Tag: Indiana

Long waits for expungement frustrate public safety purposes

Recently, in commenting on a new expungement scheme enacted by the Louisiana legislature, we noted the disconnect between the stated reentry-related purposes of the law and its lengthy eligibility waiting periods.  If people have to log many years of law-abiding conduct before they can even apply for this relief, it is not likely to be of much help to people returning home from prison.  Were Louisiana lawmakers unaware that the new expungement law would be unlikely to serve its stated purposes, or did they have some reason for advertising the new law in terms they knew were inapt. The preamble to the new Louisiana law says it is intended “to break the cycle of criminal recidivism, increase public safety, and assist the growing population of criminal offenders reentering the community to establish a self-sustaining life through opportunities in employment.”  But a felony offender is ineligible to apply for expungement until ten years after completion of sentence, long after recidivism has ceased to be a statistical risk.  In other words, the new law is not likely to do much if anything to “break the cycle of recidivism” or help people “reentering the community” (presumably from prison).  Even misdemeanants have to wait five years before they are eligible. The only people whose records can be expunged immediately are those who were never convicted to begin with. Wouldn’t people returning to the community from prison be more likely to benefit from supportive social services, rehabilitative programming, and assistance with obtaining transitional jobs and housing?  It is possible that the legislators expected the availability of expungement at some future time to provide an incentive to stay on the straight and narrow — but the reference to employment opportunities upon “reentering the community” suggests they had something more immediate in mind.   Relief after a long period of law-abiding conduct also serves a useful purpose to recognize a person’s full rehabilitation, but it does nothing to overcome obstacles faced by people upon their release from prison. The formulaic recitation of public safety-related purposes to justify providing relief from collateral consequences is not unique to Louisiana, and neither is the apparent contradiction with those purposes presented by extended eligibility periods.  New broad expungement schemes in Indiana, Minnesota and Arkansas also make felony offenders wait years without another run-in with the law before they can apply for relief.  Any notion that expungement of conviction records will facilitate reentry or discourage reoffending is either mistaken or disingenuous.   Expungement of arrest records is another matter, though concepts of “reentry” and “recidivism” don’t strictly apply where a person is not convicted. So this raises three questions:  1) why can’t we enact relief from collateral consequences at a time when it will in fact facilitate reentry and impact public safety; 2) why aren’t we doing more to avoid conviction in the first place; and 3) why are legislators and other government officials so hesitant to justify restoration of rights in terms of fairness and/or reward? The answer to Question #1 is that only a few states have enacted laws authorizing relief from collateral consequences as early as sentencing, when it could be of genuine help with reentry.  New York has had such a law for years, for first offenders sentenced to probation. Vermont, Colorado and New Jersey now also have laws authorizing the sentencing court to dispense with mandatory collateral consequences, and bills that would accomplish this have been introduced in several other states.  Relief at sentencing is a feature of both the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act and the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, so perhaps this will be the wave of the future.  Note, however, that not a single state provides record-closing relief to convicted persons prior to completion of sentence, so advocates would do well to consider more transparent forms of relief during the period covered by the sentence. Question #2 gets a more hopeful answer:  more than half the states have opportunities for diversion and deferred adjudication followed by expungement or sealing.  This means that people charged with minor offenses can avoid a conviction record if they successfully completion of probation.  But again, this is not a “reentry” remedy strictly speaking since by definition the person never leaves the community.  And, in those jurisdictions that condition eligibility on a guilty plea, they may be subject to collateral consequences during the period of probation.  The new Model Penal Code: Sentencing has provisions implementing both diversion and deferred adjudication that do not require a formal plea, and whose specific goal is to enable people to avoid incurring collateral consequences. Since there is never a conviction, the person may answer honestly that they have never been convicted.  These provisions originated in the 1970s when reformers were interested in encouraging rehabilitation through sentencing, as we perhaps are again today. (I would note it is high time that the federal government expanded the only authority it now has for deferred adjudication, 18 USC 3706, from drug possession to any minor offense.) Question #3 is rhetorical.   Read more

Louisiana’s new expungement law: How does it stack up?

