Name: Collateral Consequences Resource Center
Address: 15 Seventh Street, N.E., Washington, DC, 20002, US
Telephone: 12022360484

Restoration of Rights Project – Massachusetts Profile

Guide to restoration of rights, pardon, sealing & expungement following a Massachusetts criminal conviction

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Marijuana legalization and record clearing in 2022 (12/20/2022) - CCRC is pleased to announce a new report on recent cannabis-specific record sealing and expungement reforms in the past 18 months. The report, extending CCRC's fruitful collaboration with the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University, is available here. An accompanying infographic (reproduced at the end of this postr) summarizes the report’s findings, and includes a color-coded US map showing which states have enacted cannabis-specific record-clearing provisions. To supplement the map, the report includes an appendix classifying and describing marijuana-specific record clearing statutes in all 50 states, based on CCRC's 50-state comparison chart on "Marijuana Legalization, Decriminalization, Expungement and Clemency." To put our new report in context, CCRC and DEPC reported 18 months ago on an “unprecedented period for policymaking at the intersection of marijuana legalization and criminal record reform in the first months of 2021,” with four states (New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Virginia) legalizing marijuana possession and at the same time providing criminal record relief for past convictions along with a variety of social equity provisions. Our report shows this trend continuing into 2022. Since our 2021 report, four additional states (Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, and Rhode Island) have adopted similar record-clearing provisions in connection with adult-use cannabis legalization, authorizing sealing and expungement provisions that in most cases extend well beyond convictions for legalized conduct. All four states made at least some relief automatic, removing the burden of a criminal record from many individuals while raising the bar on standards for marijuana record relief nationwide. Like the four states discussed in our earlier report, these four also address racial disparities in marijuana criminalization by directing tax revenue and business opportunities for legal marijuana to individuals and communities disproportionately affected by criminal law enforcement. During this same timeframe, three additional states (California, Colorado, and Massachusetts) enhanced their existing marijuana-specific record sealing statutes. The report summarizes the cannabis-specific record clearing provisions enacted since publication of our earlier report in the spring of 2021 in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri and Rhode Island. Missouri's record-clearing provisions, adopted through a ballot initiative and effective immediately, are particularly impressive: individuals currently incarcerated for possession of up to three pounds of marijuana may petition for release and expungement (with certain offenses excepted), most individuals currently under supervision are automatically released from their sentence and their record expunged, and individuals convicted of all marijuana-related misdemeanors and most felonies have their records automatically expunged upon completion of sentence. See Section III(C) of the Missouri profile from the Restoration of Rights Project for additional information about this extraordinary ballot initiative. As in the 2021 report, we include laws authorizing marijuana-specific automatic record clearing provisions that are not scheduled to be implemented until some future date, with an appropriate notation. We focus exclusively on authorities that specifically expunge or seal marijuana convictions, and do not take into consideration more general record clearing laws that may also apply to marijuana convictions (frequently more broadly). Additional information about state record relief laws, including those that apply specifically to marijuana records, can be found in the state profiles in the Restoration of Rights Project. In addition to the 50-state overview of marijuana-specific record clearing provisions, the appendix also includes a summary of the marijuana-specific pardon initiatives undertaken by several states in recent years. Read the report Explore the infographic (click to enlarge)
Reintegration Champion Awards for 2021 (1/27/2022) - Based on our annual report on 2021 criminal record reforms, the bipartisan commitment to a reintegration agenda keeps getting stronger. A majority of the 151 new laws enacted last year authorize courts to clear criminal records, in some states for the very first time, and several states enacted “clean slate” automatic record clearing. Other new laws restore voting and other civil rights lost as a result of conviction, and still others limit how criminal record is considered by employers, occupational licensing agencies, and landlords. (The report includes specific citations to each of the new laws, and they are analyzed in the larger context of each state's reintegration scheme in our Restoration of Rights Project.) Again this year we have published a Report Card recognizing the most (and least) productive legislatures in the past year. While more than a dozen states enacted noteworthy laws in 2021, two states stand out for the quantity and quality of their lawmaking: Arizona and Connecticut share our 2021 Reintegration Champion award for their passage of three or more major pieces of record reform legislation. Arizona – The state enacted eight new laws, including a broad new record clearing law, two laws improving its occupational licensing scheme, and a judicial “second chance” certificate. Arizona also repealed a law authorizing suspension of driver’s licenses for failure to pay and authorized its courts to redesignate some felonies as misdemeanors. Connecticut – Enacted a major automatic record clearing scheme, restored the right to vote and hold office upon release from prison, provided for record clearing in connection with marijuana legalization, and broadened expungement for