Tag: immigration

“Arrests as Regulation”

Eisha Jain, a fellow at Georgetown Law Center, has posted on SSRN an important and (to us) alarming article about the extent to which mere arrests are beginning to play the same kind of screening role outside the criminal justice system as convictions. In “Arrests as Regulation,” to be published in the Stanford Law Review in the spring, Jain argues that arrests are increasingly being used systematically as a sorting and screening tool by noncriminal actors (including immigration authorities, landlords, employers, schools and child welfare agencies), not because they are the best tool but because they are easy and inexpensive to access. Here is the abstract: For some arrested individuals, the most important consequences of their arrest arise outside the criminal justice system. Arrests alone — regardless of whether they result in conviction — can lead to a range of consequences, including deportation, eviction, license suspension, custody disruption, or adverse employment actions. But even as courts, scholars, and others have drawn needed attention to the civil consequences of criminal convictions, they have paid relatively little attention to the consequences of arrests in their own right. This Article aims to fill that gap by providing an account of how arrests are systemically used outside the criminal justice system. Noncriminal justice actors who rely on arrests — such as immigration enforcement officials, public housing authorities, employers and licensing authorities, child protective service providers, among others — routinely receive and use arrest information for their own objectives. They do so not because arrests are the best regulatory tools, but because they regard arrests as proxies for information they value, and because arrests are often easy and inexpensive to access.     But when noncriminal justice actors rely on arrests, they set off a complicated and poorly understood web of interactions with the criminal justice system. Regulatory bodies and others that make decisions based on arrests can coordinate and pool resources with prosecutors and police officers, achieving a level of enforcement that neither could achieve alone, or they can make decisions that undermine important aspects of the criminal justice process. This Article maps different regulatory interactions based on arrests, and illustrates the need for greater oversight over how arrests are used and disseminated outside the criminal justice system. Jain shows how immigration officials use arrests to expand the reach of interior enforcement efforts through the efforts of state and local law enforcement, public housing officials rely on arrests to identify existing tenants who are potentially in breach of their lease, and employers and professional licensing authorities use arrest information to monitor off-duty workers.  Some employers suspend or terminate at-will employees based on the arrest. Many employers are automatically notified by law enforcement agencies whenever an employee is arrested.  (In New York this includes home health care workers, security guards, and taxi drivers.)  Because neither the arresting officer nor the jail has a role in initiating the notification, the arrested individual will not be informed of the notification at the time of arrest.  Until 2006, New York City taxi drivers, for example, were automatically suspended for a wide range of arrests, including misdemeanor welfare fraud or forgery.  (The New York taxi litigation, Nnebe v. Daus, is the subject of a recent post.)  As a matter of due process, a licensee may be entitled to a hearing before a license is revoked, but not before an unpaid period during which the license is suspended. Notice of arrests is also frequently mandated in the child welfare and education contexts. Jain  makes the case that use of arrests to grant or deny benefits has a number of negative systemic consequences: In a variety of settings, noncriminal actors rely on arrests as a means of achieving their own regulatory agendas. This use of arrests can serve important societal interests. But it can come at a significant cost. It can magnify the effect of unwise or unjustified policing and arrest decisions. Across a number of settings, arrests are an overbroad and imperfect proxy for the information that noncriminal justice actors value. This fact, combined with inadequate oversight and a lack of transparency in how arrest information is used, can create serious consequences for arrested individuals – ones that far outstrip any penalty imposed by the criminal justice system. Moreover, when actors outside the criminal justice system rely on arrests, one potential effect is to expand the enforcement powers of both actors.  In delegating front-end screening discretion to individual police officers, they magnify the effects of underlying and problematic police practices based on racial profiling.  Noncriminal justice actors may also work against certain criminal law enforcement goals —such as when they deport, evict, or terminate individuals after a demonstrably unlawful arrest. These consequences can undermine the aims of prosecutors and police who seek to encourage witnesses to come forward and report crime. Jain has little faith that the exercise of administrative discretion in civil settings can place appropriate limits on the power of police to tag people in ways that are counterproductive to a healthy social order.  Noncriminal justice actors who rely on arrests are driven by their own organizational priorities, and they take an instrumental view of arrests that is at odds with the principle that an arrest alone is not indicative of guilt. Jain argues that a more reliable way of introducing transparency and procedural fairness in the use of arrest information is through restrictions on sharing and storing of arrest information. Prompt and automatic expungement of arrest records that do not result in charges is one important step, so that they are available going forward only to law enforcement.  She also proposes that a third party (“one that is not committed to either the goals of criminal law enforcement actors or to the interests of the noncriminal actor”) may be in the best position to systemically evaluate considerations such as “whether the underlying arrest information is accurate, whether it provides a meaningful informational proxy, whether it disproportionately affects certain groups, whether the evaluation process is fair and transparent, and whether the use of arrests has undesirable or unintended public policy consequences.”  It is not clear what such a third party might look like, although Massachusetts’ Criminal Offender Records Information (CORI) system performs such a function, at least on paper.  Through CORI, Massachusetts regulates dissemination of criminal history information to non-justice actors, ensuring both accuracy and appropriate restrictions on dissemination. We agree with Jain that it is high time to start talking about “how arrests regulate individuals outside the criminal justice sphere, and to evaluate when and whether it is appropriate to allow an individual police officer’s decision to arrest to do so much work.” Read more