Louisiana has far and away the largest prison population of any state in the country (847 per 100,000 people — Mississippi is second with 692 per), but until last year there was little that those returning home after serving felony sentences could do to unshackle themselves from their criminal records and the collateral consequences that accompany them. While Louisiana has for years authorized expungement of misdemeanor convictions and non-conviction records, the only relief available to convicted felony offenders was a governor’s pardon — very few of which have been granted in Louisiana in recent years. Most people convicted of a felony in the state, no matter how long ago and no matter how serious the conduct, were stuck with it.* That’s why we were interested to learn that in 2014 Louisiana enacted a brand new freestanding Chapter 34 of its Code of Criminal Procedure to consolidate and extend the law governing record expungement to many felonies. We decided to find out what the new law offers to those with felony records, and how it stacks up against the three other new comprehensive expungement schemes in Arkansas, Indiana, and Minnesota. We found that while a relatively large number of people with felony convictions are newly eligible for expungement relief, the law’s effectiveness is hampered by 1) unreasonably long waiting periods and 2) limited effectiveness in mitigating collateral consequences related to employment and licensure. Waiting periods   According to its preamble, the ostensible purpose of the new Louisiana law is to “to break the cycle of criminal recidivism, increase public safety, and assist the growing population of criminal offenders reentering the community to establish a self-sustaining life through opportunities in employment.” See Art. 971. The law states an aim to provide relief from post-9/11 restrictions on TWIC credentials necessary to work in ports or on vessels under the federal Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.  Id. However, its eligibility waiting period seem inconsistent with these purposes: A felony record may not be expunged until ten years after completion of sentence, which itself may be many years after leaving prison.  Such a long waiting period is not likely to do much to “break the cycle of recidivism” or address the issues facing those “reentering the community” from prison. Even misdemeanants have to wait five years after completion of sentence to apply. Moreover, because the federal MTSA only restricts eligibility for TWIC credentials only for a ten-year period for most offenses, the new law does nothing to ease restrictions on maritime employment. By the time a person with a felony conviction becomes eligible for expungement, their TWIC eligibility has already been restored. The waiting periods for felony expungement under the three other comprehensive new expungement laws are shorter — though still long enough to make us question their utility in reducing recidivism or assisting reentry.   Eligibility for felony expungement in Indiana is three to five years years from completion of sentence or eight years after conviction (unless the prosecutor agrees to a shorter period) and five years after conviction for a misdemeanor.  In Minnesota the waiting period for expungement of all eligible felonies is five years after completion of sentence (two years for misdemeanors).  Arkansas allows “sealing” of felonies five years after completion of sentence, though misdemeanors are eligible for sealing as soon as the sentence is completed. (Compare the relief available as early as sentencing under the Vermont Uniform Act and Colorado’s new drug expungement laws.) A Louisiana record may not be expunged if the person has been convicted of a crime during the waiting period, or has charges pending. The same is true in Indiana and Minnesota. Like Minnesota, Louisiana places no limit on the number of felonies that may be expunged during a person’s lifetime, though in Louisiana a felony may only be expunged once every 15 years.  In Indiana, a person may seek expungement of multiple offenses through one expungement petition, but only one petition may be granted in a person’s lifetime. In Arkansas, an individual may only “seal” one felony conviction. Eligible offenses Unreasonable waiting periods aside, the Louisiana law takes a relatively expansive approach to eligibility, especially compared to the limits Arkansas and Minnesota place on the types of felonies that are eligible for relief.  Under Louisiana’s law, the only felonies that cannot be expunged are those for violent offenses, sex offenses, crimes against minors, and drug trafficking offenses (mere possession with intent to distribute is eligible for expungement). The only other jurisdiction with comparable scope is Indiana, which has similar limitations on violent offenses and sex offenses, but places no limit on the types of drug convictions that may be expunged and does not bar expungement of crimes against minors. Minnesota allows expungement of a list of enumerated minor non-violent felony offenses, and only minor drug distribution offenses may be expunged (most possession-only offenses are eligible).  Arkansas limits sealing to Level C and D felonies. Standards Under Louisiana’s new law, expungement is mandatory if a person meets all of the eligibility requirements.  This is also the case in Indiana for misdemeanors and minor felonies, though not for more serious crimes.  