Author: CCRC Staff

Editorial staff of the Collateral Consequences Resource Center

BU Law Review publishes symposium on misdemeanors

In May 2018 the Boston University Law Review published a symposium titled “Misdemeanor Machinery: The Hidden Heart of the American Criminal Justice System.”  Links to the articles, which were presented at a conference held in November 2017, are below.  The conference also benefited from presentations by a number of distinguished academics, judges, and policy-makers, including Alexandra Natapoff, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jeffrey Fagan and retired Judge Shira Scheindlin.  The full list of speakers is available here.

A recurring theme throughout the conference was how misdemeanors impose significant collateral consequences, including in ways that are deeply disproportionate.  The articles offer valuable insight into how prosecutors, public defenders, lawmakers and judges ought to consider collateral consequences of misdemeanor arrests and convictions.  The entire symposium issue is well worth a read.

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“Managing Collateral Consequences in the Information Age”

“Managing Collateral Consequences in the Information Age” is the title of a symposium issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter.  It is composed of papers prepared for a Roundtable conference on criminal records issues jointly sponsored by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of State Legislatures in January 2018, and associated primary source materials.  The issue’s Table of Contents shows the breadth and variety of topics covered. An introductory essay by Margaret Love summarizes the approach to managing collateral consequences in the revised sentencing articles of the Model Penal Code, and the seemingly contrary trends in criminal records management in state legislatures in recent years.  She describes each of the papers in the issue, and policy recommendations tentatively reached by participants in the January Roundtable.

  • Alessandro Corda of Queens University (Belfast) contributes a discussion of “American exceptionalism” in criminal records matters, and proposes a way of neutralizing their malign effect.
  • Scholars and practitioners describe how relief schemes work (or don’t work) in states as diverse as:
    • North Carolina (John Rubin, UNC/Government)
    • Tennessee (Joy Radice, UT/Law)
    • Nevada (Sen. Tick Segerblom and Nick Anthony, NV Legislature)
    • California (Jack Chin, UC Davis/Law; Eliza Hersh)
    • Indiana (Josh Gaines and Margaret Love, CCRC)
  • Douglas Berman and Nora Demleitner write about subsets of the collateral consequences problem (sex offender registration and marijuana decriminalization).
The issue also publishes the provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing on non-conviction dispositions and on collateral consequences, and a collection of reports and other materials from the Collateral Consequences Resource Center.
The University of California Press has generously made available to non-subscribers the entire FSR issue for downloading at this link.

SC legislature overrides veto to broaden expungement laws

On June 27, the South Carolina legislature took the extraordinary step of overriding Governor McMaster’s veto of a bill that expanded eligibility for expungement in several significant (if relatively modest) ways.  House Bill 3209 is now law, and will take effect in six months.  This is one of the very few times in recent years that a state legislature has overridden a governor’s veto of a bill intended to improve opportunities for people with a criminal record.

The new law, which will go into effect after six months, extends expungement eligibility to first offense simple drug possession (after three years) or possession with intent to distribute (after twenty years), and to conviction of repealed offenses.  It also repeals first offender limits on expungement eligibility for convictions in magistrates court (summary offenses) and in juvenile proceedings, and applies all of these authorities retroactively.  HR 3209 also restructures fee provisions and authorizes private donations to defray costs for those who cannot afford to pay the fee.  Finally, HR 3209 authorizes expungement for anyone convicted prior to passage of the Youthful Offender Act of 2010 who could have been eligible for sentencing as a first offender under that provision.  The YOA provides that individuals between the ages of 17 and 25 who are convicted of certain non-violent misdemeanors and minor felonies may be sentenced to probation and treatment, so the extension of that law’s relief to pre-2010 convictions is quite significant.  

NC expands certificate law, taking three steps forward, one step back

The states are on a roll in passing new “second chance” legislation.  In addition to the extraordinary new Pennsylvania bill on automatic sealing we posted about earlier today, we’ve just learned that the North Carolina legislature has approved a bill modifying eligibility for judicial Certificates of Relief.  Certificates, which are available from the sentencing court one year after sentencing, remove mandatory collateral consequences (including in employment and licensing), certify that an individual poses no public safety risk, and provide negligent hiring protection.  The bill has been sent to the Governor for signature, we will inform you as soon as he has done so.   Hat’s off to our friends at the North Carolina Justice Center, who worked hard to get this bill passed!   

The bill will provide further relief and opportunity for people with multiple convictions.  The “one step back” referred to in the title of this post is that while the bill significantly expands eligibility for misdemeanors and the lowest level felonies, it also removes from eligibility one class of felony.   It is inevitable that there will occasionally be some last-minute counter-current in pressing for extension of relief provisions.   In North Carolina, what might have been cause for discouragement has evidently (and commendably) provided advocates with additional incentive to pursue a reform agenda and to educate employers about the value of certificates.   

Here is a description of the bill from Daniel Bowes at the NCJC:     Read more

Justice Gorsuch on collateral consequences and due process

In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), Justice Gorsuch provided the essential fifth vote to affirm a finding that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act was too vague to be applied in a deportation case. The residual clause defined a “crime of violence” as including “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” A crime constituting a crime of violence was deemed an “aggravated felony” requiring deportation and rendering a non-citizen ineligible for almost all forms of relief.

Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion contains at least two points important for the law of collateral consequences.  First, he is much more concerned with the seriousness of the deprivation rather than its categorization as civil or criminal when evaluating how much process is required under the Constitution.  Unimpressed with the line of cases that treated deportation as quasi-criminal, he notes:

grave as that penalty may be, I cannot see why we would single it out for special treatment when (again) so many civil laws today impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Why, for example, would due process require Congress to speak more clearly when it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien than when it wishes to subject a citizen to indefinite civil commitment, strip him of a business license essential to his family’s living, or confiscate his home? I can think of no good answer.

Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch J., concurring).1

His solution is to level up the process due (in this case, the necessary degree of specificity required of statutory provisions) in civil cases, rather than level down criminal protections: “any suggestion that criminal cases warrant a heightened standard of review does more to persuade me that the criminal standard should be set above our precedent’s current threshold than to suggest the civil standard should be buried below it.” Id. at 1229.

A second interesting point is his guidance for legislatures about how penalty clauses like the one at issue could be drafted.  He notes that “the statute here fails to specify which crimes qualify for [the label of crime of violence],” id. at 1231, and that “Congress remains free at any time to add more crimes to its list.” Id. at 1233.  Many collateral consequence provisions, among other statutes, have the character of the provision voided here: they disqualify based on a quite general description of the crimes that give rise to the consequence (e.g., crimes involving dishonesty), and ask courts or agencies to evaluate specific offenses one at a time to determine whether they fit the categorical criteria.  Only after that process of evaluation do we know whether the consequence applies.

Instead of courts or agencies guessing what legislatures had in mind, it would be perfectly practical instead for Congress and state legislatures, when drafting the law in the first instance, to go item by item through the criminal codes, actually determine whether specific provisions should result in disqualification, and provide a list of those triggering crimes in the statute creating the consequence.  This is the approach of a recent Kansas statute.  If Justice Gorsuch is right that the Constitution is structured to “ensure fair notice before any deprivation of life, liberty, or property could take place,” id. at 1228, this cataloging effort does not seem like too much to ask.