteria for qualifying felony and misdemeanor convictions. The new law also authorizes courts to expunge non-conviction records 12 months after the conclusion of the case, without need for a petition from the defendant, and without regard to the nature of the offense. This is the third time in recent years that Vermont has extended eligibility for expungement. On May 29, Colorado Governor Hickenlooper signed a bill extending the state's existing authority for sentencing courts to waive application of collateral consequences affecting employment, licensing, and other opportunities and benefits, to make this relief available in all cases regardless of sentence. Previously this waiver authority was available only in cases involving a community-based penalty. Courts are authorized to take action as early as sentencing and throughout the period an individual is under sentence. In this respect, the law resembles the authority proposed by the American Law Institute in the collateral consequences provisions of its new Mode Penal Code: Sentencing. The Colorado law is described in detail in the Colorado profile from the Restoration of Rights Project. At the end of May, Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards approved several "second chance" bills: One new law extends voting rights to anyone under sentence for a felony who has not been actually incarcerated in the past five years; two additional laws make minor adjustments to the state expungement law, to exempt deferred adjudication cases from the 15-year eligibility waiting period for a second expungement, and to add to the requirements for filing an expungement motion. Another new law requires the governor to conduct regular periodic reviews of the standards applied by occupational licensing agencies. As finally enacted, this last-mentioned law substantially watered down provisions in earlier versions of the legislation that would have limited agency consideration of criminal records in licensing actions. Earlier this spring, Wyoming enacted a new provision of its general state licensing code establishing a "direct relationship" standard for consideration of conviction by all licensing agencies not otherwise subject to a specific contrary statutory standard. See Wyo. Stat. § 33-1-304. See Enrolled Act 63 (March 2018), available at http://www.wyoleg.gov/2018/Enroll/SF0042.pdf. This provision prohibits consideration of prior convictions that are more than 20 years old, except where the person is still under sentence or the sentence was completed fewer than 10 years ago, and unless the elements of the offense are "directly related to the specific duties and responsibilities of that profession or occupation." Among the new law's policies is that agencies should ensure that applicants have an adequate opportunity to appeal a denial. Wyoming also amended more than a dozen specific professional and occupational licensing statutes to rescind vague qualifications like "good moral character," and to substitute functional criteria specifically tying the nature of a particular crime to the licensed activity pursuant to a direct relationship standard. Licensing schemes affected include those regulating teachers, guides and outfitters, engineers, veterinarians, and nursing home administrators. Licensing standards for chiropractors, nurses, optometrists, dental hygienists, social workers, and marriage and family counselors and substance abuse counselors were also amended. Securities dealers and investment advisers, insurance agents, and athlete agents are covered by the reforms. Legislatures in several other states have passed bills that are currently awaiting approval of the governor, including Illinois, New Hampshire, and Tennessee. The only "second chance" legislation we know of that was disapproved by the governor is the South Carolina legislature's unsuccessful attempt to authorize expungement of drug convictions. We expect again to provide a summary of all new laws enacted in 2018 toward the end of the year, and we will also be keeping the state profiles and other resources in the Restoration of Rights Project up to date in real time.