victims of human trafficking. Another eight states and the District of Columbia earned Honorable Mention for their enactment of at least one major new law: Alabama – Enacted first state record-clearing authority applicable to misdemeanor convictions and pardoned felonies, and extended non-conviction sealing. California – Gave retroactive effect to automatic conviction sealing law enacted in 2019. (This new law may be the most consequential of any enacted last year in terms of its impact on criminal records in the state, and it was done without fanfare or publicity.) District of Columbia – Enacted a comprehensive scheme to limit consideration of criminal record in occupational licensing. Illinois – Added employment discrimination based on conviction to the state Human Rights Act, authorized voter education for prisoners. New Jersey – Enacted a landmark fair housing bill; made some improvements to its 1970’s-era occupational licensing law; and, provided for automatic record clearing in connection with marijuana legalization. (New Jersey was our Reintegration Champion for 2019, but evidently is not resting on its laurels.) New Mexico – Improved 1970’s-era public employment and licensing law; authorized expungement of marijuana convictions; and, enacted a substantial part of the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, limiting and providing relief from collateral consequences. Ohio – Expanded eligibility for record-clearing; significantly improved occupational licensing law. Virginia – Authorized petition-based and automated record-clearing of non-convictions and convictions, including convictions for marijuana possession; restored vote upon release by executive order and took steps to amend constitution to this end. Washington – restored vote upon release from prison; amended occupational licensing standards for health professions; repealed driver’s license suspension based on outstanding financial obligations Low marks go to three states that enacted no record reform laws at all in 2021. While there are six other states in this category this year, the legislatures of Alaska, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin earn their place at the bottom of the heap for having been equally unproductive in 2020 and 2019, years in which almost every other state passed at least some law limiting access to and use of criminal records. The profile of each state's restoration of rights scheme from CCRC’s Restoration of Rights Project is linked above (except for the states that made no progress). The profiles contain citations and links to the relevant new laws so that interested individuals can check their specific terms.
Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act (6/29/2018) - We've noted in recent posts the numerous states that, just in the past three or four months, have enacted broad occupational licensing reforms affecting people with a criminal record. Many of these new laws have been influenced by a model developed by the Institute for Justice (IJ), a libertarian public interest law firm that has been litigating and lobbying to reduce barriers to work for more than two decades. In turn, states like Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee and Wisconsin have built upon IJ's model to enact even more progressive schemes intended to ensure that people with the requisite professional qualifications will not be unfairly excluded based on a record of arrest or conviction. Now IJ has incorporated many of these progressive refinements into its original model licensing law, the Occupational Licensing Review Act (OLRA), and broken out the provisions relating to criminal records into a free-standing model act specifically directed at managing collateral consequences in the occupational licensing context, the new Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act (CCOLA). The CCOLA has the same key features as the original OLRA: It provides individuals with an opportunity to seek a preliminary determination from the licensing agency as to whether their criminal record will be disqualifying; It allows the individual to seek this determination at any time, including before investing in the required training necessary to otherwise qualify for the license, requires a written decision within 90 days, and limits what the agency may charge for this determination to $100; It limits the types of records that an agency may consider in a licensing decision to convictions of serious or violent crimes; It shifts the burden of proof to the agency to establish that a petitioner’s conviction is substantially related to the state’s interest in protecting public safety; It requires agencies to provide written reasons justifying denial of a license based on conviction in terms of public safety; and It requires each agency to publish a report annually on the number of applicants with a criminal record seeking a license, the number of approvals and denials, and the type of offenses for each type of action. In addition to these features, IJ has recently further clarified the types of criminal conduct that may be considered in licensing decisions, and specifically prohibited the use of vague criteria like "good moral character" as a basis for exclusion. As revised, IJ's model laws now provide that licensing agencies may not consider non-conviction records, juvenile adjudications, non-violent misdemeanors, and most felonies and violent misdemeanors that occurred more than three years prior to seeking licensure. See CCOLA, 100.02, Subd. 7. Agencies may consider violent felonies and sexual offenses at any time, although even these records must still be tested against the "public safety" standard: The board may deny the petition only if it establishes by clear and convincing evidence that: 1. The individual was convicted of a felony or violent misdemeanor, not excluded by subdivision 7, which is directly, substantially and adversely related to the state's interest in protecting public safety; and 2. The granting of state recognition will put the individual in a position where the individual is more likely than not to reoffend and cause harm. See CCOLA, 100.02, Subd 10(c). IJ's website points out that "[m]ore than 25 percent of