Tag: Trump

“The Future of the President’s Pardon Power”

The Collateral Consequences Resource Center is pleased to announce a series of online panels on successive Tuesdays in September, starting on September 14, that will explore in depth the use of the pardon power by President Donald Trump, and how it both reflects recent trends in pardoning and is likely to influence pardoning in the future. The first panel, on September 14, will discuss Trump’s abandonment of the bureaucratic tradition in pardoning and what this reveals both about his concept of office and about the nature of the constitutional power.  The second panel, on September 21, will consider whether Trump’s pardons may prompt much-needed reforms in sentencing law and practice.  The third panel, on September 28, will consider possible changes in how the pardon power is administered resulting from its idiosyncratic use by President Trump, and whether the Justice Department should remain responsible for advising the president in pardon matters. This series is jointly organized by CCRC, the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, the Federal Sentencing Reporter, and the David F. and Constance B. Girard-diCarlo Center for Ethics, Integrity and Compliance at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law. The panels are based on the essays in Volume 33, Issue 5 of the Federal Sentencing Reporter. Margaret Love, executive director of CCRC, curated and introduced the FSR essays, and recruited participants for the panels. Register for each panel here.   PANEL 1: Donald Trump’s Theatre of Pardoning: What Did We Learn? September 14, 2021 | 12:30 – 2:00 p.m. EDT | Zoom Panelists: Frank Bowman, Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law Bernadette Meyler, Carl and Sheila Spaeth Professor of Law, Stanford Law School Amy Povah, founder, CAN-DO Justice through Clemency Kenneth Vogel, The New York Times  Moderator:  Margaret Love, executive director, Collateral Consequences Resource Center, former U.S. Pardon Attorney   PANEL 2: Supplementing the Pardon Power: Second Looks and Second Chances Tuesday, September 21, 2021 | 12:30 – 2:00 p.m. EDT | Zoom Panelists: Jack Chin, Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair of Law, Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, and Director of Clinical Legal Education, University of California, Davis, Law School John Gleeson, attorney and former United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge Beverly Martin, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit JaneAnne Murray, professor of practice, University of Minnesota Law School Moderator:  Carter Stewart, executive vice president, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio   PANEL 3: Managing the Pardon Power: Should the Justice Department Remain the Gatekeeper? Tuesday, September 28, 2021 | 12:30 – 2:00 p.m. EDT | Zoom Panelists: Rachel Barkow, Vice Dean and Charles Seligson Professor of Law, New York University School of Law Jeffrey Crouch, assistant professor of American politics, School of Public Affairs, American University Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Rumpel Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation Margaret Love, executive director, Collateral Consequences Resource Center, former U.S. Pardon Attorney Moderator:  Douglas Berman, Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law and executive director, Drug Enforcement and Policy Center   Read more

Federal policies block loans to small business owners with a record

Starting a small business is increasingly recognized as a pathway to opportunity for individuals with an arrest or conviction history—particularly given the disadvantages they face in the labor market. An estimated 4% of small businesses in the United States have an owner with a conviction (1.5% have a felony conviction). Small businesses provide “a vital opportunity for those with a criminal record to contribute to society, to earn an honest profit, and to give back to others.” They also frequently employ people with a record and help reduce recidivism. A growing number of organizations and government programs are devoted to supporting individuals with a record in building their own businesses. Yet many structural barriers remain, including a series of little-known federal regulations and policies that impose broad criminal history restrictions on access to government-sponsored business loans, notably by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA).  A recent article illustrates the steep challenges faced by business owners with a record by telling the stories of several entrepreneurs who were either denied an SBA loan or were discouraged from even trying for one because of a dated felony conviction.  