California’s Proposition 47 and collateral consequences: Part II (reentry and restoration of rights)

Prop 47 and restoration of rights  California’s recently enacted Proposition 47 fundamentally alters the landscape for a handful of lower-level felony offenses in California. As discussed by Jeffery Aaron in a previous post, Prop 47 reclassifies eight offenses as misdemeanors, including simple drug possession offenses and theft of less than $950. Anyone with a qualifying conviction, who also does not have a disqualifying prior, can now petition under Prop 47 to have a felony reclassified as a misdemeanor. The most significant and immediate relief will be for people who are incarcerated for qualifying low-level felonies and who are now eligible for resentencing and release. Public defender offices around the state are busy filing those petitions. But, Prop 47 also allows two other populations to petition for reclassification of their qualifying felonies to misdemeanors: People who are under supervision but not incarcerated (on probation, parole, or post-release community supervision), and people whose sentences were completed long ago. This aspect of the new law presents good opportunities for tens of thousands of Californians, and not insignificant implementation challenges. Simply by reclassifying certain offenses from felonies to misdemeanors, Prop 47 can undo some of the most serious collateral consequences.  It’s clear from our experience providing reentry legal services to thousands of clients over the years that people with felony, as opposed to misdemeanor, convictions face increased barriers to employment, housing, and full and meaningful community reintegration and citizenship. For example, people with a felony conviction, even a decades-old low-level offense, can never serve on a jury in California. For many people, Prop 47 will reverse this lifetime disenfranchisement and move them one step closer to full civic engagement. But unfortunately, many of the statuary and extra-legal barriers to successful reentry that block people convicted of felonies also apply to people with convictions for misdemeanors and criminal infractions. Consequently, Prop 47 relief alone is not a cure-all for collateral consequences, and for most people it’s not even the most important petition they can file to overcome the statutory disabilities they face.  The following section describes how Prop 47 relief interacts with other California relief mechanisms. Interaction of Prop 47 with other relief mechanisms In California, meaningful protection against employment discrimination on the basis of a conviction—felony or misdemeanor—comes from a complicated web of local, state, and federal laws and regulations, including sections of the Penal, Labor, and Business and Professions Codes, the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act and its California analogue, and local ordinances. Most of our reentry clients become employable through these steps: First, we help them petition to obtain set-aside and dismissal relief pursuant to Penal Code sections 1203.4 (felony and misdemeanor probation cases), 1203.4a (misdemeanor and infraction non-probation cases), and 1203.41 (felony jail cases) for all convictions. (Note:  While these authorities are sometimes called “expungement,” there is no true record-closing remedy for most cases; these “dismissed” convictions remain on a person’s record and in public court records, do not restore driving privileges or gun rights, and still must be reported for many types of employment). Second, we help them navigate the complicated obligations of disclosure, and where applicable, invoke the protections under Labor Code section 432.7(a) that prohibit some—but not all—prospective employers from inquiring about or considering dismissed convictions for some—but not all—jobs. Third, if a background check company reports dismissed convictions to a potential employer in violation of the law (and chances of that are unfortunately high), we help them invoke protections under the Fair Credit and Reporting Act and its California analogue, and try to convince the background check provider to disseminate a corrected report check in a timely way. Fourth, we work to convince the employer to make the hire despite the erroneous background check, and if the employer declines to reconsider, we invoke the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, where applicable, and local ordinances, such as San Francisco’s Fair Chance Ordinance. Note that there are different, even more complicated laws, regulations, and processes covering the 30% of jobs in California that require fingerprint clearances. If threading this needle sounds daunting, imagine what it’s like for people doing it without the benefit of legal advocacy. Prop 47 creates a welcome additional reentry remedy to the web of reentry and restoration laws in California, but also creates additional complexities.  There are many different routes to relief in California, depending on the disposition of the criminal case, and Prop 47 reclassification may not be the only or even the best route available.  For example, someone who is a licensed security guard who has an old conviction for simple possession of drugs may be eligible for Prop 47 reclassification, but he may also be eligible for a reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17(b). If he receives Prop 47 relief, he continues to face a lifetime firearm ban. If he obtains 17(b) relief, he may have his firearm rights restored, and can apply for a license as an armed security guard, a pathway to employment with family-sustaining wages — something out of reach for many in the reentry population, even those who do have jobs. More broadly, people will need to affirmatively file for Prop 47 relief, and for some offenses prove eligibility. In order to take full advantage of protections that limit collateral consequences of conviction beyond reclassification, they need to determine if they are eligible for other reentry remedies and file for those in all of their cases in all counties, including but not limited to early termination of probation, set-aside and dismissal, Certificate of Rehabilitation, restoration of rights for veterans pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.9, juvenile record sealing, and reduction of felony fines and fees. And the many people who will learn that they are ineligible for Prop 47 relief will need advice about other legal remedies that can help them realize their goals in reentry. Immigration It is particularly important that non-citizens understand the impact of Pro 47 relief in their cases. Changing a felony to a misdemeanor could have many important consequences for immigrants.  It could expand relief from removal for some, and eliminate the basis of removal for others. Crucially, Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) and the expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)—announced by President Obama November 20, 2014—are barred to immigrants with a single felony conviction and certain misdemeanor convictions. Reclassifying an offense as a misdemeanor under Prop 47 could create an opportunity for temporary relief from removal and work authorization that would otherwise be unavailable to many individuals. Additionally, when combined with another momentous change this year to California’s Penal Code under SB 1310, which reduced the maximum on misdemeanors from 365 to 364 days, Prop 47 reclassification could eliminate a ground of deportability. The timing of relief is also important to consider. Immigrants who would benefit from the 1-day reduction in the misdemeanor maximum should wait until January 1, 2015, when the new law, Penal Code section 18.5, goes into effect, before seeking relief under Prop 47. But, at the same time, Prop 47 will unfortunately do little to mitigate the disastrous immigration consequences of most drug convictions. With the exception of DAPA/DACA eligibility (which is available to otherwise qualifying individuals with one misdemeanor drug possession conviction), almost all other drug convictions, even if reclassified as a misdemeanor under Prop 47, will continue to be grounds for mandatory removal. Summary  The release of people from prison currently serving sentences for low-level offenses is an unmitigated success of Prop 47. For people no longer in custody and who have completed their sentences, Prop 47 is a welcome addition to the tangle of laws that form California’s reentry policy. However, to fully realize Prop 47’s promise to limit the counterproductive, costly, and inhumane collateral consequences of low-level felony convictions, implementation of this law must include reentry legal services to help people address the unique issues in their cases. And it’s not clear that county public defender offices have the expertise or resources to take on this full range of legal advocacy—which includes immigration, employment, consumer, and administrative law—for their thousands of past clients. It’s important to figure out, and quickly, how to make these services widely available. California has only three years to get this right.   This post was co-authored by Meredith Desautels. Meredith is a staff attorney in the racial justice program at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and directs the Lawyers’ Committee’s Second Chance Legal Clinic. Rose Cahn, a Soros Justice Fellow at the Lawyers’ Committee specializing in post-conviction relief for noncitizens, also contributed substantially to this piece.  Read more