- New research report: Four Years of Second Chance Reforms, 2013-2016 (2/8/2017) - Introduction Since 2013, almost every state has taken at least some steps to chip away at the negative effects of a criminal record on an individual’s ability to earn a living, access housing, education and public benefits, and otherwise fully participate in civil society. It has not been an easy task, in part because of the volume and complexity of state and federal laws imposing collateral consequences. To encourage employers and other decision-makers to give convicted individuals a fair chance, some states have enacted or modified judicial restoration mechanisms like expungement, sealing, and certificates of relief. Others have extended nondiscrimination laws, limited criminal record inquiries, and facilitated front-end opportunities to avoid conviction. In partnership with the NACDL Restoration of Rights Project, the CCRC maintains a comprehensive and current state-by-state guide to mechanisms for restoration of rights and status after conviction. As a part of keeping that resource up to date, we have inventoried measures enacted and policies adopted by states in the past four years to mitigate or avoid the disabling effects of a criminal record, and present it here as a snapshot of an encouraging national trend. Summary of findings Between 2013 and 2016, forty-two states and the District of Columbia adopted significant reforms of various types. The most common of these reforms are ban-the-box laws and policies that prohibit employers from inquiring into an applicant’s criminal history during the initial stages of the application process. Twenty-one states banned the box in public employment, and eight (CT, DC, IL, MN, NJ, OR, RI, and VT) expanded their ban-the-box prohibitions to cover private employers as well. Expungement and sealing authorities were also expanded in a significant number of states. Arkansas, Indiana, and Minnesota enacted comprehensive new expungement/sealing schemes that grant many individuals an opportunity to have their records sealed from public view and/or rights restored for the first time. Additionally, California, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missouri all expanded existing expungement/sealing laws to make certain felonies eligible. Maryland, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota enacted entirely new authorities limiting public access to misdemeanor records. Another fifteen states expanded existing expungement or sealing opportunities, either to increase the number and type of eligible offenses and dispositions, or to broaden the protections afforded to, or rights restored by, an expunged or sealed record. Unfortunately, stiff filing fees in states like Louisiana and Kentucky will inevitably discourage people of limited means from taking advantage of these new authorities. Judicial and/or administrative “certificates of relief” were also made available in nine states for the first time. These certificates adhere to a “forgiving,” as opposed to “forgetting,” model of criminal record mitigation. The new certificates with the broadest application and effect are those in Ohio and Vermont, both of which are modeled after provisions in the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act (UCCCA) that authorize courts to completely remove specified mandatory collateral consequences imposed by law, allowing individuals to be considered for employment or licensing opportunities on the merits. Colorado's new "order of collateral relief" provides relief from mandatory consequences specified in the order, with exceptions, but is only available for non-prison sentences. The new certificate authorities in most other states either protect employers and/or other private entities from negligent hiring or retention claims based solely upon their agent’s conviction, or prohibit employers or licensing bodies from denying applicants “based solely upon” their conviction. The effect or availability of pre-existing certificate authorities were expanded in another three states. Another notable trend was the expansion of the effect and availability of deferred adjudication and diversion mechanisms, which allow individuals to avoid conviction altogether following successful completion of probation or other conditions. Five states (AL, CA, DE, GA, NJ) enacted legislation explicitly authorizing expungement or sealing of deferred adjudication records for the first time, while Colorado and Illinois enacted entirely new deferred adjudication authority. These programs provide a great benefit to those who can take advantage of them, but, in many states, prosecutorial control of these programs can result in disparate treatment and costly relief. >>View the full report below or download here<<
- NH Supreme Court takes aim at federal felon-in-possession statute (3/13/2015) - In an important decision for firearms-related collateral consequences, the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on the Second Amendment to carve out an exception to the so-called federal felon-in-possession statute, declining to follow relevant federal court precedents. At stake is whether state or federal courts have the last word on the scope of the exceptions in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). In DuPont v. Nashua Police Department, the court held that a man convicted of a misdemeanor DUI, who as a result lost his right to possess a firearm under state and federal law, was able to avoid federal firearms disability by virtue of the restoration of his state firearms rights, even though he lost none of the traditional "core" civil rights (vote, office, jury). In order to get to this result, the court had to conclude that the right to possess a firearm is itself a civil right, whose loss and restoration under state law is sufficient to satisfy the "civil rights restored" requirement in 921(a)(20), thus creating a narrow but significant exception to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Logan v. United States. While the holding in DuPont applies only to a limited class of misdemeanants (those who lost and regained state firearms rights), the decision may be the opening salvo in a state backlash against federal efforts to define the scope of state relief recognized in 921(a)(20). Gregory DuPont's 1998 Massachusetts DUI carried a potential maximum prison sentence of two and a half years, thus rendering him ineligible, under both Massachusetts and federal law, to possess a firearm. In 2005, the Massachusetts Firearm Licensing Review Board (FLRB) restored DuPont's firearms rights, finding that he was "a suitable person to possess a license to carry firearms." In 2007, the