At long last I have released the 2015 edition of my online guide to relief from a criminal conviction in North Carolina. This free guide, available here from the UNC School of Government, covers the various forms of relief available under North Carolina law, including expunctions, certificates of relief, petitions to restore firearm rights and terminate sex offender registration obligations, and other procedures. It includes changes made by the North Carolina General Assembly through the end of its 2015 legislative session.
This edition of the guide is longer, reflecting the greater attention given by the North Carolina General Assembly to this area of law in recent years. North Carolina law now authorizes certificates of relief, patterned after the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act. North Carolina also has expanded the opportunities to obtain an expunction.
Expunctions are now available for older nonviolent felony convictions. Recent statutory changes prohibit public and private employers and educational institutions from inquiring about expunged charges and convictions and, further, require government agencies to advise applicants that they have the right not to disclose expunged information. People still must meet precise statutory criteria to be eligible for relief, however. Although North Carolina courts granted approximately 13,000 expunctions of dismissals in fiscal year 2013–14, they granted about 700 expunctions of convictions and other matters. See 2014 Expunctions Report [NCAOC and DOJ Joint Report Pursuant to G.S. § 15A-160] (Sept. 1, 2014) (providing data on expunctions from 2008 to 2014).
On October 8, a former chief judge of the Eastern District of New York held that he was “constrained by controlling precedent” to deny the expungement petition of a woman who feared that her 23-year-old fraud conviction would prevent her from obtaining a nurse’s license. See Stephenson v. United States, No. 10-MC-712. Judge Raymond Dearie declined to find the “extreme circumstances” warranting expungement under Second Circuit precedent, noting that the petitioner before him was fully employed and that her aspiration to become a nurse was realistic, in light of the protection afforded her by New York’s nondiscrimination laws. He proposed that his own willingness to certify her rehabilitation could help satisfy the “good moral character” standard for a nursing license. (Could this be the sort of “certificate of rehabilitation” contemplated by Judge John Gleeson in his second Jane Doe expungement case? If so, it would seem to require no specific statutory authority for him to issue it to an individual he sentenced, no matter how long ago.)
Judge Dearie contrasted the case before him with the one in which Judge Gleeson ordered expungement in May, where the petitioner’s criminal record was having “a dramatic adverse impact on her ability to work,” citing Jane Doe I at *5. The government has appealed Judge Gleeson’s expungement order.
Joe Palazzolo has posted at the Wall Street Journal Blog an article describing an amicus brief filed yesterday in United States v. Jane Doe (Jane Doe II), one of two federal expungement cases before Judge John Gleeson that we’ve been following. Argument in Jane Doe II is now scheduled for October 26. (The government has appealed Judge Gleeson’s May 21 expungement order in Jane Doe I to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.) The brief begins like this:
This Court invited the views of Amica on the Court’s authority to issue “a certificate of rehabilitation in lieu of expungement” and the appropriateness of issuing such a certificate in this case. While there is no federal statute that authorizes a court to issue relief styled as a “certificate of rehabilitation,” Amica wishes to bring to the Court’s attention two mechanisms, each perhaps underappreciated but with deep historical roots, by which the Court may recognize an individual’s rehabilitation and otherwise address issues such as those raised by petitioner’s case. The first is by exercising its statutory authority to issue a writ of audita querela, which is available in extraordinary circumstances under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651, to grant a measure of relief from the collateral consequences of conviction. The second is by recommending to the President that he grant clemency.
The blog post describing the brief is reprinted in full after the jump.
The Justice Department has decided to pursue its appeal of Judge John Gleeson’s May 21 order expunging the conviction of a woman who could not keep a job because of her criminal record. Its brief in U.S. v. Doe (Jane Doe I) can be accessed here.
Meanwhile, briefing is underway in Judge Gleeson’s second expungement case (Jane Doe II), in which he has also asked the parties and a “policy expert” to advise him on his authority to issue a “certificate of rehabilitation.” Judge Gleeson commented to the New York Times on the general problem of collateral consequences:
“As a society we really need to have a serious conversation on this subject of people with convictions’ never being able to work again,” Judge Gleeson wrote in an email. “A strong argument can be made that the answer to this problem should be more systemic, through legislation, not on a case-by-case basis in individual judges’ courtrooms.”
Petitioner’s brief in Jane Doe II is due on October 5, the brief of the “policy expert” is due on October 8, and argument has been scheduled for October 15. The government’s brief is here, and briefs of petitioner and amicus will be posted here when filed.
An article from The Marshall Project published on September 17 got us thinking about the elusive term “expungement” and what it really means, both functionally and philosophically. In “Five Things You Didn’t Know About Clearing Your Record: A primer on the complicated road to expungement,“ Christie Thompson describes an unusual class action lawsuit recently filed by a public-spirited lawyer in a Tennessee county court seeking “to have the case files destroyed for hundreds of thousands of arrests and charges that never resulted in a conviction.” She proceeds to point out some of the pros and cons of expungement relief, including that expunged records may still be available from private background screening companies or the internet.
