Tag: Louisiana

New era for expungement reform? Too soon to tell.

A new article in the Harvard Law & Policy Review evaluates some of the recent legislative efforts to deliver relief from the burden of collateral consequences through new or expanded expungement laws.  In “A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the State and Federal Levels,” Brian Murray argues that many of the newer record-closing laws are far too modest in scope and effect to have much of an impact on the problem of reintegration, citing Louisiana and Maryland enactments as examples of relief that is both too little and too late.  He admires Indiana’s broad new expungement scheme, which limits use of records as well as access to them, regarding it (as do we) as an enlightened exception to a general legislative aversion to risk.  He considers recent legislation in Minnesota to fall into a middle category — and we could add Arkansas as another state to have recently augmented and clarified older record-closing laws.  Our round-up of new expungement laws enacted just this year finds very little consistency from state to state, with Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and New Jersey all experimenting with different approaches. Murray appreciates the need for a multifaceted approach to the problem of criminal records, and recognizes the doctrinal and practical shortcomings of a reform agenda that depends primarily on concealment.  His bottom line, with which we agree, is that “[s]kepticism regarding the benefits of expungement in the information age, coupled with the incremental nature of legislative reform, leads to the conclusion that expungement law must continue to develop as one piece in a larger puzzle.”   Read more

Excessive filing fees frustrate new expungement schemes

How much is a clean slate worth?  That’s the question many people with criminal records are asking in Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee, where the cost of filing for expungement is (or will soon be) between $450 and $550.  To put that into perspective:  In Kentucky, the $500 fee required to expunge an eligible felony conviction under a new law that takes effect in July will equal nearly half of the monthly wages of a full-time worker earning the state’s $7.25 minimum wage.  The relative cost will be even higher for the many people who have difficulty securing steady full-time employment because of their criminal record.  The high filing fee puts relief effectively out of reach for most of those it was intended to benefit,  even if they elect to file without retaining a lawyer. There is a major disconnect between these exorbitant fees and the policy rationale that has led many states to create or expand expungement opportunities in recent years.  Expungement improves the employment prospects of people with criminal records, allowing them to achieve a degree of economic stability that in turn discourages further criminal behavior.  People held back from economic stability by their criminal records are the people that are likely to benefit most from expungement, and the social advantages of expungement are most keenly experienced among this population.  But these are the very people least likely to be able to afford to pay high application fees. According to an article by Maura Ewing published by the Marshall Project earlier this week that takes a closer look at the issue, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee are outliers among states that allow for expungement in charging such high fees: Many states charge $150 or less to apply for expungement … and some states offer a waiver if the applicant is too poor to pay. In the 17 states that allow for expungement of low-level felonies, “the application fee is generally in line with standard court fees.” So why are the application fees in those three states so high, and where does that money go?  Ewing found that while Louisiana’s fees were considered necessary to cover the costs of an inefficient and underfunded justice system, the fees in Kentucky and Tennessee were driven solely by the prospect of generating general revenue.  From the article: In Tennessee and Kentucky, bloated prices have little to do with processing the application, but rather the state revenue they were designed to produce. Fifty-five percent of the cash collected in Tennessee goes into the state’s general fund. In Kentucky, it will be a full 90 percent. The prospect of revenue is exactly why Tennessee lawmakers were persuaded to pass felony expungement legislation in 2012, said State Representative Raumesh Akbari, a Democrat. At the time, the official estimate was that the law would raise $7 million for the state annually. But it didn’t turn out that way.  Apparently the Tennessee legislature failed to consider that the state’s $450 fee would be an insurmountable obstacle for many otherwise eligible petitioners: In reality, it has generated only about $130,000 each year according to an analysis by a criminal justice nonprofit, Just City. The lack of income is tied to the fact that few would-be applicants can afford to apply, Akbari said. Those disparities are now causing some Tennessee lawmakers to reconsider the high fees; but others seem unwilling to act if lowering the fee means even a modest decrease in the state’s revenue stream. The relatively small revenue stream provided by the expungement fee has complicated legislative reform. A recent bill, sponsored by Akbari, would have lowered it by $100. It had wide bipartisan support, but never made it to the floor because it would have reduced overall income by $88,000. Akbari is undeterred and plans to reintroduce it next year. The $100 reduction is a baby step, she said. Eventually she would like the fee to reflect only the cost of processing the application. As it stands, the costs are so prohibitive in Tennessee that advocates have resorted to creating private funds to pay the fees on the behalf of petitioners who cannot afford them. Public awareness of the issue is gaining momentum in Tennessee. At a fundraising event in February, Memphis Mayor Jim Strickland raised $55,000 in private donations to cover the cost of expungement for indigent applicants. A similar fund run by Just City … has underwritten 70 applicants since its launch three years ago — a modest gain, said Josh Spickler, the Just City executive director. In its reporting on the enactment of Kentucky’s new expungement law, the AP noted that it will give over 60,000 people with felony records a chance at a clean slate.  But if Tennessee is any indication, the $500 application fee will make expungement a practical impossibility for those who could benefit from it the most.  And, since a vast majority of the fees will go directly into the state’s general fund, for which there are many strong defenders, it could be many years before the legislature acts to reconcile the law’s substantive policy goals and its deterrent fee stucture. Read more