One of those entrepreneurs comments: “You might do five years, ten years, one year, but you pay for it until you’re in the grave.” To illuminate and help reduce these barriers, our organization is working to develop a new “Fair Chance Lending” project. We hope to show that—rather than broadly exclude individuals with a criminal history—officials should draw record-based restrictions as narrowly as feasible, facilitate access to resources, and celebrate entrepreneurial efforts, consistent with growing national support for reintegration and fair chances in civil society. The SBA’s record-related lending policies came into focus in the spring of 2020 when the agency imposed remarkably broad criminal history restrictions on hundreds of billions in financial relief for small businesses and nonprofits authorized through the CARES Act in response to COVID-19. The SBA’s pandemic relief programs were massive: in fiscal year 2020, the agency distributed $525 billion through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and $211 billion through the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. But hundreds of thousands of small businesses and nonprofits were barred by the SBA from accessing these funds through shockingly extensive criminal history restrictions not required or suggested by statute, with disproportionate impacts on Black and Latino/Latinx communities. A recent RAND study found that just one aspect of these restrictions—the disqualification from PPP relief of all businesses with an owner or “associate” with a felony conviction within the previous five years—excluded an estimated 212,655 small businesses with 343,198 employees. When we began to write about SBA’s restrictions on COVID-19 relief shortly after the passage of the CARES Act, our servers crashed because of the level of public interest, requiring us to update our systems. Thousands of business owners emailed us, with a wide variety of disqualifying records and types of businesses, desperate for help, fearful of publicly discussing their predicament lest their backgrounds be exposed. We researched the issues in detail and joined a large bipartisan group of organizations calling on the SBA to revise its restrictions. The SBA, also facing public pressure from impacted individuals, a bipartisan group of lawmakers, and litigation, rolled back most of the restrictions it had imposed, with the Trump Administration loosening restrictions on multiple occasions over the course of 2020 and the Biden Administration making additional changes in early 2021. Despite the massive impact of these restrictions on the first round of emergency relief, the SBA did not initially explain or attempt to justify them. When sued in June 2020, the SBA defended its rule on grounds that criminal history can speak to an applicant’s “higher likelihood of reincarceration” and “potential for misuse of funds.” See Defy Ventures v. U.S. Small Business Administration, 469 F. Supp. 3d 459, 476 (D. Md. 2020). Despite the easing of record-related restrictions on COVID-19 relief, the SBA continues to maintain extensive criminal record barriers in its general business loan and disaster assistance programs which are summarized below. The SBA treats criminal history as a credit risk, despite the absence of any evidence to support that position or statutory authority for it.1 While the agency has awarded a handful of grants in recent years to community-based organizations working with formerly incarcerated entrepreneurs, its general lending programs all but preclude loans to the entrepreneurs themselves. In addition to its various lending programs, the SBA provides training, contracting opportunities, and other forms of assistance to small disadvantaged businesses through the 8(a) Business Development Program, which allows participants to take advantage of set-aside and sole-source contracts to help aspiring entrepreneurs compete for positions as government contractors. The 8(a) Program allows for, and often requires, consideration of applicants’ criminal backgrounds as part of a mandate that applicants have “good character.” In contrast, the SBA’s rural-focused sister agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, appears to administer its various lending programs to farmers and ranchers with narrowly-tailored criminal history restrictions tied to specific statutory provisions.2 The SBA’s criminal history restrictions very likely contribute to racial inequalities in the economy. The SBA’s criminal history restrictions on COVID-19 relief led to documented racial disparities. The SBA’s comparable criminal history restrictions in its general loan programs almost certainly have similar effects, particular given the well-documented racial disparities in the instance of criminal records in general. The SBA makes little effort to justify its broad policy-based restrictions, which heightens their contrast with the targeted statutory restrictions that apply to rural-focused lending programs administered by the USDA. The criminal record restrictions in the SBA’s lending programs are described in greater detail below. Criminal record restrictions in the Small Business Administration’s lending programs The SBA 7(a) and 504 programs The SBA’s most common business loan, through the 7(a) program, guarantees a large percentage of a loan provided by a private lender. The SBA’s development company program, the 504 program, provides long-term, fixed rate financing for major fixed assets through Certified Development Companies. Both