workers need a government-issued license to work," so lowering barriers to licensure for people with a criminal record has important implications for efficiency and public safety. In introducing its stand-alone CCOLA model, IJ’s website states the following: An honest living is one of the best ways to prevent those with a criminal record from re-offending. But many occupational licensing laws block or burden ex-offenders from entering regulated fields. Numerous licensing laws have morality clauses that (1) bar automatically and permanently ex-offenders from working without any individualized review or (2) require the ex-offender to prove a negative—that the ex-offender’s past crimes will not cause him to harm customers in the future. Such provisions ironically may decrease public safety. States with prohibitions and high burdens on entry have higher criminal recidivism. Conversely, states that have no such bars and low burdens have seen declines in recidivism, according to Professor Stephen Slivinski’s landmark study Turning Shackles into Bootstraps. IJ’s website surveys some of the key provisions of many of the recently enacted state licensing reforms. It also very happily links to the relevant 50-state chart from the Restoration of Rights Project, which we very much appreciate! With an enrolled bill sitting on its governor's desk for action, New Hampshire is poised to become the 10th state to enact comprehensive licensing reform in 2018. In addition to Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee and Wisconsin, Arizona, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Wyoming have all just this year enacted new laws incorporating many of the features of IJ's model law. Illinois anticipated these states by six months when it significantly amended its licensing scheme to reflect IJ's approach in August 2017. We were pleased to be able to work with Lee McGrath of IJ’s office in Minneapolis in developing many of the amended features of the CCOLA, which have also been folded into IJ's broader model occupational licensing act. We look forward to continuing to work with Lee and his colleagues in months to come.
Wisconsin joins crowd of states regulating occupational licensure (4/30/2018) - On April 16, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker signed into law Act 278, making his state the sixth in the past two months to establish new rules on consideration of criminal record in the context of occupational and professional licensure. Effective August 1, 2018, licensing boards in Wisconsin will be prohibited in most cases from denying or revoking a license based on arrests or pending charges, and required to justify in writing any adverse action based on conviction. Boards will also be required to give applicants a preliminary determination as to whether a particular conviction will be disqualifying. Indiana, Arizona, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Tennessee have all recently enacted laws regulating how licensing boards treat arrests and convictions, in some cases with strikingly similar features, as described in recent posts here and here. The conviction-related provisions of the model occupational licensing law proposed by the Institute for Justice are reflected in almost all of these new laws, though many of them go even farther to discourage unwarranted discrimination affecting as much as 25% of the U.S. workforce. Act 278 puts new teeth into the provisions of Wisconsin’s Fair Employment Act that relate to occupational and professional licensing through a new subsection titled "Discrimination in Licensing." See Wisc. Stat. § 111.335 (4). A licensing agency will be required, before denying or terminating a license based on a prior conviction, to state its reasons in writing, including "a statement of how the circumstances of the offense relate to the particular licensed activity." An agency must also provide individuals with an opportunity to show evidence of rehabilitation and fitness to engage in the licensed activity. Moreover, "[i]f the individual shows competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and fitness to perform the licensed activity . . . . the licensing agency may not refuse to license the individual or bar or terminate the individual from licensing based on that conviction." In addition to any evidence of rehabilitation adduced by the applicant, agencies are directed to take into account the nature and seriousness of the offense, any "mitigating circumstances or social conditions surrounding the commission of the offense," the age of the individual at the time the offense was committed and the time elapsed since, and letters of reference by persons who have been in contact with the individual since. Negligent hiring protections are included for any firm that hired a licensee approved pursuant to an agency determination of rehabilitation. See Wis. Stat. § 452.139. Act 278 tightens provisions of current law that permit denial of licensure based on a pending criminal charge, or based on a juvenile adjudication, if the offense conduct is "substantially related" to the licensed activity, by adding a proviso that the substantial relationship standard will be met in this context only if the charge or adjudication involved a “crime against life and bodily security” or a crime “against children.” Like most of the other recently enacted occupational licensing laws, Act 278 requires agencies to make it possible for individuals to obtain a preliminary determination as to whether they would be disqualified from obtaining a license due to a prior conviction, a determination that is binding on the agency in connection with a formal application. A fee may be charged to cover the cost of processing. This provision comes straight from the model occupational licensing law proposed by the Institute for Justice, discussed in our post of April 18. Finally, each licensing agency must also publish on its Internet site a document indicating the offenses or kinds of offenses that may result in denial or termination of a license. The provisions of Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act are further elaborated in the Wisconsin profile from the Restoration of Rights Project.