Minnesota and Arkansas require a judicial finding based on a balancing test.  In Minnesota, a felony can only be expunged if the court determines that the benefits of an expungement to the person seeking it are commensurate with concerns of the public and public safety, and with the burden on courts and public authorities to issue, enforce, and monitor an expungement order. In Arkansas, an order to seal records depends on a court’s determination that it is “in the interest of justice” based on consideration of a menu of factors. The fact that an expungement is mandatory in Louisiana if the eligibility requirements are met also means that expungement may be granted without a hearing. A hearing must be held only if the prosecutor or law enforcement objects to the expungement request on grounds of ineligibility. A hearing is generally required in Minnesota and Arkansas. Use of expunged records  Where Louisiana’s law looks most different from the other three laws is in its relatively limited legal and practical effect insofar as employment and licensing is concerned. Expungement of a felony conviction record in Louisiana essentially does two things: 1) It prohibits the state from disclosing records to the general public (as in almost all other states, the record remains available to law enforcement, prosecutors and courts); and 2) it relieves a person of any obligation to disclose the record, or the fact of the record’s expungement. The Louisiana law does not have a restorative effect on any rights lost (most basic civil rights are otherwise restored automatically upon completion of sentence), nor does it restrict the use of expunged records by licensing authorities or employers.  It has no effect on sex offender registration and does not restore handgun rights (long gun rights are not lost) — except, surprisingly, in domestic violence offenses. Though Louisiana’s law generally prohibits the state from releasing expunged records to the public, the law provides some significant exceptions. Most notably, it specifically allows disclosure of expunged records to a number of specified licensing boards, including those governing health care, the insurance industry, social work, and the bar, all of which are authorized to consider criminal records when making licensing determinations. It also allows disclosure for the purpose of screening applicants for licenses and employment involving the care or supervision of children.  Accordingly, while Louisiana’s law permits individuals whose records have been expunged to deny that they have been convicted, the range of permissible disclosures by the state qualifies this benefit. The other three states also allow expunged records to be used as predicate offenses, and for sentencing and sex offender registration purposes.   However, all three states restrict how an expunged record may be used by private and public entities in evaluating eligibility for employment, licensure, and other opportunities.  Indiana’s law is by far the most expansive, prohibiting employers, licensing boards, and anyone else from discriminating against a person based on a record that has been expunged, and even from asking about such a record.  Minnesota takes a similar approach by prohibiting discrimination, but only as it applies to public employment and licensing (with a large and growing list of excepted employers and licensing boards). Under Arkansas’s Criminal Offender Rehabilitation Act, a licensing board may not disqualify a person based on an “expunged” record — though, since Arkansas’ new law now styles what was once known as an “expungement” a “sealing,” it is unclear what affect this provision currently has.  Indiana and Minnesota additionally encourage hiring of those with expunged records by prohibiting admission of expunged convictions as evidence of negligence in negligent hiring actions. The Louisiana law contains no analogous provisions. Third party providers of records The Louisiana law does make some attempt attempt to addresses the problem posed by third party dissemination of expunged records, but it does so in a way that is likely to be ineffective in practice. The law prohibits private providers of criminal records (other than news organizations) from disseminating expunged records, but only if they have been put on notice by the subject of the expunged record. This notice must be sent by certified mail and contain a certified copy of the expungement order. Until a particular provider receives notice from the recipient of an expungement, the provider is entirely free (at least under state law) to disseminate the record to anyone, even if they have other notice it has been expunged. To ensure that expunged records do not reach a potential employer, a person would have to give notice to each and every private provider out there. This a practical impossibility, of course, but, even if it could be done, it would be ineffective because the only providers obligated by receiving notice are those that are not governed by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Considering that a vast majority of private providers of criminal records are subject to FCRA, it is hard to see why this provision was included at all. The Indiana and Minnesota laws offer significantly greater protection against irresponsible private providers.  