programs authorize individual loans of up to $5 million. In fiscal year 2020 alone, the SBA provided $22.5 billion in loans through the 7(a) program and $5.8 billion through the 504 program. An SBA regulation makes ineligible for either program “[b]usinesses with an Associate who is incarcerated, on probation, on parole, or has been indicted for a felony or a crime of moral turpitude.” SBA’s policy statement applicable to both programs imposes additional blanket restrictions, also making ineligible businesses with an associate currently under specified forms of diversionary or conditional dispositions, an order of protection, registered with a sex offense registry, or facing any criminal charges in any jurisdiction. This policy statement further provides that various individuals associated with the business must also be “of good character,” as determined by the SBA (this includes any proprietor, general partner, officer, director, managing member of a limited liability company, owner of 20% or more of the equity of the Applicant, Trustor, or any person hired to manage day-to-day operations). Each of these persons must disclose and provide documentation about: (1) any arrests in the past six months; and (2) any criminal offense (excluding minor vehicle violations), any convictions, guilty pleas, no contest pleas, or any placements on pretrial diversion or any form of parole or probation, at any time. All expunged and sealed records must be disclosed. If any person has not satisfied all sentencing conditions (which may include payment of court debt), the applicant is not eligible for a loan. A lender may proceed with a loan (assuming all other requirements are met) if all the documented criminal records are older than six months and involve either: a non-conviction or a misdemeanor conviction not involving a crime against a minor. However, if any person has: a prior felony conviction that was not reduced to a misdemeanor, a prior misdemeanor conviction for a crime against a minor, or, within the previous six months, either a misdemeanor conviction or charges filed, they are required to complete an FBI fingerprint background check and undergo an individualized character determination by the SBA—before a lender may process the loan. It is unknown how often lenders actually proceed with the FBI/SBA process at that point rather than simply deny the application. It is also unknown how often the SBA finds that such a person meets the “good character” requirement in its policy statement. 2. The SBA microloan program The SBA’s microloan program, which provides loans of up to $50,000 through authorized nonprofit community-based intermediaries, imposes narrow criminal history restrictions. The SBA distributed $85 million through this program in fiscal year 2020. Regulations provide that businesses are ineligible only if they have an associate who is incarcerated or under indictment for a felony or crime of moral turpitude, or on probation or parole for certain offenses. The SBA’s policy statement for the microloan program does not impose any additional blanket restrictions or good character requirements, although it vests discretion with the lender to determine whether to lend to an applicant with a criminal record other than the disqualifying records described above. 3. The SBA disaster loan program The SBA’s disaster loan program, which provides long-term, low-interest loans to recover from disasters, also includes criminal history restrictions. First, an applicant is not eligible by statute if an owner was convicted in the previous year of a felony during and in connection with a riot or civil disorder or other declared disaster. Second, the applicable SBA policy statement states that it will not approve a loan if the applicant or principal owner is presently on parole or probation following conviction of a “serious criminal offense” (unless, for partnerships, corporations, and limited liability entities, the offense was unrelated to the business and the individual will divest all interest in the business). Third, the SBA requires that all of the following persons undergo a “character evaluation”: proprietors, limited partners who own 20% or more interest,  general partners, or stockholders or entities owning 20% or more voting stock, if they have any current charges pending, have been arrested in the previous six months, or if they have for any criminal offense excluding minor vehicle violations, any convictions, guilty pleas, no contest pleas, or any placements on pretrial diversion or any form of parole or probation. A detailed explanation about the records must be provided, including unpaid fines and fees. An application can be processed without an FBI fingerprint check only if the disclosed criminal activity “is both minor in nature and was committed more than 10 years ago.” Otherwise, an FBI background check must be completed. Finally, the SBA will make a determination of whether the person is “of good character.” (Note that separate criminal history requirements apply to COVID-19 disaster loans.) *** In the coming months, we plan to continue this work by conducting further research on SBA, USDA, and state policies, convening conversations between stakeholders, and issuing policy recommendations on this important issue. 