Long waits for expungement frustrate public safety purposes

Recently, in commenting on a new expungement scheme enacted by the Louisiana legislature, we noted the disconnect between the stated reentry-related purposes of the law and its lengthy eligibility waiting periods.  If people have to log many years of law-abiding conduct before they can even apply for this relief, it is not likely to be of much help to people returning home from prison.  Were Louisiana lawmakers unaware that the new expungement law would be unlikely to serve its stated purposes, or did they have some reason for advertising the new law in terms they knew were inapt. The preamble to the new Louisiana law says it is intended “to break the cycle of criminal recidivism, increase public safety, and assist the growing population of criminal offenders reentering the community to establish a self-sustaining life through opportunities in employment.”  But a felony offender is ineligible to apply for expungement until ten years after completion of sentence, long after recidivism has ceased to be a statistical risk.  In other words, the new law is not likely to do much if anything to “break the cycle of recidivism” or help people “reentering the community” (presumably from prison).  Even misdemeanants have to wait five years before they are eligible. The only people whose records can be expunged immediately are those who were never convicted to begin with. Wouldn’t people returning to the community from prison be more likely to benefit from supportive social services, rehabilitative programming, and assistance with obtaining transitional jobs and housing?  It is possible that the legislators expected the availability of expungement at some future time to provide an incentive to stay on the straight and narrow — but the reference to employment opportunities upon “reentering the community” suggests they had something more immediate in mind.   Relief after a long period of law-abiding conduct also serves a useful purpose to recognize a person’s full rehabilitation, but it does nothing to overcome obstacles faced by people upon their release from prison. The formulaic recitation of public safety-related purposes to justify providing relief from collateral consequences is not unique to Louisiana, and neither is the apparent contradiction with those purposes presented by extended eligibility periods.  New broad expungement schemes in Indiana, Minnesota and Arkansas also make felony offenders wait years without another run-in with the law before they can apply for relief.  Any notion that expungement of conviction records will facilitate reentry or discourage reoffending is either mistaken or disingenuous.   Expungement of arrest records is another matter, though concepts of “reentry” and “recidivism” don’t strictly apply where a person is not convicted. So this raises three questions:  1) why can’t we enact relief from collateral consequences at a time when it will in fact facilitate reentry and impact public safety; 2) why aren’t we doing more to avoid conviction in the first place; and 3) why are legislators and other government officials so hesitant to justify restoration of rights in terms of fairness and/or reward? The answer to Question #1 is that only a few states have enacted laws authorizing relief from collateral consequences as early as sentencing, when it could be of genuine help with reentry.  New York has had such a law for years, for first offenders sentenced to probation. Vermont, Colorado and New Jersey now also have laws authorizing the sentencing court to dispense with mandatory collateral consequences, and bills that would accomplish this have been introduced in several other states.  Relief at sentencing is a feature of both the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act and the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, so perhaps this will be the wave of the future.  Note, however, that not a single state provides record-closing relief to convicted persons prior to completion of sentence, so advocates would do well to consider more transparent forms of relief during the period covered by the sentence. Question #2 gets a more hopeful answer:  more than half the states have opportunities for diversion and deferred adjudication followed by expungement or sealing.  This means that people charged with minor offenses can avoid a conviction record if they successfully completion of probation.  But again, this is not a “reentry” remedy strictly speaking since by definition the person never leaves the community.  And, in those jurisdictions that condition eligibility on a guilty plea, they may be subject to collateral consequences during the period of probation.  The new Model Penal Code: Sentencing has provisions implementing both diversion and deferred adjudication that do not require a formal plea, and whose specific goal is to enable people to avoid incurring collateral consequences. Since there is never a conviction, the person may answer honestly that they have never been convicted.  These provisions originated in the 1970s when reformers were interested in encouraging rehabilitation through sentencing, as we perhaps are again today. (I would note it is high time that the federal government expanded the only authority it now has for deferred adjudication, 18 USC 3706, from drug possession to any minor offense.) Question #3 is rhetorical.   Read more

Louisiana’s new expungement law: How does it stack up?