Here again, Indiana’s law is the stronger, placing a blanket prohibition on dissemination of expunged records by “criminal history providers.” This prohibition is unqualified: Dissemination is prohibited whether the provider has notice of it or not, putting the onus on the provider rather the individual. The Minnesota law occupies a middle ground, prohibiting dissemination by a “business screening service” if the service has notice of the expungement from any source.  Arkansas’s law does not address the issue of third party providers of records. Conclusion Louisiana’s new expungement law represents a significant and commendable move toward giving those with criminal records a chance to regain opportunities lost as a result of conviction. However, although it expands eligibility for expungment to a relatively large number of people, and makes relief mandatory upon a determination of eligibility, its benefits are limited by long waiting periods and limited legal effect. If Louisiana is serious about expanding employment opportunities to those with felony convictions, it would do well to enact measures limiting dissemination and use of expunged records by employers and other third parties, as Indiana, Minnesota, and (to a more limited extent) Arkansas have done.  Until expungement in Louisiana is more than a mechanism to limit official disclosure of records, those who might otherwise be eligible to apply for it may wonder whether it is worth the trouble and expense.   * Louisiana does have a quirky law from 1981 that permits the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information to remove the records of anyone over the age of 60 “from active dissemination to eligible agencies” so long as the person hasn’t been arrested for 15 years. The removal isn’t mandatory, though, so it offers little comfort to anyone young or old.   Read more

State courts question mandatory lifetime sex offender registration

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decisions in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) and Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), state courts are coming to different conclusions under their own constitutions about whether sex offender registration and notification laws constitute punishment for purposes of due process and ex post facto analysis.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the most recent to invalidate mandatory registration requirements imposed on juveniles, but several state supreme courts have limited the retroactive application of registration requirements to adults under an ex post facto analysis. Juvenile registration requirements On December 29, 2014 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the state Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the use of an irrebuttable presumption of recidivism.  See In the Interest of J.B., 2014 Pa. LEXIS 3468 (Pa. 2014).  The court noted that “the common view of registered sexual offenders is that they are particularly dangerous,”  and that consequently registration “negatively affects juvenile offenders ability to obtain housing, schooling, and employment, which in turn hinders their ability to rehabilitate.”  Citing research demonstrating the difference between juvenile and adult offenders, notably where sex offenses are involved (“many acts of delinquency involve immaturity, impulsivity, and sexual curiosity rather than hardened criminality”), the court held that “individualized risk assessment, as used in other provisions of SORNA, provides a reasonable alternative means of determining which juvenile offenders pose a high risk of recidivating” so as to warrant their registration. Given that juvenile offenders have a protected right to reputation encroached by SORNA’s presumption of recidivism, where the presumption is not universally true, and where there is a reasonable alternative means for ascertaining the likelihood of recidivating, we hold that the application of SORNA’s current lifetime registration requirements upon adjudication of specified offenses violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing an irrebutable presumption. The Pennsylvania court joined the Ohio Supreme Court in invalidating lifetime sex offender registration requirements imposed on juveniles.  In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio, 2012) (invalidating on state and federal cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process grounds automatic, lifetime registration imposed on juvenile tried in juvenile system). Meanwhile, federal courts have persisted in upholding categorical registration requirements imposed on juveniles under the Adam Walsh Act.  See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 234 (2012) (rejecting equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, procedural and substantive due process challenges against automatic, lifetime registration). On the general issue of juveniles being subject to registration and notification requirements, see Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 Hastings L.J. 1 (2013); Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm of Placing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the US, available at . http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/05/01/raised-registry; Stephanie Forbes, Comment, Sex, Cells, and SORNA: Applying Sex Offender Registration Laws to Sexting Cases, 52 Wm. & L. Rev. 1717 (2011).  Adult registration requirements Adults have also caught a few breaks in state court from increasingly harsh registration and notification requirements.  