1 The Small Business Act authorizes the SBA to “verify [a loan] applicant’s criminal background, or lack thereof,” and authorizes the conduct of an FBI investigation of loan applicants. See 15 U.S.C. §636(a)(1)(B).  But neither this provision nor any other law requires that a background check be conducted as a condition of making a loan, much less does it require the agency to treat criminal history as a measure of creditworthiness.  Cf. 13 C.F.R. §120.150(a) (SBA regulation stating that it will consider “character” and “reputation” in determining if an applicant is “creditworthy”). The only statutory criminal history restriction on SBA loan applicants that we can identify is a half-century old exclusion from 7(b) disaster loans of persons convicted in the year prior to application of a felony “during and in connection with a riot or civil disorder.” See Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Act of 1968, P.L. 90-448 § 1106(e). In addition, the SBA, and every other federal agency, is subject to a government-wide provision that can result in disqualification from federal loans and grants for a period of time based on certain drug convictions. See 21 U.S.C. § 862 (denial of federal grants, contracts, loans, and licenses based on court-imposed and mandatory debarments based on convictions for trafficking or possessing controlled substances). 2 Record-related barriers covering USDA lending programs appear to be few and targeted, rooted in statutes, and triggered by specific offenses. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 889 (conviction for planting, cultivation, growing, producing, harvesting, or storing a controlled substance triggers prohibition for that crop year and four succeeding crop years on access various USDA loan, grant, payment and contract programs); 7 C.F.R. § 718.6 (same); 7 U.S.C. § 2209j (permanent or 10-year debarment from USDA programs for fraud in connection with USDA programs); 2 C.F.R. § 417.865 (same). One of the USDA’s business loan programs, for example, the Business & Industry (B&I) Loan Guarantees program, described by the USDA as “similar” to the SBA 7(a) program but targeted to rural businesses, does not appear to contain any additional criminal history restrictions except an optional bank “character” review that is not specifically linked to criminal record. See 7 C.F.R. § 5001.202 (“When applicable, a [lender’s] evaluation [of an applicant] may include the character of persons with management control or a 20 percent or more ownership interest in the borrower.”). In addition, the USDA, like every federal agency, is subject to government-wide provisions that can result in disqualification from federal loans and grants for a period of time based on specific types of criminal convictions. See note 1. Read more

“Trump’s Theater of Pardoning”

The piece reprinted below is the first part of Bernadette Meyler’s contribution to a Symposium published by the Stanford Law Review on her book Theaters of Pardoning. It is as cogent a guide to understanding President Trump’s pardoning practices, and how they differ from those of his predecessors, as anything else we have seen. If, as Prof. Meyler argues, the message sent by Trump’s pardons is “the rejection of law,” it would be ironic (though entirely welcome) if they prompted Congress to reroute into the legal system much of the business heretofore committed exclusively to presidential pardoning, notably relief from the collateral consequences of a federal conviction. Then presidents could pardon to their heart’s delight, without worrying about the inherent unfairness of their actions. “Trump’s Theater of Pardoning” by Bernadette Meyler Introduction In many ways, President Trump has returned to a performance of pardoning more familiar to early modern England than to contemporary America. Largely eschewing bureaucratic processes, Trump has taken advantage of the political theater that pardoning can provide. Like some of the real-life and fictional kings who appear in my book, Theaters of Pardoning, Trump has also called law and legal regimes into question through his pardons, and, in doing so, asserted his own impunity from law. Ignoring the common law restrictions that had accreted around pardoning, Trump has chosen to interpret his power as absolute, unfettered by norms like refraining from judging in one’s own case and forgiving but not forgetting. And this is only the story of Trump’s formal pardons. As Kenji Yoshino’s essay in this Symposium elaborates, Trump’s numerous revisions of history represent even more pervasive efforts at enacting amnesty and oblivion. Pardoning as Political Theater Within Anglo-American history, pardoning has adopted two contrasting forms: one routine and bureaucratic, happening without fanfare, and the other dramatic and subject to popular critique, acclaim, and discussion.