But the problems with expungement laws are deeper than the article suggests. Quite apart from theoretical objections to relief based on pretense, the fact is that expungement laws have functional flaws even where public records are concerned. For example, the Tennessee expungement law described in the Marshall Project article has no effect on records in the possession of law enforcement or prosecutors, or on appellate court records and opinions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-32-101(b)(1). Moreover, it authorizes release of expunged arrest histories of a defendant or potential witness in a criminal proceeding to an attorney of record in the proceeding upon request. See § 40-32-101(c)(3).
What relief is available for people with a federal conviction who cannot find or keep a job? Part of the answer may soon be found in two cases from Brooklyn that raise the question whether a federal judge has the power to expunge a conviction whose validity is conceded. In the first case, U.S. v. Jane Doe (Jane Doe I), the Justice Department has appealed Judge John Gleeson’s May 21 expungement order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In the second case, also styled U.S. v. Jane Doe (Jane Doe II), Judge Gleeson asked the Department to brief the issue of his authority to expunge. He also asked the government to advise whether he has authority to “enter a certificate of rehabilitation in lieu of expungement.” The government has now delivered its answer, and it is “No” to both questions.
The government’s brief is fairly predictable. On the expungement issue, it argues that federal courts have no “ancillary jurisdiction” to expunge the record of a lawful conviction, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). As to the court’s authority to issue a certificate of rehabilitation, the government appears to assume that Judge Gleeson was referring to one of the certificates provided for under New York law, and relies on cases holding that a federal court cannot grant relief under a state law. One clue that this was not what Judge Gleeson had in mind might have been that neither of the New York certificates is called that (though they are considered evidence of rehabilitation), and that the only mention of a certificate of rehabilitation in federal law (Rule of Evidence 609(e)) is generic. Another clue is that no federal court that we know of has ever attempted to grant state relief to a federal offender (with the exception of a few assimilative crimes cases), indicating that the law on this issue is too clear to tempt even even the most creative jurist.
The petitioner’s brief is now due on October 5. The expert’s brief is likely to be due a day or two afterwards. No date has yet been set for oral argument.
For those following developments in the federal expungement case currently pending before Judge John Gleeson in the Eastern District of New York, Jane Doe v. United States (Jane Doe II), the following order was entered by the court on August 6:
ORDER: Margaret Love, a nationally-recognized authority on collateral consequences and co-author of the treatise Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction: Law, Policy and Practice (NACDL/West 2013), is respectfully invited to submit an amicus brief addressing the issues raised in my July 28, 2015 Order (i.e., the authority of the court to enter a certificate of rehabilitation and the appropriateness of doing so in this case) as well as any other matters that may be relevant to the adjudication of defendant’s motion.
The government’s brief is due on August 28, and petitioner’s brief is due September 11. Argument is scheduled for September 18. Meanwhile, no briefing schedule has yet been set in the appeal of Judge Gleeson’s May 21 expungement order in the first Jane Doe case.
Visitors to this site are familiar with the expungement order issued by Federal District Judge John Gleeson on May 21. See Jane Doe v. United States, now on appeal to the Second Circuit. A second Jane Doe, a codefendant of the first, applied for expungement on June 23, and on June 29 Judge Gleeson ordered the government to show cause on or before August 28 why her application should not be granted. A hearing has been scheduled for September 18.
Yesterday the Judge issued a new order directing the government to include in its briefing “its view as to whether I have authority to enter a certificate of rehabilitation in lieu of expungement, and if so, the appropriateness of entering such a certificate in this case.”
The REDEEM Act currently in committee in the U.S. Senate provides the first authority for “sealing” federal criminal records since the repeal of the Youth Corrections Act in 1984. As we described in an earlier post, the Act would provide significant relief from many of the collateral consequences imposed on those with a federal rap sheet. But the Act’s limitation on eligibility to “nonviolent” crimes, together with its corresponding restriction on consideration of state priors, threaten to undermine the Act’s beneficent purpose — not simply by categorically excluding many deserving individuals from relief, but also by inviting endless wrangling over which particular individuals are deserving.
Increasingly, scholars and advocates are questioning the glib and thoughtless distinction politicians have for years drawn between violent and non-violent crimes for purposes of sentencing. The unfairness of categorically excluding all offenses falling within a broad definition of violence, without regard to how long ago the conduct occurred or how minor, is compounded when the record sought to be sealed did not result in a conviction.
But perhaps the most persuasive reason for federal lawmakers to junk the distinction between violent and nonviolent offenses is a practical one, since it is frequently impossible to determine if a particular federal crime is violent or not, as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States demonstrates. If the distinction must be retained, definitions need to be clarified lest disputes over coverage result in few people actually getting relief. The good news is that the necessary fix is a simple one: rather than defining vaguely which offenses are eligible for sealing, the REDEEM Act should define precisely which offenses are not.
We start with a description of the REDEEM Act’s eligibility criteria, then show why they will give the government an opportunity to frustrate the Act’s intent. Indeed, a wag has described them as catnip for the litigious.