In 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a challenge to the state’s amended registration law under the state’s constitutional ban on non-remedial retroactive laws, finding that “all doubt has been removed” as to whether the state’s law is punitive in character. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011). Earlier, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the increasingly onerous features of Indiana’s law, including in-home visits by police and the requirement that registrants carry a personal identification card at all times, violated the state constitution’s ex post facto provision. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009).  See also State v. Letalien, 985 A. 2d 4 (Me. 2009)(more burdensome later-enacted registration requirement violated ex post facto); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry, 882 N.E. 2d 298 (Mass. 2008)(due process violation in failure to give man subjected to new registration requirement opportunity to show that he posed no risk).  For recent examples of state court invalidation of registration requirements under state ex post facto provisions, see Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 40 A.3d 39 (Md. 2013); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1994 (Okla. 2013).* As in situations involving juveniles, federal courts have persisted in finding that registration requirements fail to qualify as constitutional punishment, even in their augmented post-Adam Walsh Act form.  See, e.g., U.S. v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012).  The state/federal duality is exemplified by the Alaska Supreme Court’s 2008 decision disagreeing with the Smith majority’s opinion that Alaska’s registration law was not punitive. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008). For a discussion of constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and notification requirements, and other sex offense-related residency and associational restrictions, see Chapters 2 and 3 of Love, Roberts & Klingele, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction: Law, Policy & Practice (2013).  Wayne Logan will shortly be posting his new article on relief from registration requirements, discussed in an earlier post here. *NOTE:  See also Doe v. New Hampshire, ___ N.H. ___ , No. 2013-496 (2015)(lifetime-registration-without-review provision of state law, pursuant to which petitioner was denied public housing, made requirement punitive for ex post facto purposes; the requirement could be enforced against petitioner only if he was promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he was permitted to demonstrate that he no longer posed a risk sufficient to justify continued registration.)   Read more

Indiana’s new expungement law the product of “many, many compromises”

In May of 2013, Indiana Governor Mike Pence signed into law what is possibly the most comprehensive and forward-looking restoration of rights statute ever enacted in this country.  Under the new law, courts are empowered to “expunge” most criminal records, after waiting periods keyed to the seriousness of the offense.  The effect of an expungement order varies to some extent according to the nature of the crime, but its core concept is to restore rights and eliminate discrimination based on criminal record in the workplace and elsewhere.  This new law has already resulted in relief for hundreds of individuals, due in large part to the proactive approach of the state courts in facilitating pro se representation. We recently had a chance to talk to the person primarily responsible for shepherding this law through the Indiana legislature, and his experience should be instructive to reform advocates in other states.  Jud McMillin, a conservative former prosecutor who chairs the House Committee on Courts and Criminal Code, might once have been regarded as a rather unusual champion of this unique and progressive legislation.  But in an age of bipartisan support for criminal justice reform, apparently anything can happen.   Rep. McMillin told us how he was able to persuade his colleagues in the legislature by careful groundwork, and overcome opposition from prosecutors and courts by making what he described as “many, many compromises.” One of the most important of those compromises was limiting use of criminal records rather than limiting public access to them, at least in the case of more serious offenses. Before letting Rep. McMillan describe in his own words how he secured passage of this relief scheme, here is a brief description of the law’s most salient features. (A more detailed description can be found here.)     All criminal records (except convictions involving serious violence, public corruption, and sexual offenses) are eligible for expungement from the court of conviction, after waiting periods ranging from one year (for non-conviction records) to ten years (for the most serious eligible felonies). After the court has issued an expungement order, records not resulting in conviction and records of misdemeanors and minor felonies are automatically sealed.  After a record is sealed, even a prosecutor may not access it without a court order. Expunged records of more serious convictions “remain public,” although they must be “clearly and visibly marked or identified as being expunged.”  