More states facilitating licensing for people with a criminal record (4/18/2018) - Last week we posted a description of a detailed new Indiana law regulating consideration of conviction in occupational and professional licensure throughout the state. It now appears that this may represent a trend, as eight additional states have either recently enacted or are poised to enact similarly progressive occupational licensing schemes. New general laws regulating licensure are in place in Arizona, Illinois, and Massachusetts. Similar bills have been enrolled and are on the governor's desk for signature in Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, and Tennessee. Arizona's new 2018 licensing law follows on another law passed in that state in 2017 that authorized provisional licenses for individuals with a criminal record. Massachusett's new licensing law is part of a more general criminal justice reform bill. Delaware and Connecticut have also recently loosened restrictions on licensing for cosmetology and related professions. The licensing reforms in these states - and in several other states where licensing bills are less far along toward enactment -- seem to have been influenced by a model law proposed by the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public interest law firm. Key features of the Model Occupational Licensing Review Act as they affect individuals with criminal records are 1) to provide individuals with an opportunity to seek a preliminary determination from the licensing agency as to whether their criminal record will be disqualifying; 2) to require licensing agencies to disqualify only if an applicant has been convicted of a felony or violent misdemeanor, and if the agency determines that "the state has an important interest in protecting public safety that is superior to the individual's right to pursue a lawful occupation"; and 3) to require each agency to publish a report annually on the number of applicants with a criminal record seeking a license, the number of approvals and denials, and the type of offenses for each type of action. Disqualification is justified under this model law only if the conviction is "substantially related to the state's interest in protecting public safety," and the individual will be "more likely to reoffend by having the license than by not having the license." The federal government is also encouraging licensing reform: the U.S. Department of Labor is supporting a three-year project to assist states improve their general policies and practices related to occupational licensing, including those that affect persons with a criminal record. The project brings together 11 states to participate in the Occupational Licensing Learning Consortium. The 11 states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, Utah and Wisconsin. We are monitoring this legislative trend and will revise the state profiles and other materials in the Restoration of Rights Project as new laws are enacted.
New research report: Four Years of Second Chance Reforms, 2013-2016 (2/8/2017) - Introduction Since 2013, almost every state has taken at least some steps to chip away at the negative effects of a criminal record on an individual’s ability to earn a living, access housing, education and public benefits, and otherwise fully participate in civil society. It has not been an easy task, in part because of the volume and complexity of state and federal laws imposing collateral consequences. To encourage employers and other decision-makers to give convicted individuals a fair chance, some states have enacted or modified judicial restoration mechanisms like expungement, sealing, and certificates of relief. Others have extended nondiscrimination laws, limited criminal record inquiries, and facilitated front-end opportunities to avoid conviction. In partnership with the NACDL Restoration of Rights Project, the CCRC maintains a comprehensive and current state-by-state guide to mechanisms for restoration of rights and status after conviction. As a part of keeping that resource up to date, we have inventoried measures enacted and policies adopted by states in the past four years to mitigate or avoid the disabling effects of a criminal record, and present it here as a snapshot of an encouraging national trend. Summary of findings Between 2013 and 2016, forty-two states and the District of Columbia adopted significant reforms of various types. The most common of these reforms are ban-the-box laws and policies that prohibit employers from inquiring into an applicant’s criminal history during the initial stages of the application process. Twenty-one states banned the box in public employment, and eight (CT, DC, IL, MN, NJ, OR, RI, and VT) expanded their ban-the-box prohibitions to cover private employers as well. Expungement and sealing authorities were also expanded in a significant number of states. Arkansas, Indiana, and Minnesota enacted comprehensive new expungement/sealing schemes that grant many individuals an opportunity to have their records sealed from public view and/or rights restored for the first time. Additionally, California, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missouri all expanded existing expungement/sealing laws to make certain felonies eligible. Maryland, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota enacted entirely new authorities limiting public access to misdemeanor records. Another fifteen states expanded existing expungement or sealing opportunities, either to increase the number and type of eligible offenses and dispositions, or to broaden the protections afforded to, or rights restored by, an expunged or sealed record. Unfortunately, stiff filing fees in states like Louisiana and Kentucky will inevitably discourage people of limited means from taking advantage of these new authorities. Judicial and/or administrative “certificates of relief” were also made available in nine states for the first time. These certificates adhere to a “forgiving,” as opposed to “forgetting,” model of criminal record mitigation. The new certificates with the broadest application and effect are those in Ohio and Vermont, both of which are modeled after provisions in the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act (UCCCA) that authorize courts to completely remove specified mandatory collateral consequences imposed by law, allowing individuals to be considered for employment or licensing opportunities on the merits. Colorado's new "order of collateral relief" provides relief from mandatory consequences specified in the order, with