Labels and stereotypes in the President’s immigration speech

The President’s decision to take unilateral executive action to insulate certain undocumented immigrants from the immediate threat of deportation has provoked outrage in some quarters and profound relief in others.   The legal issues raised by this decision are important and debatable, some of its line-drawing is problematic, and its success stands or falls on the uncertain terrain of bureaucratic discretion.  No doubt its political implications are yet to be revealed. But amid all the uncertainty, one thing is clear.  In his speech announcing the initiative the President said, repeatedly and definitively, that no one with a criminal record would benefit from his reprieve.   Thus, he emphasized that enforcement resources would remain focused on “actual threats to our security,” by which he meant “Felons, not families. Criminals, not children.”   Again, it is possible to benefit from the law if you can “pass a criminal background check” (whatever that means), but “[i]f you’re a criminal, you’ll be deported.”   Even people convicted of misdemeanors will not be spared under the new DHS enforcement priorities. Entirely apart from the wisdom or fairness of the immigration policy choice involved in this broad blanket exclusion (and there are good reasons to be critical of it), it was disheartening to hear the President present it in such unfortunate language.  The ugly labels of “felon” and “criminal” do, after all, at least technically describe a status shared by 25% of adult Americans.  Labels like these serve only to demonize and exclude, and they are fundamentally at odds with our national policy of encouraging rehabilitation to reduce crime.  There were other ways the President could have justified continuing his policy of deporting based on criminal record than by using words that do more to stir up fear of “the other” than to describe relevant functional attributes. The President’s words suggest that people who have been convicted of a crime are evermore to be regarded as “felons” and “criminals,” categorically threatening to our safety and security, and uniformly deserving to be segregated and sent away.  But he himself pardoned such a person less than two years ago, precisely to keep her from being deported. And he is surely aware of the bipartisan conversation now underway about the need to curb over-criminalization, one of the few matters on which Republicans and Democrats can agree.   It is tempting to take linguistic shortcuts when politically expedient, but it is a temptation he might have resisted without jeopardizing his larger objective. It is time we stopped using negative stereotypes and labels to describe people who at some point in their past have committed a crime, in the immigration context or otherwise.  It is no longer acceptable to describe undocumented immigrants as “illegal aliens.”  Our language needs a similar makeover where past convictions are concerned. Read more