However, all expungement orders similarly limit the use to which a criminal record can be put, as described below. Expungement may be granted by the court without a hearing unless the prosecutor objects.  Those filing for expungement of a conviction must pay the filing fees required for filing a civil action ($141), and this requirement may not be waived. Defendants are not permitted to waive the right to seek expungement as part of a plea agreement. A petitioner may seek to expunge more than one conviction at the same time, but may be granted expungement only once in his or her lifetime. If the first petition fails, there is a three-year waiting period before a person may reapply, and the only convictions expungeable are those in the original petition. It is unlawful discrimination for any person to refuse to employ or license a person because of a conviction or arrest record that has been expunged or sealed, and a person may not be questioned about a previous criminal record except in terms that exclude expunged convictions or arrests. Expunged convictions are not admissible as evidence of negligence in a civil action against a person who relied on the expungement order, and they may not be reported by credit reporting companies. The Attorney General may enforce the provisions relating to credit reporting companies through injunction and fines, and a private individual injured by a violation of these sections may recover damages, court costs and attorney fees. The Indiana courts have published a detailed explanation of the law and sample petitions for expungement that are tailored to the particular categories of eligible cases, to enable a person to seeking expungement without hiring a lawyer. * * * * * * * * * Here is our interview with Rep. McMillin: How did you get interested in the subject of criminal records? As a former prosecutor, and now someone who does some criminal defense work while serving in the legislature, I think I have seen the justice system from several sides.  Also, as a fiscal conservative it just makes practical sense to me that when somebody has served their court-imposed sentence there has to be a pathway back into society for them. Without this, we can’t expect them to become productive members of society.  The Indiana Constitution requires our criminal justice system to be based upon the principles of reformation and not vindication. I firmly believe that our expungement law moves substantially in that direction. How did you build support for the concept of expungement among your colleagues in the legislature? This was a process that played out over several years.  We proceeded in incremental steps, building on existing law and gaining supporters from various constituencies. We started by expanding an existing provision of the Indiana code that allowed courts to reduce a minor felony to a misdemeanor upon completion of the sentence, to allow people to come back after a waiting period to get the felony reduced, as long as they had no further charges.  I thought if I could just start the conversation with a simple bill that did not involve more serious offenses I would be able to get people to see how detrimental having a felony conviction can be for someone who wants to get back into the work force.  I took a practical approach, and was able to persuade some of my fiscally conservative colleagues that there can be economic benefits through the reduction of recidivism.  After getting that initial language enacted I came back the next session to work on full expungement, and found that there was support on both sides of the aisle as many people were able to see the benefits. There were those who had general objections to the legislation, some for ideological reasons, some for practical reasons, but we were able to overcome all of them with solid logic when it came to debating this issue.  We were even able to win over some of the prosecutors, enough that the opposition of the holdouts didn’t derail the legislation’s chances.  One of the most effective supporters was the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, which helped me convince people that expungement could be beneficial to business owners and economy as a whole. Obviously there were a lot of compromises we had to make, and it’s not hard to see what some of them were, like the lifetime limit to one expungement, the prohibition on seeking expungement of offenses committed after a petition has been denied, and the filing fee that is hefty for many.  Certain violent and sexual offenses had to be excluded from coverage or it would have torpedoed the effort before we got it off the ground. It was sometimes difficult to give up some things just to get the bill passed, while still ending up with a law that actually made a difference. We were able to resist several offers to compromise that would have simply gutted the bill.  We had to keep our eye on the core purposes of the legislation, which are to restore rights and give people a fair chance in the workplace and elsewhere.  We will see how the law works.  If some of the compromises we made need to be revisited, we can do that.  In fact, in the 2014 session we made quite a number of reasonably minor adjustments in the law, notably to permit more government entities including licensing agencies access to sealed records. How were you able to defuse opposition from the prosecutors? Because I anticipated the prosecutors would be the main opponents, I reached out to them early in the process, and worked with the ones who were willing to consider the concept. Here again I took a practical view, asking if they really wanted people they had prosecuted to return to the system, or whether they wanted them to succeed.  