exceptions, but is only available for non-prison sentences. The new certificate authorities in most other states either protect employers and/or other private entities from negligent hiring or retention claims based solely upon their agent’s conviction, or prohibit employers or licensing bodies from denying applicants “based solely upon” their conviction. The effect or availability of pre-existing certificate authorities were expanded in another three states. Another notable trend was the expansion of the effect and availability of deferred adjudication and diversion mechanisms, which allow individuals to avoid conviction altogether following successful completion of probation or other conditions. Five states (AL, CA, DE, GA, NJ) enacted legislation explicitly authorizing expungement or sealing of deferred adjudication records for the first time, while Colorado and Illinois enacted entirely new deferred adjudication authority. These programs provide a great benefit to those who can take advantage of them, but, in many states, prosecutorial control of these programs can result in disparate treatment and costly relief. >>View the full report below or download here<<
When collateral consequences drive the sentence: The David Becker case (9/15/2016) - In the wake of the Brock Turner case, a new controversy was ignited in Massachusetts last month when 18-year-old David Becker, a white college-bound athlete, received two years' probation after pleading guilty to indecent assault of an unconscious woman at a house party. As in the Turner case, many are outraged by a penalty they regard as too lenient and the result of white privilege. However, any perceived injustice in the Becker case may be less about an abuse of judicial discretion than about the limited ability of judges to mitigate collateral consequences. Critics of the decision may be even more concerned to learn that David Becker was not actually convicted of a crime. Instead, District Court Judge Thomas Estes accepted Becker's guilty plea and ordered a “continuance without a finding” (known as a CWOF) for two years while Becker serves a term of probation. If Becker completes the conditions of probation successfully, the charges against him will be dismissed and the record will be eligible for sealing. The fact that Becker was not convicted is significant because it allows him to avoid both registering as a sex offender and the numerous collateral consequences that would come with having a criminal record. As in most states, Massachusetts requires only those who are convicted of sex offenses to register, and sex offender registration obligations are imposed by operation of law at the moment of conviction. However, a Massachusetts court may choose to waive the registration requirements either upon a motion from the prosecution, or sua sponte if the sentence includes no immediate term of confinement. If Becker were convicted and a term of imprisonment were imposed, as prosecutors had recommended (and as many of critics of the disposition would have preferred), then he would have been required to register as a sex offender for 10 to 20 years, regardless of whether he served two days or two years. His educational, employment, and housing opportunities would all have been severely diminished, he would have suffered the severe social stigma reserved for sex offenders, and, at just 18 years old, his chances of leading a normal successful life would have declined significantly. Because registration would be imposed by operation of law, Judge Estes would have been powerless to mitigate those consequences. This was not lost on the judge, who addressed the severity and automatic nature of sex offender registration explicitly at Becker’s sentencing hearing. When the prosecution suggested that Becker could pose a risk to college classmates, Judge Estes interjected, saying: He’s not going to college if I adopt your recommendation. He’s going to jail and he’ll be a sex offender, and he’ll register for at least the next 20 years – I don’t think he’ll go to college at all. But the judge was also aware of the many other collateral consequences that would follow a conviction, even if probation were imposed and registration were waived. After acknowledging the persuasiveness of the of the victim’s request for leniency (in which she said she did not want to "be responsible for ruining his life”), Judge Estes stated: If I found him guilty at this point, it would slam a lot of doors. [] There have already been significant collateral consequences to simply being charged with the offense in the first place. (The consequences of being charged became even more apparent when the University of Dayton, the college that Becker was set to attend, pulled his scholarship after the controversy erupted, even though no judgement of conviction had been entered.) Under Massachusetts law, Judge Estes could only keep those doors ajar by declining to convict Becker. As in most states, Massachusetts judges have no authority to mitigate individual collateral consequences of conviction, so the only recourse available to a judge that believes the collateral consequences of a conviction would be too severe is to avoid conviction with a CWOF. If it seems that David Becker got off easy, it may be because Judge Estes' hands were tied when it came to crafting a disposition that addressed the collateral consequences Becker would be subject to. Deferred adjudication mechanisms like Massachusetts's CWOF were created specifically to provide defendants with a second chance, and they are essential tools in the administration of justice; but they are also blunt tools that are not necessarily appropriate in every situation and can result in “all or nothing” decision-making. If sentencing judges had broad authority to mitigate individual collateral consequences by ordering relief from mandatory consequences (as provided for in the latest revision of the Model Penal Code) or issuing certificates of relief or rehabilitation to address discretionary ones, then one can envision a judge in Judge Estes' position being more willing to enter a conviction and impose at least some jail time. Regardless of whether that would have represented justice for Becker, his victim, or the public, the ability to mitigate individual collateral consequences would have given Judge Estes much more latitude to craft a disposition that most would agree fit the crime. You can find more information about the availability of deferred adjudication mechanisms, including Massachusetts' CWOF, in our state-by-state restoration of rights guides here.
