Author Archives: Gabriel "Jack" Chin

Gabriel "Jack" Chin

Professor of Law at the UC Davis School of Law, Jack is one of the leading academic authorities on collateral consequences. He served as reporter for the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, and the ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification.

View All Posts

Federal Certificate Offers New Hope for Americans in ‘Internal Exile’

The title of this post is the title of our op-ed in The Crime Report in support of a bipartisan Senate bill that would authorize judges to issue a “Certificate of Rehabilitation” to qualified individuals with federal convictions.  The bill in question was included in the Business Roundtable’s “Second Chance Agenda,” which was the subject of a post here two weeks ago.  The op ed is reprinted below:

Federal Certificate Offers New Hope for Americans in ‘Internal Exile’

The collateral consequences of a federal conviction have thrust many Americans into what some have termed an “internal exile.” Barriers that prevent full reintegration into society are liberally distributed in federal and state laws and regulations.

Congress is now weighing a new form of relief—a Certificate of Rehabilitation—intended to address the absence of any general federal restoration of rights regime, leaving aside the once-robust, now rare and erratic presidential pardon power.

Under the proposed RE-ENTER Act of 2019 (S. 2931), the certificates would be issued by a judge to alleviate the burdens of a criminal record.

The concept was pioneered by New York more than half a century ago, and is currently authorized in 12 states. It has been recommended by the major national law reform organizations.

Now more than ever, there is a pressing need for judicial relief to supplement the federal pardon power: President Donald Trump’s neglect of the Justice Department advisory process has produced a 3,000-case backlog of post-sentence pardon applications.

So far, the RE-ENTER Act has been languishing in committee, despite bipartisan support.

While the Senate is otherwise occupied at the moment, a recent endorsement by the Business Roundtable may have given it new momentum. It’s possible that S. 2931 will be considered in the lame duck session or reintroduced after the new Congress is seated.

For tens of thousands of Americans, that would be welcome news.

There are several things to like about the bill.

Read more

Commercializing criminal records and the privatization of punishment

The deeply ingrained, indeed, constitutionally protected, U.S. tradition of the public trial and public records has led to a system where there are few restrictions on public access to criminal record information.  Europe, by contrast, is more willing to limit the press in service of important goals such as reintegration of people with convictions. Alessandro Corda and Sarah E. Lageson have published an important new study on how this works on the ground.  Disordered Punishment: Workaround Technologies of Criminal Records Disclosure and The Rise of A New Penal Entrepreneurialism, in the British Journal of Criminology, explains how these traditions play out practically in the United States and Europe.

The paper notes that systematically in the United States, and increasingly in Europe, private actors are “extracting, compiling, aggregating and repackaging records from different sources;” as the authors put it, they are “producing” not merely reproducing criminal records.  In so doing they expand the reach of punishment.  To the extent that any random Joe or Jane can obtain criminal records, then potential associates can make decisions based on records, accurate or inaccurate, showing convictions or even mere arrests or charges which were dismissed, diverted, or led to an acquittal.

The case study of the United States notes that employers, landlords, universities and civic organizations often engage in criminal background screening, but these uses are regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.   However, internet databases scrape and buy official and semi-official sources, criminal, financial, licensing, and many others, and make compilations available for a fee.  These “people search” services, thus far, have successfully claimed they are mere information aggregators not subject to FCRA: “these websites provide disclaimers warning users they are not to use the information for any sort of decision-making (such as hiring or housing decisions) but rather can only use the information for review of public records in an information-gathering spirit.” One wonders: How often might employers, landlords and other decisionmakers skip official FCRA reports and go to an unregulated, perhaps cheaper, web search?  Since the chances of getting caught and punished seem small, one might assume it happens a lot. In addition, the quality of this data is sometimes poor; are such things as expungements and set-asides pursuant to state law are reliably added to the databases?

The result is what the authors term “disordered punishment,” imposition of punishment is not restricted to the state: “Employers, insurers and landlords—but also neighbours, acquaintances and potential partners—ultimately determine whether impactful consequences are imposed and, if so, with what magnitude.”  As a result, the consequences of a crime or an accusation become unpredictable.  In some cases, the consequences will be vastly disproportionate to the underlying conduct, for example, when a serious charge has been made but dropped because authorities believe the accused is innocent or even prove the guilt of someone else.  In such cases, decisionmakers may still conclude that looking for another tenant, employee, or date is the safest course.