City of Nashua (NH) issued DuPont a license to carry a pistol or revolver, and in 2009 the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) issued him an armed security guard license. In 2013, when DuPont applied to the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for a Curios and Relics License, a background check revealed that the 1998 state conviction was disqualifying under federal firearms law. As a result, the federal license was denied and DuPont's state licenses were revoked. The state trial court denied DuPont's appeal, reasoning that DuPont could not “be deemed suitable to possess a license to carry a pistol or revolver” because, “[u]nder applicable federal law, which New Hampshire must follow under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, [he] cannot possess a firearm.” The circuit court agreed, relying on Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007), to hold that because DuPont had never lost any of the "core" civil rights (vote, jury, office) he could not benefit from the "civil rights restored" exception under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). The court explained that the right to carry a gun "is a constitutional, not civil, right.” The state high court disagreed, relying on the Second Amendment to hold that Massachusetts' restoration of his firearms rights was enough to bring him within the "civil rights restored" proviso: The Sixth Circuit has opined that Heller “suggests that a handgun possession ban . . . might infringe a civil right.” United States v. Sanford, 707 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2012) . . . . In addition, the Supreme Court has referred, in an unrelated context, to the loss of the right to bear arms as the deprivation of a civil right. See Nat. Fedn. of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (noting that “[a]n individual who disobeys” a law passed under Congress’s Commerce Clause power “may be subjected to criminal sanctions . . . [which] can include not only fines and imprisonment, but all the attendant consequences of being branded a criminal: deprivation of otherwise protected civil rights, such as the right to bear arms or vote in elections”). The court reasoned that when Congress used "civil rights restored" as a touchstone for regaining firearms rights it meant that "by reinvesting a person with core civic responsibilities, the state vouches for the trustworthiness of that person to possess firearms (unless that right is withheld).” Thus, as the petitioner puts it: “The right[s] to vote, hold office and sit on a jury are simply surrogates for an underlying state determination/vouching for a person’s trustworthiness to possess a firearm.” We find it unlikely that Congress intended to credit the restoration of “core rights” as indicative of trustworthiness, but exclude the restoration of the very right at issue – the right to possess firearms – from the trustworthiness calculus. Cf. Coram v. State, 996 N.E.2d 1057, 1077 (Ill. 2013) (Karmeier, J., writing separately) (opining that “whether a person previously convicted of an offense constitutes a present danger with a weapon going forward, and whether that individual’s rights to keep and bear arms should be restored . . . , logically, should be the core question” instead of “quibbling over what rights irrelevant to that question have been restored, or, as some cases would have it, how many of those rights”). Put another way, 921(a)(20) reflects “the general intent of Congress to redirect enforcement efforts against firearms owners that have a demonstrated potential for serious unlawful activity.” The court quoted the Ninth Circuit's statement in U.S. v. Valerio that “[b]y contrast to the right to vote, no civil right could be more relevant to a felon’s future dangerousness than the right to possess firearms.” 441 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2006). The court therefore concluded that the “civil rights” contemplated by § 921(a)(20) must include the right to keep and bear arms, and that restoration of that civil right alone (if no others are lost) brings a conviction within the § 921(a)(20) exemption. It distinguished Logan by pointing out that, unlike the the defendant in that case, DuPont had received a "status-altering dispensation," a "token of forgiveness" from Massachusetts through the FLRB’s determination thatv his gun rights should be restored. As previously noted, the FLRB specifically found that the petitioner was “a suitable person to possess a license to carry firearms, and his right to possess a firearm therefore is fully restored in the Commonwealth.” Given our conclusion that the right to keep and bear arms is a civil right for purposes of § 921(a)(20), the petitioner has had one civil right “restored” in the Logan sense. Accordingly, we conclude that Logan does not exclude the petitioner from § 921(a)(20)’s exemption. Further, even though only one civil right was lost and restored, this was enough to bring petitioner’s 1998 conviction within § 921(a)(20)’s exemption, based on precedent holding that the exemption does not require a "full" restoration of rights. The FOPA amendment . . . exempted felons to whom the convicting jurisdiction extended a subsequent gesture of forgiveness, or partial forgiveness, by means of pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights. The theory was no doubt that such a subsequent forgiveness should be credited as an acknowledgment of rehabilitation or an affirmative gesture of goodwill that merited exemption from the firearms bar. . . . [T]he ultimate question is whether the state, by its “gesture of forgiveness,” has “vouche[d] for the trustworthiness of that person to possess firearms (unless that right is withheld).” . . . The gesture of forgiveness here – explicit restoration of firearm rights – vouches for that trustworthiness more directly than any other. In asserting a state's right to interpret the scope of the exemption in 921(a)(20), the New Hampshire court specifically declined to follow federal court decisions involving convictions for misdemeanor domestic violence, in which restoration of gun rights by itself was found insufficient to bring a prior conviction within the exemption. We decline to follow those cases. We conclude that our interpretation of § 921(a) better fulfills Congress’s purpose of “defer[ring] to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 37. Here, Massachusetts acted clearly and directly to remove the restriction the petitioner’s 1998 conviction had placed upon his civil right to keep and bear arms. We hold that Massachusetts thereby restored the petitioner’s civil rights within the meaning of § 921(a)(20).