NH Supreme Court takes aim at federal felon-in-possession statute (3/13/2015) - In an important decision for firearms-related collateral consequences, the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on the Second Amendment to carve out an exception to the so-called federal felon-in-possession statute, declining to follow relevant federal court precedents. At stake is whether state or federal courts have the last word on the scope of the exceptions in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). In DuPont v. Nashua Police Department, the court held that a man convicted of a misdemeanor DUI, who as a result lost his right to possess a firearm under state and federal law, was able to avoid federal firearms disability by virtue of the restoration of his state firearms rights, even though he lost none of the traditional "core" civil rights (vote, office, jury). In order to get to this result, the court had to conclude that the right to possess a firearm is itself a civil right, whose loss and restoration under state law is sufficient to satisfy the "civil rights restored" requirement in 921(a)(20), thus creating a narrow but significant exception to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Logan v. United States. While the holding in DuPont applies only to a limited class of misdemeanants (those who lost and regained state firearms rights), the decision may be the opening salvo in a state backlash against federal efforts to define the scope of state relief recognized in 921(a)(20). Gregory DuPont's 1998 Massachusetts DUI carried a potential maximum prison sentence of two and a half years, thus rendering him ineligible, under both Massachusetts and federal law, to possess a firearm. In 2005, the Massachusetts Firearm Licensing Review Board (FLRB) restored DuPont's firearms rights, finding that he was "a suitable person to possess a license to carry firearms." In 2007, the City of Nashua (NH) issued DuPont a license to carry a pistol or revolver, and in 2009 the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) issued him an armed security guard license. In 2013, when DuPont applied to the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for a Curios and Relics License, a background check revealed that the 1998 state conviction was disqualifying under federal firearms law. As a result, the federal license was denied and DuPont's state licenses were revoked. The state trial court denied DuPont's appeal, reasoning that DuPont could not “be deemed suitable to possess a license to carry a pistol or revolver” because, “[u]nder applicable federal law, which New Hampshire must follow under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, [he] cannot possess a firearm.” The circuit court agreed, relying on Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007), to hold that because DuPont had never lost any of the "core" civil rights (vote, jury, office) he could not benefit from the "civil rights restored" exception under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). The court explained that the right to carry a gun "is a constitutional, not civil, right.” The state high court disagreed, relying on the Second Amendment to hold that Massachusetts' restoration of his firearms rights was enough to bring him within the "civil rights restored" proviso: The Sixth Circuit has opined that Heller “suggests that a handgun possession ban . . . might infringe a civil right.” United States v. Sanford, 707 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2012) . . . . In addition, the Supreme Court has referred, in an unrelated context, to the loss of the right to bear arms as the deprivation of a civil right. See Nat. Fedn. of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (noting that “[a]n individual who disobeys” a law passed under Congress’s Commerce Clause power “may be subjected to criminal sanctions . . . [which] can include not only fines and imprisonment, but all the attendant consequences of being branded a criminal: deprivation of otherwise protected civil rights, such as the right to bear arms or vote in elections”). The court reasoned that when Congress used "civil rights restored" as a touchstone for regaining firearms rights it meant that "by reinvesting a person with core civic responsibilities, the state vouches for the trustworthiness of that person to possess firearms (unless that right is withheld).” Thus, as the petitioner puts it: “The right[s] to vote, hold office and sit on a jury are simply surrogates for an underlying state determination/vouching for a person’s trustworthiness to possess a firearm.” We find it unlikely that Congress intended to credit the restoration of “core rights” as indicative of trustworthiness, but exclude the restoration of the very right at issue – the right to possess firearms – from the trustworthiness calculus. Cf. Coram v. State, 996 N.E.2d 1057, 1077 (Ill. 2013) (Karmeier, J., writing separately) (opining that “whether a person previously convicted of an offense constitutes a present danger with a weapon going forward, and whether that individual’s rights to keep and bear arms should be restored . . . , logically, should be the core question” instead of “quibbling over what rights irrelevant to that question have been restored, or, as some cases would have it, how many of those rights”). Put another way, 921(a)(20) reflects “the general intent of Congress to redirect enforcement efforts against firearms owners that have a demonstrated potential for serious unlawful activity.” The court quoted the Ninth Circuit's statement in U.S. v. Valerio that “[b]y contrast to the right to vote, no civil right could be more relevant to a felon’s future dangerousness than the right to possess firearms.” 