Louisiana has far and away the largest prison population of any state in the country (847 per 100,000 people — Mississippi is second with 692 per), but until last year there was little that those returning home after serving felony sentences could do to unshackle themselves from their criminal records and the collateral consequences that accompany them. While Louisiana has for years authorized expungement of misdemeanor convictions and non-conviction records, the only relief available to convicted felony offenders was a governor’s pardon — very few of which have been granted in Louisiana in recent years. Most people convicted of a felony in the state, no matter how long ago and no matter how serious the conduct, were stuck with it.* That’s why we were interested to learn that in 2014 Louisiana enacted a brand new freestanding Chapter 34 of its Code of Criminal Procedure to consolidate and extend the law governing record expungement to many felonies. We decided to find out what the new law offers to those with felony records, and how it stacks up against the three other new comprehensive expungement schemes in Arkansas, Indiana, and Minnesota. We found that while a relatively large number of people with felony convictions are newly eligible for expungement relief, the law’s effectiveness is hampered by 1) unreasonably long waiting periods and 2) limited effectiveness in mitigating collateral consequences related to employment and licensure. Waiting periods   According to its preamble, the ostensible purpose of the new Louisiana law is to “to break the cycle of criminal recidivism, increase public safety, and assist the growing population of criminal offenders reentering the community to establish a self-sustaining life through opportunities in employment.” See Art. 971. The law states an aim to provide relief from post-9/11 restrictions on TWIC credentials necessary to work in ports or on vessels under the federal Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.  Id. However, its eligibility waiting period seem inconsistent with these purposes: A felony record may not be expunged until ten years after completion of sentence, which itself may be many years after leaving prison.  Such a long waiting period is not likely to do much to “break the cycle of recidivism” or address the issues facing those “reentering the community” from prison. Even misdemeanants have to wait five years after completion of sentence to apply. Moreover, because the federal MTSA only restricts eligibility for TWIC credentials only for a ten-year period for most offenses, the new law does nothing to ease restrictions on maritime employment. By the time a person with a felony conviction becomes eligible for expungement, their TWIC eligibility has already been restored. The waiting periods for felony expungement under the three other comprehensive new expungement laws are shorter — though still long enough to make us question their utility in reducing recidivism or assisting reentry.   Eligibility for felony expungement in Indiana is three to five years years from completion of sentence or eight years after conviction (unless the prosecutor agrees to a shorter period) and five years after conviction for a misdemeanor.  In Minnesota the waiting period for expungement of all eligible felonies is five years after completion of sentence (two years for misdemeanors).  Arkansas allows “sealing” of felonies five years after completion of sentence, though misdemeanors are eligible for sealing as soon as the sentence is completed. (Compare the relief available as early as sentencing under the Vermont Uniform Act and Colorado’s new drug expungement laws.) A Louisiana record may not be expunged if the person has been convicted of a crime during the waiting period, or has charges pending. The same is true in Indiana and Minnesota. Like Minnesota, Louisiana places no limit on the number of felonies that may be expunged during a person’s lifetime, though in Louisiana a felony may only be expunged once every 15 years.  In Indiana, a person may seek expungement of multiple offenses through one expungement petition, but only one petition may be granted in a person’s lifetime. In Arkansas, an individual may only “seal” one felony conviction. Eligible offenses Unreasonable waiting periods aside, the Louisiana law takes a relatively expansive approach to eligibility, especially compared to the limits Arkansas and Minnesota place on the types of felonies that are eligible for relief.  Under Louisiana’s law, the only felonies that cannot be expunged are those for violent offenses, sex offenses, crimes against minors, and drug trafficking offenses (mere possession with intent to distribute is eligible for expungement). The only other jurisdiction with comparable scope is Indiana, which has similar limitations on violent offenses and sex offenses, but places no limit on the types of drug convictions that may be expunged and does not bar expungement of crimes against minors. Minnesota allows expungement of a list of enumerated minor non-violent felony offenses, and only minor drug distribution offenses may be expunged (most possession-only offenses are eligible).  Arkansas limits sealing to Level C and D felonies. Standards Under Louisiana’s new law, expungement is mandatory if a person meets all of the eligibility requirements.  This is also the case in Indiana for misdemeanors and minor felonies, though not for more serious crimes.  Minnesota and Arkansas require a judicial finding based on a balancing test.  