[1] Several factors distinguish the two varieties of pardoning, including the process by which a decision to pardon is made, the prominence of the pardoner as a figure within the pardon, and the public reception of the pardon. During the past century, the bureaucratic pardon in America has come to be associated on the federal level with the Office of the Pardon Attorney, which has reviewed pardon applications since the late nineteenth century.[2] In recent decades, presidents have overwhelmingly relied on the recommendations of the Office in determining whether or not to grant pardons.[3] Not so with Donald Trump. Instead, President Trump has revitalized the theatrical version of pardoning that had seemed to atrophy under his predecessors. As Robert Weisberg observes in his essay for this Symposium, many have noted this theatricality in passing, and, in the words of the Los Angeles Times editorial board, “It’s as if he were still starring on a reality TV show that ended every week with a climactic ‘You’re pardoned!’”[4] It is instructive, however, to return to early modernity—including, as Peter Brooks’s contribution to this Symposium demonstrates, European as well as English contexts—to understand the characteristics and significance of theatrical pardoning.[5] Within that context, pardoning represented “one of the marks of sovereignty,” or a supreme power above the law, and often served to aggrandize the majesty of the King rather than simply omitting punishment for an offender.[6] Oftentimes, the pardon wasn’t deserved; the recipient had not reformed or repented, and the pardon, whether taking place on the political or theatrical stage, served not justice but the plot.[7] The timing of the pardon was also crucial; in plays, and sometimes in life, it arrived unexpectedly to shift the scene from tragedy to comedy.[8] And the theater involved was sometimes of the page rather than the stage.[9] Finally, the impact of the performance was not localized with the event but reverberated long afterwards through controversy among the audience and citizenry.[10] President Trump’s pardons revive many of these elements. While he has pardoned the fewest people of any recent president during his first three years in office, public discussion of and controversy over his pardons have outstripped those of any modern president.[11] Rather than continuing in the vein of bureaucratic pardoning produced by the work of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Trump has instead appeared to select the vast majority of pardon recipients because of their celebrity, his personal connection with them, political ties, or the nature of the law under which they were convicted.[12] As Robert Weisberg elaborates upon the aesthetics of these pardons, Trump has extended his status “as emperor of his shows” on reality TV, where he “made subjective choices of winners and losers,” to his role as a presidential “disruptor of rules and norms of government,” through, among other devices, pardoning.[13] In all of these pardons, Trump himself has been front and center and the pardon has served to aggrandize his own power. Comparing the textual form of President Trump’s pardons with those of President Obama visually demonstrates the prominence of Trump and his own power within his clemency grants. President Obama generally pardoned multiple people at a time, prefacing the enumeration of their names with a statement of the processes that led to these pardons, and delegated the power to sign specific clemency grants to the Pardon Attorney.[14] By contrast, Trump has announced most of his pardons individually and emphasized his own actions by placing his name in enormous bold letters at the beginning of the document then specifically referring to his constitutional power.[15] In this case, the document furnishes a striking performance of Trump’s exercise of sovereignty through pardoning. In the aftermath of pardoning, Trump has also integrated pardon recipients into his own public performance, highlighting the significance of the pardon as prospective and legal rather than retrospective and pertaining to culpability. Most recently, he staged an appearance of the military officers he had pardoned of war crimes at his own fundraising event.[16] President Trump’s performance of pardoning has exalted himself over both pardon recipients and the rule of law. The theatrical foregrounding of pardoning within Trump’s regime stages pardoning as a personal and sovereign decision rather than an outcome of routine or bureaucratic processes. The result is an emphasis on Trump himself and his decisions about what is or is not properly sanctioned. The visibility of the theatrical pardon conveys a message, and that message is, as the following Part discusses, the rejection of law. Pardoning as a Rejection of Law Continued here. [1] See Bernadette Meyler, Theaters of Pardoning 3 (2019); see also Jim Phillips, The Operation of the Royal Pardon in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815, 42 U. Toronto L.J. 401, 414-21 (1992) (emphasizing the theatrical aspects of the pardon process in Nova Scotia and their political importance in contrast with earlier arguments for the exclusively legal and bureaucratic functions of pardoning). [2] For a discussion of the history of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, see Jeffrey Crouch, The Presidential Pardon Power 21-23 (2009). Rachel Barkow has associated that office with an endorsement of administrative procedures over the President’s independent power to exercise mercy, arguing that “[t]hose attacking clemency are . . . using key administrative law concepts to frame their critiques.” Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1350 (2008). [3] Crouch, supra note 2, at 21. [4] Editorial, Trump Is Politicizing (and Personalizing) the Pardon Process, L.A. Times (May 18, 2019, 3:10 AM), https://perma.cc/8V8T-7FS4; see also Robert Weisberg, The Drama of the Pardon, the Aesthetics of Governing and Judging, 72 Stan. L. Rev. Online 80 (2020). [5] Peter Brooks, The Ends of Pardoning, 72 Stan. L. Rev. Online 73 (2020). [6]  Meyler, supra note 1, at 82-84, 262-67. [7] See id. at 16, 36-43. [8] Id. at 20-25. In Peter Brooks’s words, the “moment of pardoning” in the final act of Pierre Corneille’s Cinna, ou la clémence, “irrupts into the play as a kind of gratuitous gesture of the sovereign.” Brooks, supra note 5, at 76. [9] See, for example, Michel Foucault’s mention of the letter of pardon, discussed in Meyler, supra note 1, at 15. When researching images for the cover of my book, I realized how few artistic renderings of pardon scenes exist from even the most popular Shakespeare plays. This may reflect the fact that the pardon itself is not as visually arresting as the events leading up to it or the pardon’s reception and aftermath. [10] Meyler, supra note 1, at 6-13. As Robert Weisberg describes this phenomenon, in his essay for this Symposium, “[t]he pardons are anticlimaxes that disrupt the usual expectations.” Weisberg, supra note 4, at 83. [11] Although President Obama commuted many sentences, primarily in drug cases, he did not grant that many outright pardons, fitting within the trend of diminishing presidential pardons. See Margaret Colgate Love, Obama’s Clemency Legacy: An Assessment, 29 Fed. Sent. R. 271, 272 (2017) (“The 142 pardons granted in the final weeks of his term, more than twice the total number granted in the previous seven-plus years, enabled Obama to avoid being labeled the stingiest full-term president in history.”). Trump has been even more sparing of his pardon power if one looks numerically at the tally. As of February 21, 2020, he has granted a total of twenty-five pardons. Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, https://perma.cc/QXW8-CKBE (last updated Feb. 19, 2020). At the same time, media attention has focused extensively on his use of the pardon power, already resulting in over 100 articles and op-eds in mainstream media by my count. Jeffrey Crouch has even credited Trump with “single-handedly reinvigorat[ing] the clemency power” due to the prominence of his pardons. Jeffrey Crouch, President Donald J. Trump and the Clemency Power: Is Claiming “Unfair” Treatment for Pardon Recipients the New “Fake News”?, in Presidential Leadership and the Trump Presidency: Executive Power and Democratic Government 91, 91 (Charles M. Lamb & Jacob R. Neiheisel eds., 2020). [12] For articles suggesting these motivations, see Crouch, supra note 11, at 91-92; Kevin Liptak, Trump’s Pardons Appear Prompted by TV, Friends and Politics, CNN (May 21, 2019, 7:53 AM ET), https://perma.cc/FR3Z-GGQ5. [13] Weisberg, supra note 4, at 80. [14] See, e.g., Exec. Office of the President, Executive Grant of Clemency (Jan. 17, 2017) https://perma.cc/7PQG-FANA (“After considering the applications for executive clemency of the following named persons and a letter from the Department of Justice recommending executive clemency in each case, I hereby grant full and unconditional pardons to the following named persons for those offenses against the United States described in each such recommendation . . . .”). [15] Exec. Office of the President, Executive Grant of Clemency of Joseph M. Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/L9CA-6TJ6 (“Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting: Be it known that this day, I, Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, pursuant to my powers under Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, have granted unto . . . .”). [16] Maggie Haberman, Trump Brings 2 Officers He Cleared of War Crimes Onstage at Fund-Raiser, N.Y. Times (Dec. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/B5PX-TSVY. Read more

“Presidential pardons have lost their true purpose”