- State courts question mandatory lifetime sex offender registration (1/4/2015) - Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decisions in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) and Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), state courts are coming to different conclusions under their own constitutions about whether sex offender registration and notification laws constitute punishment for purposes of due process and ex post facto analysis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the most recent to invalidate mandatory registration requirements imposed on juveniles, but several state supreme courts have limited the retroactive application of registration requirements to adults under an ex post facto analysis. Juvenile registration requirements On December 29, 2014 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the state Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the use of an irrebuttable presumption of recidivism. See In the Interest of J.B., 2014 Pa. LEXIS 3468 (Pa. 2014). The court noted that "the common view of registered sexual offenders is that they are particularly dangerous," and that consequently registration "negatively affects juvenile offenders ability to obtain housing, schooling, and employment, which in turn hinders their ability to rehabilitate." Citing research demonstrating the difference between juvenile and adult offenders, notably where sex offenses are involved ("many acts of delinquency involve immaturity, impulsivity, and sexual curiosity rather than hardened criminality"), the court held that "individualized risk assessment, as used in other provisions of SORNA, provides a reasonable alternative means of determining which juvenile offenders pose a high risk of recidivating" so as to warrant their registration. Given that juvenile offenders have a protected right to reputation encroached by SORNA’s presumption of recidivism, where the presumption is not universally true, and where there is a reasonable alternative means for ascertaining the likelihood of recidivating, we hold that the application of SORNA’s current lifetime registration requirements upon adjudication of specified offenses violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing an irrebutable presumption. The Pennsylvania court joined the Ohio Supreme Court in invalidating lifetime sex offender registration requirements imposed on juveniles. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio, 2012) (invalidating on state and federal cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process grounds automatic, lifetime registration imposed on juvenile tried in juvenile system). Meanwhile, federal courts have persisted in upholding categorical registration requirements imposed on juveniles under the Adam Walsh Act. See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 234 (2012) (rejecting equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, procedural and substantive due process challenges against automatic, lifetime registration). On the general issue of juveniles being subject to registration and notification requirements, see Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 Hastings L.J. 1 (2013); Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm of Placing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the US, available at . http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/05/01/raised-registry; Stephanie Forbes, Comment, Sex, Cells, and SORNA: Applying Sex Offender Registration Laws to Sexting Cases, 52 Wm. & L. Rev. 1717 (2011). Adult registration requirements Adults have also caught a few breaks in state court from increasingly harsh registration and notification requirements. In 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a challenge to the state's amended registration law under the state's constitutional ban on non-remedial retroactive laws, finding that "all doubt has been removed" as to whether the state's law is punitive in character. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011). Earlier, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the increasingly onerous features of Indiana's law, including in-home visits by police and the requirement that registrants carry a personal identification card at all times, violated the state constitution's ex post facto provision. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009). See also State v. Letalien, 985 A. 2d 4 (Me. 2009)(more burdensome later-enacted registration requirement violated ex post facto); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry, 882 N.E. 2d 298 (Mass. 2008)(due process violation in failure to give man subjected to new registration requirement opportunity to show that he posed no risk). For recent examples of state court invalidation of registration requirements under state ex post facto provisions, see Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 40 A.3d 39 (Md. 2013); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1994 (Okla. 2013).* As in situations involving juveniles, federal courts have persisted in finding that registration requirements fail to qualify as constitutional punishment, even in their augmented post-Adam Walsh Act form. See, e.g., U.S. v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012). The state/federal duality is exemplified by the Alaska Supreme Court's 2008 decision disagreeing with the Smith majority's opinion that Alaska's registration law was not punitive. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008). For a discussion of constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and notification requirements, and other sex offense-related residency and associational restrictions, see Chapters 2 and 3 of Love, Roberts & Klingele, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction: Law, Policy & Practice (2013). Wayne Logan will shortly be posting his new article on relief from registration requirements, discussed in an earlier post here. *NOTE: See also Doe v. New Hampshire, ___ N.H. ___ , No. 2013-496 (2015)(lifetime-registration-without-review provision of state law, pursuant to which petitioner was denied public housing, made requirement punitive for ex post facto purposes; the requirement could be enforced against petitioner only if he was promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he was permitted to demonstrate that he no longer posed a risk sufficient to justify continued registration.)