The paper does not propose solutions, but the CCRC project on non-conviction records may lead to some reforms that could mitigate the problem.  Perhaps the government should not make some records available at all, perhaps some entities now not subject to FCRA should be included, and at a minimum the law should be set up so that if a conviction has been subject to some sort of set-aside, that fact also must be disclosed.

New book argues collateral consequences can’t be justified

University of Nottingham philosophy professor Zachary Hoskins has written an important new book about “collateral legal consequences” (CLCs), just published by Oxford University Press.  Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction engages cases and statutes from the United States and other countries, but it is primarily a philosophical interrogation of the legitimacy of CLCs, not an analysis of legal doctrine or constitutional limitations.

A core principle is the powerful one that harsh treatment and disadvantage requires justification, particularly when hardships are imposed on specific groups.  Beyond Punishment argues that CLCs could be justified as criminal punishment to some degree, but that legitimate punishment is that which is necessary and sufficient to pay one’s debt to society. The way CLCs actually operate in the United States often does not fit into this category.  First, CLCs are not characterized as punishment (and therefore are exempt from the constitutional limitations on criminal punishment) but as civil, regulatory measures.  Second, they are often imposed years after completion of the criminal sentence.

A non-punitive rationale might be that by breaching the social contract, people with convictions are not entitled to the benefits of that contract.  But this proves too much–because someone jaywalked in 1989 does not mean they can legitimately be robbed or defrauded today.  If breaching the social contract justifies only a proportional as opposed to an unlimited response, most CLCs go too far. Beyond Punishment also criticizes public safety as a justification for CLCs, for essentially the same reason: The more or less random and arbitrary imposition of collateral consequences is unduly harsh on some, while others who should be restrained for the same reason but have no criminal conviction are not subject to CLCs.

Beyond Punishment’s careful analysis and precise definitions make a strong case that CLCs are, as Justice Kennedy said about imprisonment itself, disabling “too many persons for too long.”  But the tradition of American constitutional jurisprudence, anyway, has not been to require rigorous fairness or precise justification for hard treatment.  Even with regard to incarceration, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has not been much of a limitation on brutal sentences for minor crimes.  This is, to some extent, good news as well as bad.  While courts have proved, thus far, of only limited help in reining in collateral consequences and other criminal sanctions, legislatures are as unconstrained in repealing or mitigating them as they were in imposing them in the first place.  Legislators and voters, as well as students and lawyers, will be hard-pressed to justify our current system of CLCs after reading this book.

 

Justice Gorsuch on collateral consequences and due process

In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), Justice Gorsuch provided the essential fifth vote to affirm a finding that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act was too vague to be applied in a deportation case. The residual clause defined a “crime of violence” as including “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” A crime constituting a crime of violence was deemed an “aggravated felony” requiring deportation and rendering a non-citizen ineligible for almost all forms of relief.

Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion contains at least two points important for the law of collateral consequences.  First, he is much more concerned with the seriousness of the deprivation rather than its categorization as civil or criminal when evaluating how much process is required under the Constitution.  Unimpressed with the line of cases that treated deportation as quasi-criminal, he notes:

grave as that penalty may be, I cannot see why we would single it out for special treatment when (again) so many civil laws today impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Why, for example, would due process require Congress to speak more clearly when it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien than when it wishes to subject a citizen to indefinite civil commitment, strip him of a business license essential to his family’s living, or confiscate his home? I can think of no good answer.

Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch J., concurring).1

His solution is to level up the process due (in this case, the necessary degree of specificity required of statutory provisions) in civil cases, rather than level down criminal protections: “any suggestion that criminal cases warrant a heightened standard of review does more to persuade me that the criminal standard should be set above our precedent’s current threshold than to suggest the civil standard should be buried below it.” Id. at 1229.

A second interesting point is his guidance for legislatures about how penalty clauses like the one at issue could be drafted.  He notes that “the statute here fails to specify which crimes qualify for [the label of crime of violence],” id. at 1231, and that “Congress remains free at any time to add more crimes to its list.” Id. at 1233.  Many collateral consequence provisions, among other statutes, have the character of the provision voided here: they disqualify based on a quite general description of the crimes that give rise to the consequence (e.g., crimes involving dishonesty), and ask courts or agencies to evaluate specific offenses one at a time to determine whether they fit the categorical criteria.  Only after that process of evaluation do we know whether the consequence applies.

Instead of courts or agencies guessing what legislatures had in mind, it would be perfectly practical instead for Congress and state legislatures, when drafting the law in the first instance, to go item by item through the criminal codes, actually determine whether specific provisions should result in disqualification, and provide a list of those triggering crimes in the statute creating the consequence.  This is the approach of a recent Kansas statute.  If Justice Gorsuch is right that the Constitution is structured to “ensure fair notice before any deprivation of life, liberty, or property could take place,” id. at 1228, this cataloging effort does not seem like too much to ask.