441 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2006). The court therefore concluded that the “civil rights” contemplated by § 921(a)(20) must include the right to keep and bear arms, and that restoration of that civil right alone (if no others are lost) brings a conviction within the § 921(a)(20) exemption. It distinguished Logan by pointing out that, unlike the the defendant in that case, DuPont had received a "status-altering dispensation," a "token of forgiveness" from Massachusetts through the FLRB’s determination thatv his gun rights should be restored. As previously noted, the FLRB specifically found that the petitioner was “a suitable person to possess a license to carry firearms, and his right to possess a firearm therefore is fully restored in the Commonwealth.” Given our conclusion that the right to keep and bear arms is a civil right for purposes of § 921(a)(20), the petitioner has had one civil right “restored” in the Logan sense. Accordingly, we conclude that Logan does not exclude the petitioner from § 921(a)(20)’s exemption. Further, even though only one civil right was lost and restored, this was enough to bring petitioner’s 1998 conviction within § 921(a)(20)’s exemption, based on precedent holding that the exemption does not require a "full" restoration of rights. The FOPA amendment . . . exempted felons to whom the convicting jurisdiction extended a subsequent gesture of forgiveness, or partial forgiveness, by means of pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights. The theory was no doubt that such a subsequent forgiveness should be credited as an acknowledgment of rehabilitation or an affirmative gesture of goodwill that merited exemption from the firearms bar. . . . [T]he ultimate question is whether the state, by its “gesture of forgiveness,” has “vouche[d] for the trustworthiness of that person to possess firearms (unless that right is withheld).” . . . The gesture of forgiveness here – explicit restoration of firearm rights – vouches for that trustworthiness more directly than any other. In asserting a state's right to interpret the scope of the exemption in 921(a)(20), the New Hampshire court specifically declined to follow federal court decisions involving convictions for misdemeanor domestic violence, in which restoration of gun rights by itself was found insufficient to bring a prior conviction within the exemption. We decline to follow those cases. We conclude that our interpretation of § 921(a) better fulfills Congress’s purpose of “defer[ring] to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 37. Here, Massachusetts acted clearly and directly to remove the restriction the petitioner’s 1998 conviction had placed upon his civil right to keep and bear arms. We hold that Massachusetts thereby restored the petitioner’s civil rights within the meaning of § 921(a)(20).
State courts question mandatory lifetime sex offender registration (1/4/2015) - Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decisions in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) and Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), state courts are coming to different conclusions under their own constitutions about whether sex offender registration and notification laws constitute punishment for purposes of due process and ex post facto analysis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the most recent to invalidate mandatory registration requirements imposed on juveniles, but several state supreme courts have limited the retroactive application of registration requirements to adults under an ex post facto analysis. Juvenile registration requirements On December 29, 2014 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the state Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the use of an irrebuttable presumption of recidivism. See In the Interest of J.B., 2014 Pa. LEXIS 3468 (Pa. 2014). The court noted that "the common view of registered sexual offenders is that they are particularly dangerous," and that consequently registration "negatively affects juvenile offenders ability to obtain housing, schooling, and employment, which in turn hinders their ability to rehabilitate." Citing research demonstrating the difference between juvenile and adult offenders, notably where sex offenses are involved ("many acts of delinquency involve immaturity, impulsivity, and sexual curiosity rather than hardened criminality"), the court held that "individualized risk assessment, as used in other provisions of SORNA, provides a reasonable alternative means of determining which juvenile offenders pose a high risk of recidivating" so as to warrant their registration. Given that juvenile offenders have a protected right to reputation encroached by SORNA’s presumption of recidivism, where the presumption is not universally true, and where there is a reasonable alternative means for ascertaining the likelihood of recidivating, we hold that the application of SORNA’s current lifetime registration requirements upon adjudication of specified offenses violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing an irrebutable presumption. The Pennsylvania court joined the Ohio Supreme Court in invalidating lifetime sex offender registration requirements imposed on juveniles. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio, 2012) (invalidating on state and federal cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process grounds automatic, lifetime registration imposed on juvenile tried in juvenile system). Meanwhile, federal courts have persisted in upholding categorical registration requirements imposed on juveniles under the Adam Walsh Act. See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 234 (2012) (rejecting equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, procedural and substantive due process challenges against automatic, lifetime registration). On the general issue of juveniles being subject to registration and notification requirements, see Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 Hastings L.J. 1 (2013); Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm of Placing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the US, available at . http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/05/01/raised-registry; Stephanie Forbes, Comment, Sex, Cells, and SORNA: Applying Sex Offender Registration Laws to Sexting Cases, 52 Wm. & L. Rev. 1717 (2011). Adult registration requirements Adults have also caught a few breaks in state court from increasingly harsh registration and notification requirements. In 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a challenge to the state's amended registration law under the state's constitutional ban on non-remedial retroactive laws, finding that "all doubt has been removed" as to whether the state's law is punitive in character. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011). Earlier, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the increasingly onerous features of Indiana's law, including in-home visits by police and the requirement that registrants carry a personal identification card at all times, violated the state constitution's ex post facto provision. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009). See also State v. Letalien, 985 A. 2d 4 (Me. 2009)(more burdensome later-enacted registration requirement violated ex post facto); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry, 882 N.E. 2d 298 (Mass. 2008)(due process violation in failure to give man subjected to new registration requirement opportunity to show that he posed no risk). For recent examples of state court invalidation of registration requirements under state ex post facto provisions, see Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 40 A.3d 39 (Md. 2013); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1994 (Okla. 2013).* As in situations involving juveniles, federal courts have persisted in finding that registration requirements fail to qualify as constitutional punishment, even in their augmented post-Adam Walsh Act form. See, e.g., U.S. v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012). The state/federal duality is exemplified by the Alaska Supreme Court's 2008 decision disagreeing with the Smith majority's opinion that Alaska's registration law was not punitive. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008). For a discussion of constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and notification requirements, and other sex offense-related residency and associational restrictions, see Chapters 2 and 3 of Love, Roberts & Klingele, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction: Law, Policy & Practice (2013). Wayne Logan will shortly be posting his new article on relief from registration requirements, discussed in an earlier post here. *NOTE: See also Doe v. New Hampshire, ___ N.H. ___ , No. 2013-496 (2015)(lifetime-registration-without-review provision of state law, pursuant to which petitioner was denied public housing, made requirement punitive for ex post facto purposes; the requirement could be enforced against petitioner only if he was promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he was permitted to demonstrate that he no longer posed a risk sufficient to justify continued registration.)
How risky is pardoning? Not as risky as committing uninformed journalism (12/15/2014) - An AP story about the perils of pardoning, picked up by newspapers and media outlets across the country, manages to convey three pieces of misinformation in its very first sentence. Riffing off a recent high profile pardon application, it begins like this: "Mark Wahlberg's plea for a pardon has focused fresh attention on excusing criminal acts - something governors rarely do because it's so politically risky." But pardons do not "excuse" crimes, they forgive them; governors have been pardoning more and more generously in recent years; and pardoning, like any other government program involving personal participation by a high profile elected official, is generally not risky if done in a responsible manner with good staff support and without apology. The AP article (Steve LeBlanc, "Wahlberg Plea Underscores Risk of Issuing Pardons") supports its tired "politically risky" thesis with three examples from the last twenty years of governors' pardons gone bad: two involve bad staffing, and the third dubious causality. (Mr. LeBlanc could have found plenty more examples of poor pardon staffing resulting in executive embarrassment in the recent annals of presidential pardoning.) The article does not mention that Massachusetts is one of only a handful of states whose governors have stubbornly refused to use their beneficent executive power even in the most sympathetic cases. It fails to see any irony in Governor Patrick's delay in acting on expanded criteria for issuing pardons he announced almost a year ago. It also does not mention that pardoning has been alive and well for some time in more than a dozen states, and has enjoyed a renaissance under current governors in Illinois and California. While former Maryland governor Robert Ehrlich is no longer the only responsible living pardoner in the country, as this writer once proposed, he certainly has the right idea about pardon being "part of the job" for any governor. Ehrlich has embarked on a commendable campaign to educate governors to this idea. It would be nice if more members of the working press were interested in encouraging responsible executive action instead of using misinformation to discourage it. At least the editorial pages seem to have figured it out.