In Minnesota, a felony can only be expunged if the court determines that the benefits of an expungement to the person seeking it are commensurate with concerns of the public and public safety, and with the burden on courts and public authorities to issue, enforce, and monitor an expungement order. In Arkansas, an order to seal records depends on a court’s determination that it is “in the interest of justice” based on consideration of a menu of factors. The fact that an expungement is mandatory in Louisiana if the eligibility requirements are met also means that expungement may be granted without a hearing. A hearing must be held only if the prosecutor or law enforcement objects to the expungement request on grounds of ineligibility. A hearing is generally required in Minnesota and Arkansas. Use of expunged records  Where Louisiana’s law looks most different from the other three laws is in its relatively limited legal and practical effect insofar as employment and licensing is concerned. Expungement of a felony conviction record in Louisiana essentially does two things: 1) It prohibits the state from disclosing records to the general public (as in almost all other states, the record remains available to law enforcement, prosecutors and courts); and 2) it relieves a person of any obligation to disclose the record, or the fact of the record’s expungement. The Louisiana law does not have a restorative effect on any rights lost (most basic civil rights are otherwise restored automatically upon completion of sentence), nor does it restrict the use of expunged records by licensing authorities or employers.  It has no effect on sex offender registration and does not restore handgun rights (long gun rights are not lost) — except, surprisingly, in domestic violence offenses. Though Louisiana’s law generally prohibits the state from releasing expunged records to the public, the law provides some significant exceptions. Most notably, it specifically allows disclosure of expunged records to a number of specified licensing boards, including those governing health care, the insurance industry, social work, and the bar, all of which are authorized to consider criminal records when making licensing determinations. It also allows disclosure for the purpose of screening applicants for licenses and employment involving the care or supervision of children.  Accordingly, while Louisiana’s law permits individuals whose records have been expunged to deny that they have been convicted, the range of permissible disclosures by the state qualifies this benefit. The other three states also allow expunged records to be used as predicate offenses, and for sentencing and sex offender registration purposes.   However, all three states restrict how an expunged record may be used by private and public entities in evaluating eligibility for employment, licensure, and other opportunities.  Indiana’s law is by far the most expansive, prohibiting employers, licensing boards, and anyone else from discriminating against a person based on a record that has been expunged, and even from asking about such a record.  Minnesota takes a similar approach by prohibiting discrimination, but only as it applies to public employment and licensing (with a large and growing list of excepted employers and licensing boards). Under Arkansas’s Criminal Offender Rehabilitation Act, a licensing board may not disqualify a person based on an “expunged” record — though, since Arkansas’ new law now styles what was once known as an “expungement” a “sealing,” it is unclear what affect this provision currently has.  Indiana and Minnesota additionally encourage hiring of those with expunged records by prohibiting admission of expunged convictions as evidence of negligence in negligent hiring actions. The Louisiana law contains no analogous provisions. Third party providers of records The Louisiana law does make some attempt attempt to addresses the problem posed by third party dissemination of expunged records, but it does so in a way that is likely to be ineffective in practice. The law prohibits private providers of criminal records (other than news organizations) from disseminating expunged records, but only if they have been put on notice by the subject of the expunged record. This notice must be sent by certified mail and contain a certified copy of the expungement order. Until a particular provider receives notice from the recipient of an expungement, the provider is entirely free (at least under state law) to disseminate the record to anyone, even if they have other notice it has been expunged. To ensure that expunged records do not reach a potential employer, a person would have to give notice to each and every private provider out there. This a practical impossibility, of course, but, even if it could be done, it would be ineffective because the only providers obligated by receiving notice are those that are not governed by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Considering that a vast majority of private providers of criminal records are subject to FCRA, it is hard to see why this provision was included at all. The Indiana and Minnesota laws offer significantly greater protection against irresponsible private providers.  Here again, Indiana’s law is the stronger, placing a blanket prohibition on dissemination of expunged records by “criminal history providers.” This prohibition is unqualified: Dissemination is prohibited whether the provider has notice of it or not, putting the onus on the provider rather the individual. The Minnesota law occupies a middle ground, prohibiting dissemination by a “business screening service” if the service has notice of the expungement from any source.  Arkansas’s law does not address the issue of third party providers of records. Conclusion Louisiana’s new expungement law represents a significant and commendable move toward giving those with criminal records a chance to regain opportunities lost as a result of conviction. However, although it expands eligibility for expungment to a relatively large number of people, and makes relief mandatory upon a determination of eligibility, its benefits are limited by long waiting periods and limited legal effect. If Louisiana is serious about expanding employment opportunities to those with felony convictions, it would do well to enact measures limiting dissemination and use of expunged records by employers and other third parties, as Indiana, Minnesota, and (to a more limited extent) Arkansas have done.  Until expungement in Louisiana is more than a mechanism to limit official disclosure of records, those who might otherwise be eligible to apply for it may wonder whether it is worth the trouble and expense.   * Louisiana does have a quirky law from 1981 that permits the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information to remove the records of anyone over the age of 60 “from active dissemination to eligible agencies” so long as the person hasn’t been arrested for 15 years. The removal isn’t mandatory, though, so it offers little comfort to anyone young or old.   Read more