I had to persuade them that expunging a record did not reflect badly on the prosecution or create problems for law enforcement.  While their ideas were substantially different than mine, I felt it was important to incorporate many of them, and so we were able to reach a middle ground. That is how we came to have a multi-tiered system, with limits on sealing for more serious offenses, a role for prosecutors in the expungement process, the possibility of unsealing in the event of a new crime, and a lifetime limit of one expungement.   This is not to say that prosecutors across Indiana ended up supporting expungement. In fact many of them remain its most ardent opponents. However, asking for their input early and making them a part of the process instead of a constant and united opponent was instrumental in getting the job done. What about other sources of opposition or support? Many judges objected and some of the clerks were opposed to the additional work that the legislation would make for them.  The credit reporting companies were also not happy but they did not mount any substantial resistance.  As noted, the business community was surprisingly supportive.  Many employers liked the protections afforded them in the bill — including not being held responsible for information there were not permitted to have.  Governor Pence was a supporter from the beginning.  Early in his term he adopted a slogan that “Indiana should be the worst place to commit a crime, but the best place to get a second chance.” This slogan fit perfectly into the concept of this legislation. How has the law been working in its first year? Once the law was passed, the courts took a proactive role in carrying out their new responsibilities.  They took it upon themselves to develop a variety of forms for different kinds of cases, and publish them on a website so that people could apply for expungement without the need to hire a lawyer.   Legal services organizations have been spreading the word around the state, and are helping to clarify what appears to have been some initial confusion because of the law’s complexity.  There have been a few kinks, and as I said we have already passed several bills to make slight adjustments mostly of a procedural nature.  I anticipate that there will more a few more tweaks this year.  Thankfully the concept has been received wonderfully by the public so making the changes at this point is relatively easy and meets little resistance. Why is the relief called “expungement” if many records remain open to the public? I get this question frequently, and yes I agree it is a bit confusing to use a term that ordinarily implies some limits on access.  The original concept was that an expungement order would seal all records except for law enforcement purposes.  But that was not an approach that I could sell, in or out of the legislature, especially for more serious offenses.  As the bill ended up with tiered approaches, there really was not a single term that fit the whole — and as we studied what other states do, I am not even sure the term “expungement” has a single meaning. Also, even if a record is actually destroyed, it may be impossible to ever remove all evidence of it.   In the end, I was convinced that “expungement” was the best term to use to ensure that people who need relief would take advantage of it.  There’s no doubt that most people believe that you only get a second chance if your record is clear in a literal sense.  But even where a record is sealed, our law does not permit people to deny that they were arrested or convicted; rather, they cannot be asked about a record that has been expunged.  In this way we were able to reconcile keeping the record open with the core concept of restoring rights.  By limiting the use of a record we hope to clear away the cloud that these individuals have been living under. What advice do you have for legislators in other states and for advocates who want to try to develop a comprehensive scheme like Indiana’s? To begin with, to pass a bill like this you have to have someone in a leadership role who really understands the inside and out of the criminal justice system, and who is willing to live and breathe this concept through the entire legislative process and see it all the way through to completion. You have to start the conversation very early, and learn patience. It takes a long time to convince people who may only have a passing interest (or no real interest at all) in something like this, and no personal experience with the justice system, to understand why it is a good idea and why they should take the perceived risk of supporting this concept. In the political world it is very easy for those who oppose this concept to get their hooks into legislators early by telling them that this is “soft on crime” and that it will damage them politically to support it. In order to combat this I think it is necessary for the legislator who is carrying the bill to spend one-on-one time sitting down with other legislators. While advocates are important and certainly should be recruited, I find that nothing is as persuasive as the legislators themselves discussing the concept.  The other really important thing is to secure the support of the business community.   