The op ed below by CCRC Executive Director Margaret Love appeared in the Washington Post this afternoon.  Love argues that focusing on the political message sent by the Arpaio pardon obscures a more fundamental problem with pardoning in today’s federal system: It has all but ceased to play the role the framers intended of advancing fairness and proportionality.  She urges a reconnection with the true redemptive purposes of pardoning: to mitigate collateral consequences, recognize rehabilitation, and encourage reintegration. The recent preview of CCRC’s forthcoming study of state relief mechanisms shows that in at least a dozen states pardon continues to serve those purposes. President Trump’s pardon of former Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio has stirred up a hornet’s nest. The pardon is certainly controversial and admittedly unusual, coming even before a court had imposed a sentence. But Trump’s action, whatever its merits, is by no means unprecedented. Presidents have in the past used their pardon power to interrupt a criminal prosecution and deliver a political message — and not always a popular one. To understand how Trump’s action fits within the framework of pardons past, consider another case in which law enforcement officials were similarly charged with civil rights violations. In March 1981,only weeks into his first term, President Ronald Reagan pardoned W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, two high-ranking FBI officials then appealing a conviction for their roles in approving so-called black-bag jobs to spy on members of the Weather Underground through illegal wiretaps and break-ins. Like the Arpaio pardon, the Felt and Miller pardons fulfilled promises the president had made on the campaign trail; like Trump, Reagan argued the pardons were justified by the two men’s long careers in government — though he stopped short of commending their actions. (Felt later admitted that he was “Deep Throat,” the key source for Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein as they uncovered President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal.) Since then, a number of high-profile pardons have taken on a political tone, including President George H.W. Bush’s Iran-contra pardons and President George W. Bush’s commutation of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s prison sentence. Like the Arpaio pardon, these grants were not handled through the established Justice Department pardon process, and they all stirred up similar public outrage. But focusing on the political message sent by the Arpaio pardon obscures a more fundamental problem with pardoning in today’s federal system: It has all but ceased to play the role the framers intended of advancing fairness and proportionality. Until about 40 years ago, hundreds of pardons were granted each year to ordinary people convicted of garden-variety crimes. A substantial percentage of those who applied for this official forgiveness received it. But since about 1980, pardoning has become irregular and increasingly arbitrary, with grant rates in the single digits and processing times extending for years. President Barack Obama, for example, used the pardon power to commute many long prison sentences, but he largely neglected the cases of people who had completed their sentences and were seeking relief from their convictions’ lingering civil consequences and social stigma. The result of this neglect is that more than 2,000 applications for full pardon are pending in the Justice Department, with no sign that any will soon be granted. At the same time, there has never been a greater need for some mechanism in the federal justice system to mitigate the damage done to our social fabric by decades of mass prosecution. Nationwide, severe conviction-based legal restrictions coupled with the now-ubiquitous practice of criminal background checking have marginalized a substantial percentage of our population, burdened their families and communities, and deprived the country of capable people willing to join the workforce. It is encouraging that in the past half-dozen years, almost every state has enacted some form of relief from these so-called collateral consequences. Just last week Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner (R) signed a sweeping law authorizing courts to limit public access to most state criminal records after a three-year eligibility waiting period. Other states such as Nevada, Missouri and Indiana, have enacted broad remedial legislation. But there has been no similar interest in Congress in creating a statutory alternative to pardon that would mitigate or avoid collateral consequences for federal offenders. Meanwhile, the Justice Department, the longtime gatekeeper of the pardon power, continues to hold it in an iron grip. This disadvantages not only individuals seeking official forgiveness but also the person responsible for dispensing it. In failing to encourage the president in the regular and respectable use of his constitutional power, the Justice Department has instead encouraged its abuse. Rather than seeing presidential pardons as a way to recognize the redemptive power of the justice system, federal prosecutors have often regarded pardons with suspicion — as antithetical and even threatening to what they do. This shortsighted and parochial attitude has ill-served three successive presidents and resulted in an administrative system that is inefficient, arbitrary and unfair. It’s time we reconnect with the original values laid out for presidential pardons — what Alexander Hamilton described as “the benign prerogative.” If the Arpaio pardon provides the occasion for getting such a conversation started, it will have done both the presidency and the nation a great service. Read more