 

Civil death lives!

The first and foremost collateral consequence in Colonial America was civil death; based on the grim fact that felonies were punished by execution, upon conviction, the law began to wrap up the convict’s affairs.  As the law developed, capital punishment ceased to be the default punishment, and civil death was seen as too harsh for a felon who might serve a probationary sentence instead of being executed or even going to prison at all.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court recently issued an opinion demonstrating that this ancient doctrine is not entirely obsolete.

In Gallup v. Adult Correctional Institutions, the court upheld dismissal of a complaint alleging that the state negligently allowed the plaintiff, a prisoner serving life, to be assaulted by another inmate.  The court pointed to the state’s civil death statute, which applies to prisoners serving life in an adult correctional institution. Such persons “shall, with respect to all rights of property, to the bond of matrimony and to all civil rights and relations of any nature whatsoever, be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death had taken place at the time of conviction.”  Of U.S. jurisdictions, only Rhode Island, New York, and the Virgin Islands maintain civil death, and New York’s statute has many exceptions.  There is, accordingly, not much modern law on the scope of civil death statutes.

One wonders whether the Rhode Island statute could really extend to the full scope of its language; could a lifer be denied, for example, freedom of religion and speech under the U.S. and/or Rhode Island constitutions?  Suggesting that the answer is “no” is the fact that the court granted the plaintiff leave to plead a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on the same underlying facts; the court recognized that a state statute cannot eliminate federal rights.

That acknowledgement raises the hard question of the extent to which the federal Constitution protects the property, right to marry, and “civil rights and relations” of even a person serving a life sentence.

California high court invalidates sex offender residency restrictions

326746prIn a remarkable, unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court held on March 2, 2015 that residence restrictions for sex offenders on parole were unconstitutional as applied.  Although the case technically addressed the situation of four named plaintiffs in San Diego County, the decision calls into doubt the statute’s validity in the entire state.

In re Taylor tested the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law, which, like many overwrought and unwise laws was enacted by initiative.  Passed in 2006, it added Section 3003.5(b) to the Penal Code, making it “unlawful for any person for whom registration is required . . . to reside within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.”  In 2010, in an earlier stage of the case, the Court rejected claims brought by that the law was invalid on its face because it was unconstitutionally retroactive under California law, or because it violated state or federal prohibitions on ex post facto laws.  However, the plaintiffs pursued the argument that the law was unconstitutional as applied; the trial court, California Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court agreed.

Read more

Can a taxi license be revoked based on arrest alone?

I went to college, and practiced law, with Dan Ackman, an outstanding New York lawyer who represents taxi drivers in a variety of contexts.  One of his cases, pending in the Southern District of New York, Nnebe v. Daus, challenges the TLC’s alleged practice of automatic license suspension a upon arrest for a felony or specified misdemeanor, and automatic revocation upon conviction, even if the charges had no temporal, physical or logical relationship to driving a cab.  The Second Circuit previously held that automatic revocation was constitutional, but directed a trial on whether the post-deprivation hearing was sufficient.  The case was remanded, tried, and is now pending a decision before Judge Sullivan.  The case has important implications for collateral consequences; mere arrests should not be the basis for any important decision, other than an inquiry into the actual facts, and even a conviction for an unrelated offense should not be the basis for  license revocation.

The Democrat who would be the “Reentry President”: James Webb

This week’s New Yorker features an article by Ryan Lizza about potential democratic candidates.  One, James Webb, former U.S. Senator from Virginia, has a history of interest in prisons and reentry of people with convictions.  The article states:

Jim Webb speaks about his bill about Iran in Washington“In the Senate, he pushed for creating a national commission that would study the American prison system, and he convened hearings on the economic consequences of mass incarceration. He says he even hired three staffers who had criminal records. ‘If you have been in prison, God help you if you want to really rebuild your life,’ Webb told me. ‘We’ve got seven million people somehow involved in the system right now, and they need a structured way to reënter society and be productive again.’ He didn’t mention it, but he is aware that the prison population in the U.S. exploded after the Clinton Administration signed tough new sentencing laws.”

Of course, reentry is not necessarily a partisan issue; President George W. Bush also cared about it, calling America “the land of second chance” in his 2004 State of the Union address, and signing into law the Second Chance Act.  It will be interesting to see if prison spending and reentry become issues in the primaries or the general election.