You should also find examples of individuals who have been battling for years if not decades to be successful in society while carrying the weight of a criminal record. Their anecdotal testimony can be extremely powerful. I also recommend reaching out to those you anticipate will oppose the bill and asking them to help with the bill. If they are not on the inside helping they will be on the outside opposing. Even if the “help” they are giving is not always consistent with the concept you are trying to advance, you are still much better off having those people working with you on developing language than trying to kill any language that you come up with. It is helpful to defuse opposition if you couch the conversation in terms of the social and economic benefit to society rather than always talking about the benefit to the individuals who might seek expungement. It is very important to make people see that while our human compassion should want to give people a second chance, our duty is to be fiscally responsible to our constituents, and that for numerous reasons (recidivism, costs of incarceration, costs of providing welfare, public safety, etc.) this concept is the right one for all of our constituents. In the end, you really do have to be willing to compromise, recognizing that if you get the key concepts enacted you can always come back later and change the details.     Read more

Federal regulation of criminal background checking

Twenty years ago, criminal record background checks for employment were rare. Today, the easy accessibility of criminal records on the Internet, and the post-September 11th culture of heightened scrutiny, have contributed to a sharp increase in background checks of job candidates.  If you’re applying for jobs in most industries, expect employers to ask about a criminal record at some point in the hiring process—and expect many of them to run a background check on you. It’s a harsh reality for an estimated one in four U.S. adults who have some type of criminal record.  Unfortunately, any involvement with the criminal justice system—even having minor or old offenses—could become a job obstacle for these 70 million Americans. Even if you’ve avoided a run-in with the law, you could still find yourself being unfairly screened out for a job due to an erroneous background check report. With thousands of private background check companies across the country that have varying levels of reliable information, inaccuracies in these reports are far too common. Unknown to many job candidates, private background check companies and the employers relying on their reports are regulated by a federal consumer protection law called the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).  Although more well-known in the credit report context, FCRA also applies to companies that produce criminal background check information, and gives job-seekers a number of protections. Here are a few highlights of FCRA as applied to criminal record information reports: Background check companies may not report arrests older than seven years and must have procedures to ensure accuracy of the information provided to employers. Employers must obtain authorization from the job applicant before getting the report. Before the background check report can be used to deny a job, the employer must provide a copy of the report to the job-seeker. The job applicant also has the right to dispute the accuracy of the report. Despite the letter of the law, advocates representing workers have identified background check reports that are riddled with errors. The consequences are devastating for workers unfairly denied job opportunities because of an inaccurate record, particularly in a tight labor market.  Some common errors include the reporting criminal record information of another person with a similar name, failure to include the final outcome of an arrest, reporting a stale arrest record, or reporting an item multiple times giving the appearance of a lengthy record.  The National Consumer Law Center’s Broken Records captures many of the common problems. FCRA is enforced administratively by the Federal Trade Commission, but “The ‘Wild West’ of Employment Background Checks” hasn’t been tamed.  With limited regulatory accountability, advocates have turned to litigation against some of the largest background check companies for FCRA violations.  Advocates have also urged the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to take an interest in this industry because of the impact of widespread noncompliance with FCRA on consumers. Another promising strategy is to tackle the issue at the state level.  States could enact limitations on reporting of certain criminal record information, take steps to increase accuracy of records, and ensure disposition information is processed efficiently.  For example, California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) restricts the reporting of convictions older than seven years. And recently, Indiana made regulation of background checkers a part of its comprehensive 2013 expungement and sealing scheme.  For more ideas on a state reform agenda, see this report.   CCRC STAFF NOTE:  The provisions of the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act are described in greater detail, and court cases collected, by Sharon Dietrich in §§5:14 to 5:31 of Love, et al., Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions (West/NACDL 2013).     Read more